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CHAPTER 14 
Constitutional Law 
STUDENT. CoMMENTS 
§14.1. Political advertising in newspapers: Unconstitutionality of 
legislative compulsion to publish: Opinion of the Justices to the Senate.1 
The 1973 Massachusetts legislative session yielded evidence of an increas-
ing desire on the part of the General Court to regulate the political 
advertising policies of newspapers during election campaigns. Proposed 
legislation in the form of a bill, House Doc. No. 3460, would have re-
quired that a newspaper or magazine, which circulates among the general 
public, print all paid election advertising if it had previously published 
paid advertising relating to the same election campaign.2 Although the 
bill was apparently designed to provide for a right to reply with a re-
sponsive paid newspaper advertisement, the bill was drafted so as to 
require publication of any political advertising if the newspaper or 
§ 14.1 1 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1061, 298 N.E.2d 828. 
2 197!1 Mass. Legis. Doc., House No. !1460 [hereinafter cited as House Doc. No. 8460] 
provides: 
If the owner, editor, publisher or agent of a newspaper or other periodical of 
general circulation publishes any paid political advertisement designed or tending 
to aid, injure or defeat any candiate for public or political office or any position 
with respect to a question to be submitted to the voters, he shall not refuse to 
publish any paid political advertisement tending to aid, injure or defeat any other 
candidate for the same public or political office or any other position with respect 
to the same question to be submitted to the voters in the primary or election 
unless such publication would violate section forty-two or any other provision of 
this chapter. 
Whoever refuses to comply with this section may be ordered to comply there-
with in a suit in equity commenced by any· aggrieved candidate or other person 
or persons and shall forfeit to him or them not less than one hundred dollars. 
The court may award such additional damages as it may deem proper, together 
with costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. · 
The owner, editor, publisher or agent of a newspaper for other periodical of 
general circulation shall not charge for the publication of any paid political 
advertisement an amount greater than the local display rate charged for a paid 
nonpolitical advertisement offered under similar circumstances and of comparable 
size, complexity, and location in the same edition or issue of such newspaper or 
periodical. 
A candidate_ or other person or persons aggrieved by a violation of this section 
may recover treble the differential between the amount charged and the amount 
that should have been charged, plus court costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
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magazine had printed any other advertisement relating to the same elec-
tion campaign, although the second advertisement supports the first one.s 
Although the bill failed to pass the Massachusetts Legislature,4 it raised 
such important freedom of the press issues that the Legislature, before 
final action was taken, requested a constitutional analysis of the proposal 
from the Supreme Judicial Courtli in the form of an Advisory Opinion of 
the Justices to the Senate.6 The advice of the Justices, that the bill would 
be unconstitutional if enacted, may have induced the Legislature's sub-
sequent refusal to pass it.'f Although the Advisory Opinion adjudicates no 
case and holds no value as precedent,s it raises important questions con-
cerning the constitutional power of the Commonwealth to impose, 
through the legislative process, a duty upon the press to provide a paid 
access to a publication as a forum for election debate. 
In rendering its Advisory Opinion, the Justices of the Supreme Judicial 
Court sought to answer the specific question whether a state legislature 
may compel the press to publish paid election advertising without violat-
ing the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,9 
which guarantees the "freedom of the press." In advising that such a 
regulation would be unconstitutional under the First Amendment, the 
Justices rendered an opinion without the benefit of a particular fact 
situation to which the merits of arguments advanced in favor of the bill's 
constitutionality could have been applied. The absence of facts places 
the Justices' opinion in a theoretical context. Thus, it is hoped an ex-
tended analysis will demonstrate the significance of the issue of whether 
the constitutionality of House Doc. No. 3460 can be justified in an effort 
to balance the First Amendment right of newspapers to publish without 
editorial restriction with the public's First Amendment right of access 
to the press.10 
This comment will initially focus upon the provisions of the proposed 
8 See House Doc. No. MOO. 
4 House Doc. No. MOO contained two sections. Enactment of the first section, which 
would have required publication of paid election advertising, was defeated by a floor 
vote in the Legislature. The second section, which would have regulated the price of 
paid election advertising, was enacted by the Legislature which then failed to override 
the Governor's veto of that enactment. 1973 Mass. Legis. Rec. 266A (Nov. 30, 1973). 
II Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. 2 imposes an obligation upon the Supreme Judicial 
Court to give advisory opinions to the other branches of state government. See also 
Answer of the Justices to the Senate, 358 Mass. 833, 835, 276 N.E.2d 694 (1970). 
6 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1061, 298 N.E.2d 828. 
7 1973 Mass. Legis. Rec. 266A (Nov. 30, 1973). 
s See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate and House of Representatives, 341 
Mass. 738, 748, 167 N.E.2d 745, 750 (1960). 
9 U.S. Const. amend. I states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibition the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or the press .... " 
10 See generally Barron, Access to the Press-a New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. 
L Rev. 1641 (1967). 
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legislation and the Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court. 
Secondly, background for a consideration of the constitutional issues will 
be provided by means of an analysis of the newspaper's duty to the ad-
vertising public at common law. Next, this common law duty of news-
papers to the advertising public will be contrasted with the constitutional 
argument that the contemporary newspaper's power to control the citi-
zens' exercise of freedom of speech through its advertising policies should 
be limited in some cases under the state action doctrine.11 Finally, the 
rationale and the limits of the constitutional power of government to 
regulate radio and television broadcast licensees will be analyzed in order 
to decide if that rationale will constitutionally support a government 
regulation of newspapers and magazines such as the compulsion to pub-
lish election advertising embodied in House Doc. No. 3460. In this way, 
this note will hopefully show the broader implications of the Justices' 
Advisory Opinion, which was rendered without application to a particu-
lar fact situation. 
I. THE BILL AND THE OPINION 
If enacted into law, House Doc. No. 3460 would have required that 
newspapers and periodicals offered for general distribution to the public 
publish paid election campaign advertisements under certain conditions. 
The election advertisements within the scope of the requirement fell into 
two categories: first, those advertisements addressed to any election for 
public office in the Commonwealth;12 and second, those addressed to 
issues to be submitted to the voters, such as referendums, initiatives and 
recall petitions. The conditions upon which the duty to publish the paid 
advertising would have attached were similar for both categories. Where 
the particular newspaper or magazine publication had previously printed 
any other paid advertising concerning an election campaign, it would 
have been required to publish any offered advertisement addressed to the 
same campaign. Where the publication had previously published any 
paid advertisement aiming to influence the vote on a ballot issue, it 
would have had to print any other paid advertisement on that issue ir-
respective of its position.ta 
The fact that the proposed bill mandated that a newspaper print any 
other advertisement would have permitted anyone, including individuals, 
corporations, political committees, or special interest groups, to submit 
an advertisement. The remedy available to the plaintiff whose election 
ad was refused would have included the right to compel publication 
through a suit in equity, and recovery of at least one hundred dollars in 
11 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. 
12 House Doc. No. 5460. 
11 Id. 
3
Vartain et al.: Chapter 14: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1973
§14.1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 509 
punitive damages, plus costs of the suit.u The publication's liability to 
the plaintiff would also have included "such additional damages as [the 
court] might deem proper.''111 · 
The first section of House Doc. No. 3460 may be termed the "compul-
sion to publish" element of the bill. This term refers to that type of regu-
lation of the press which requires it to publish material, rather than that 
type which seeks to restrict or censor what is published.16 An example 
of a presently enforced "compulsion to publish" is the federal statute 
requiring radio and television broadcasters to provide equal time for the 
candidate wP.ose opponent appeared over the station during non-news 
programming.17 A second example is the so-called "fairness doctrine," 
which is also implemented by a federal statute and which compels broad-
casters to air competing viewpoints on controversial issues of public im-
portance.18 Thus, the "compulsion to publish" present in the fairness 
doctrine defines "fairness" on the basis of the material presented. How-
ever, the "compulsion to publish" contained in House Doc. No. 3460 
sought not only to increase the fairness of the material presented by in-
creasing the variety of political opinion available to readers, but also 
sought to increase the diversity in the sources of that material. Thus 
House Doc. No. 3460 may be seen as a "compulsion to publish" which 
affects what is said as well as who will have access to speak. 
The second section of House Doc. No. 3460, which was passed by the 
Legislature but was killed by means of a veto by the Governor,19 sought 
to limit the price to be charged for political advertisements in newspapers 
and periodicals published in Massachusetts. It would have limited the 
price to that which the publication normally charged for non-political 
advertising of the same quality.20 Substantially similar price regulation 
of political advertising in the press has existed in many states21 and has 
not fallen to constitutional attack22 based on the First Amendment. The 
Opinic~m of the Justices found no constitutional difficulty with this price 
regulation, and upheld it as a valid business regulation.2a 
The primary issue with regard to the first section of House Doc. No. 
3460 was the constitutionality of the compulsion to publish mandate 
under the First Amendment. In advising that such a legislative mandate 
would violate the guarantee of freedom of the press contained in the 
14 Id. 
111 Id. 
18 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1065, 298 N.E.2d at 8!12. 
17 47 U.S.C. §ll15(a) (1970). 
18 47 U.S.C. §ll15(a)(4) (1970). 
19 197!1 Mass. Legis. Rec. 266A (Nov. !10, 197!1). 
20 House Doc. No. !1460. 
21 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1071, 298 N.E.2d at 8!15. 
22 Id. 
28 Id. 
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First Amendment,24 the Justices distinguished the compulsion to publish 
type of regulation from other forms of regulation of the press. First, the 
Advisory Opinion pointed out that this section of the bill, unlike the 
second section, was not a general business regulation falling incidentally 
upon a newspaper as a business operation. The Justices did recognize the 
line of United States Supreme Court precedent211 which holds that the 
press's constitutional immunity from government regulation does not 
insulate newspapers from reasonable legislative regulation of their busi-
ness practices, unless the regulation would result in a financial burden 
that would be likely to itp.pair the ability of the newspaper to publish.~ 
However, the Opinion pointed out that the compulsion to publish in 
House Doc. No. 3460, being a regulation of the content of the publica-
tion, was aimed at the editorial policy rather than the business policy of 
the publication. Admitt!ng that in certain cases the government may be 
afforded a narrow area in which to constitutionally regulate even edito-
rial policy, the Justices noted that this limited area encompasses only 
editorial policy which involves commercial speech21 such as help wanted 
advertisements,2s rather than editorial policy which involves the expres-
sion of political opinion: "However, when dealing with the First Amend-
ment rights, the Supreme Court of the United States has been tradition-
ally unwilling to uphold State regulation of political views."29 
The Justices also distinguished the compulsion to publi_sh imposed on 
broadcasters licensed by the federal government from one imposed on a 
newspaper or magazine publisher, whose right to print is not conditioned 
on the granting of a government license.so Noting the federal statutory 
requirement that broadcast licensees operate in the public interest,sl 
which requirement is implemented by Federal Communication Commis-
sion regulation of the editorial policy and the content of broadcaster pro-
gramming,32 the Advisory Opinion pointed out that at least four Justices 
of the Supreme Court of the United States have recognized that regula-
tions that are constitutionally permissible when applied to broadcast 
24 Id. at 1070, 298 N.E.2d at SM. 
211 See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 415 U.S. 576, 
585 (1975) (citing cases). 
26 See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 255, 244-45 (1956). 
27 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1069, 298 N.E.2d at 854. See also Valentine v. Chrestensen, 
516 U.S. 52 (1942) (handbill advertising a commercial service for profit is commercial 
speech not accorded full First A,mendment protection). _ 
28 See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 415 
U.S. 576 (1975) (finding no violation in a government regulation of help wanted news-
paper advertising promulgated in order to prevent job discrimination). 
29 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1065, 298 N.E.2d at 852. 
80 Id. at 1066-67, 298 N.E.2d at 855. 
81 47 U.S.C. §515(a)(4) (1970). 
82 The rule making authority of the Federal Communications Commission is provided 
by 47 U.S.C. §515(c). The rules are published in 47 C.F.R. 0.1-81.1. 
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licensees are not permissible when applied to newspaper publishers.aa In 
support of this point, the Justices reasoned that: 
The process of communication by printed word presents certain 
different considerations from those applicable to the broadcast media. 
The physical limitations inherent in the use of the airwaves have 
necessitated governmental regulation with the unavoidable result 
that, even assuming the financial capacity to do so, not everyone has 
access to the means of broadcasting his views.84 
Having used this reasoning process to conclude that the compulsion 
to publish within House Doc. No. 3460 was a regulation of political 
speech, the Justices then rejected the contention of the supporters of the 
bill that because the legislation may have provided the public with fuller 
and more balanced political advertising, it would have advanced the 
policies behind the First Amendment.a11 By subjecting publications to a 
burden of publishing an unascertainable amount of advertising and by 
providing for extensive potential liability8e for violation of the law, the 
legislation, in the judgment of the Justices, would actually have encour-
aged the publisher to refuse any election advertising and thus escape from 
the duty to publish the responsive advertisements: 
House No. 3460 presents a paradox because its enactment, instead of 
achieving a fairer dissemination of political advertising, may pro-
duce the chilling effect of discouraging newspapers and other affected 
publications from accepting any political advertisements. A news-
paper or other publisher of general circulation may decide to publish 
no political advertisements on an election issue rather than expose 
itseH to a commitment to publish all responsive advertisements.87 
In one area the Justices' opinion left open to speculation the actual 
breadth of their constitutional condemnation of the compulsion to pub-
lish. The Opinion stated that the almost unanimously accepted rule that 
a newspaper has the unfettered freedom to publish or refuse to publish 
advertising "might be different if the particular publication involves state 
action within the meaning of those words under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."BS However, the Justices failed to outline under what circumstances 
an application of the Fourteenth Amendment under the state action 
doctrine would permit governmental regulation of the press. The Opinion 
of the Justices did strongly disapprove of one argument advanced in 
sa 197S Mass. Aqv. Sb. at 1067, 298 N.E.2d at 8SS. 
84 Id. at 1066-67, 298 N.E.2d at 8SS. 
811 Id., 298 N.E.2d at 8SS-M. 
86 House Doc. No. MOO. 
87 197S Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1068, 298 N.E.2d at 8SS-!l4. 
88 Id. at 1064, 298 N.E.2d at 8!12. 
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support of the validity of House Doc. No. 3460, namely, that the compul-
sion to publish is justified by the need to counterbalance the " 'monopo-
listic' status of certain news publications"89 which might use their position 
of monopoly power to act as a private censor of the flow of political 
opinion through the advertising medium.4o 
It is submitted that a surface analysis of House Doc. No. 3460 could 
give rise to the inaccurate, but tempting conclusion that the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts has the constitutional power to prohibit what 
may be viewed as private censorship of the flow of political opinion to 
the public. Such an opinion is based on the principle that although the 
First Amendment prohibits only government censorship, powerful news-
papers are armed with a market monopoly,4t often encouraged by federal 
legislation.42 Supporters of such a position would contend that the use 
89 Id. at 1070, 298 N.E.2d at 885. 
40 See, e.g., Tornillo v. Miami Herald, 42 U.S.LW. 2075 (Fla. July 18, 1975), appeal 
docketed, No. 73-797, 42 U.S.L.W. 5519 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1975). In this case, the Supreme 
Court of Florida upheld the constitutionality under the First Amendment of a state 
"right to reply" statute. The statute requires newspapers to provide free space for 
candidates for public office who have been criticized in the news and editorial columns 
of the newspaper. The statute further requires the newspaper to provide space in the 
amount and quality of space used to express the criticism of the candidate. Fla. Stat. 
Ann., Title IX, section 104.58 (1971). The majority opinion reasoned that the statute 
would encourage fuller presentation of the election issues by giving the candidate an 
opportunity to respond. The majority saw the statute as a legitimate response to the 
monopolistic influence of the mass media over the right of the public to receive both 
sides of the issues. However, the Florida court did not consider whether the statute 
would discourage the newspaper from exercising First Amendment rights by imposing 
such broad duties upon the newspaper whenever matter "critical" of a candidate is 
published. Even though the United States Supreme Court may hold the statute uncon-
stitutional, such a decision would likely not determine the constitutional issue of 
political advertising regulation. The United States Supreme Court has noted that it 
will hear argument on this case. 42 U.S.LW. 5405 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1974). 
41 Statistics show that communities are increasingly becoming one-newspaper towns. 
J. Wiggins, Freedom or Secrecy 178 (1956). The author cites statistics: as of 1951, 85% 
of the 1500 American cities served by any daily newspaper had access to only one 
daily. Another 10% of the cities had aa:ess to two dailies operating under a single 
ownership. Id. The decreasing number of daily newspapers is indicated by the follow-
ing: 
U.S. dailies in 1909 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2,202 
U.S. dailies in 1955 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1,760 
U.S. cities with competing dailies in 1909 • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . • • • • • . . • • • • . • . . 684 
U.S. cities with competing dailies in 1955 • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . • • • • • • • • • 87 
U.S. cities with non-competing dailies in 1909 • • • • • • • • • • • . . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • 518 
U.S. cities with non-competing dailies in 1955 .•.••.•.••••••. , .••..•••••••• 1,!161 
Presently there are approximately 1800 dailies publishing in the United States. Massa-
chusetts has 54 dailies and 198 weekly newspapers reaching only 151 of the 551 cities and 
towns. Ayer Directory of Publications at VI (1975); Official Census of Massachusetts 
(1971). 
42 See Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. 11801 et seq. (1970). See discussion infra 
at notes 75-85. 
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by a newspaper of its editorial policy to decide what political opinion, 
in the form of election advertising, reaches the public is state action 
equivalent to government censorship.4S It would then be argued that a 
state may, in the exercise of its general police power, regulate such news-
paper conduct by enacting legislation like House Doc. No. 3460. This 
contention is also based on the belief that because such legislation aims 
at greater expression of political opinion, it would be furthering First 
Amendment values, although limiting the editorial freedom of the pub-
lisher. Although the Supreme Judicial Court did not accept this argu-
ment, it did not completely analyze its merits or discover its weaknesses. 
It is tempting to conclude that a state may regulate the press with the 
rationale that it is only limiting a quasi-governmental censor in order to 
further First Amendment values. However, it will be submitted that this 
rationale will not adequately support such a conclusion. In order to un-
derstand better the development and the weaknesses of the rationale 
supporting a compulsion to publish upon the press, it will be helpful 
to consider the treatment of regulation of the press at common law. 
II. THE CoMMON LAw DuTY OF THE NEWSPAPER TO THE 
ADVERTISING PUBLIC 
House Doc. No. 3460 would have regulated advertising policies of the 
press in Massachusetts only in the area of paid political advertising during 
election campaigns. A discussion of the common law duty of the press 
with respect to business as well as political advertising is important be-
cause it is this common law which would have been altered by the House 
Doc. No. 3460 compulsion to publish. With only one notable exception, 
the common law has protected a newspaper publisher's absolute freedom 
to accept or reject advertising at will. In that case, Uhlman v. Sherman,44 
a frustrated merchant brought suit against a local newspaper which had 
refused to print his advertisements while continuing to publish the ad-
vertisements of his competitors. In finding for the plaintiff, the Ohio 
court imposed a common law duty upon the newspaper to accept all 
offered advertising of a class which it generally printed. The court im-
posed an obligation on the newspaper to refrain from discrimination in 
allocation of advertising space, an obligation similar to that proposed by 
House Doc. No. 3460. In imposing the duty upon the local newspaper, the 
court in Uhlman placed newspapers acting as forums for advertising in 
43 For the purposes of this argument, both state governmental and federal govern-
mental action are included within the scope of the state action doctrine. See Business 
Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 651 n.l5 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
44 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225 (1919). 
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the category of quasi-public entities, which are normally subject to a duty 
to deal with the public without discrimination. Relying on evidence of 
extreme community dependence upon newspapers for advertising, the 
court refused to wait for the legislative imposition of the duty.411 
However, the Uhlman holding is clearly an exceptional view of the 
common law duty of the private newspaper. Courts have generally re-
fused to impose on newspapers any duties to the advertising public.46 
Even the fact that a newspaper's advertising policy may favor one adver-
tiser over his commercial competitor has not persuaded the majority of 
courts to agree with Uhlman.47 In Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald•s a 
merchant operating a dry cleaning establishment was refused advertising 
space by the county's only newspaper, which continued to accept adver-
tising from the merchant's competitors. The Supreme Court of Iowa 
refused to compel publication on the ground that a newspaper is a purely 
private business and not a quasi-public corporation, even if it were as-
sumed that the plaintiff suffered economic injury. Although a Michigan 
court in Bloss v. Federated J'ublications49 also recognized the harmful 
economic consequences to a movie theater owner who lost his customary 
advertising space in the area's only newspaper, it followed the Shuck 
decision upon the reasoning that the newspaper business is not affected 
with a public interest and thus not within the group of quasi-public 
corporations like transportation and utilities companies, which have a 
duty to deal with the public without discrimination. 
Although the issue was not specifically raised in the Shuck and Bloss 
cases, the judiciary does attribute some significance to the monopoly 
status of newspapers in the process of defining their duty to the advertis-
ing public. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court first spoke on the 
relevance of the monopoly status of newspapers in Commonwealth v. 
Boston Transcript Co.110 That case involved the validity of a state statute 
penalizing a newspaper which refused to print legal notices when directed 
to do so by the state minimum wage board. Because the Commonwealth 
failed to prove that there was such a scarcity of newspapers so as to justify 
requiring any one newspaper to publish the notices, the court found 
insufficient state interest to warrant interfering with the newspaper's 
freedom of contract: 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the public board 
did not have ample opportunity to print its notice in other news-
papers than that published by the defendant at the statutory price. 
45 Id. at 234. 
46 Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1286, 1287. 
47 Id. 
48 215 Iowa 1276, 247 N.W. 813 (1933). 
49 145 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. App. 1966). 
rso 249 Mass. 477, 144 N.E. 400 (1924). 
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It does not appear that there ... is any difficulty about procuring 
the adequate publications at reasonable rates. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, in the present state of civilization to imagine the exis-
tence of such conditions. It cannot be thought the Legislature acted 
on such facts.lll 
The Supreme Judicial Court refused to depart from the majority defini-
tion of the newspaper's common law status and place newspapers in the 
category of quasi-public entities whose freedom of contract is subject to 
pervasive legislative regulation. Nevertheless, its emphasis on the lack of 
scarcity of newspapers can be interpreted as an indication that, were 
there an increased monopolization of the market and consequent greater 
scarcity of newspapers, the court would be more willing to uphold a 
limitation on the newspaper's freedom of contract as contained in a 
statutory compulsion to publish. 
However, the increasing scarcity of newspapers in Massachusetts112 
has induced no change in the definition of their advertising responsibili-
ties under the common law of this state. In ].]. Gordon v. Worcester 
Telegram Publishing Co.,11s the Supreme Judicial Court upheld a 
demurrer to a cause of action based on the allegation that the defendant, 
who owned all three newspapers in the relevant market region, refused 
the plaintiff advertising space for his real estate business. In holding that 
there was no duty to print the plaintiff's advertising, despite the defen-
dant's monopoly, the Supreme Judicial court ignored its own dicta in 
Boston Transcript,M where it had implied that the quantity of news-
papers available is relevant to the nature of the newspaper's duty to the 
advertising public. Instead, the Supreme Judicial Court in Worcester 
Telegram relied on the common law rule, followed generally in Massa-
chusetts and elsewhere, that newspapers are not public utilities and thus 
are under no compulsion to deal with the public.ll11 The court reached 
this conclusion without even reaching a potential second line of defense 
for the newspaper-its constitutional guarantee under the First Amend-
ment freedom of the press. 
Though the common law cases have generally refused to impose upon 
the press a duty to refrain from discriminatory advertising policies, they 
have indicated that state legislative power was available to create such 
a duty. In ShuckG6 and in Bloss,~~'~ language in a prior Louisiana case was 
cited with approval: 
111 Id. at 484, 144 N.E; at 402 (emphasis added). 
112 See note 41 supra. 
118 M5 Mass. 142, 177 N.E.2d 586 (1961). 
M 249 Mass. at 484, 144 N.E. at 402. 
1111 M5 Mass. at 145, 177 N.E.2d at 587. 
H 215 Iowa at 1280, 247 N.W. at 814-15. 
liT 145 N.W.2d at 805. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/17
516 1973 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSE'ITS LAW §14.1 
The weight of authority is ... the publishers .•. are free to con-
tract and deal or refuse to contract and deal with whom they please . 
. . . And at any rate, it is for the Legislature, and not for the courts, 
to declare that a business has become impressed with a public use.l18 
In sum, efforts to curtail the editorial freedom of newspaper publishers 
through the development of a common law doctrine placing the news· 
paper, and especially the monopoly newspaper, in the category of a quasi-
public entity, have generally failed. Thus, the present state of the law in 
Massachusetts and in other jurisdictions would require legislative action 
if one desired to compel equality among those seeking to purchase news-
paper space for communication. 
As a result; the provisions of the United States Constitution have been 
cited to support the contention that the editorial freedom of newspapers 
can be legislatively curtailed in order to foster greater public access to the 
forums of communications embodied in the advertising pages of the 
press. Supporters of such a position have relied on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to show that the press has evolved into an institution in this coun-
try which, for various reasons, is not significantly different from the gov-
ernment; and hence, is an institution whose First Amendment freedom 
of speech can be regulated by the government in order to promote the 
First Amendment rights of the public. Although such an argument 
seems persuasive on public policy grounds, an examination of it on con-
stitutional grounds demonstrates important weaknesses. 
III. THE FoURTEENm AlllENDMENT: "STATE AClloN" 
AND NEWSPAPERS 
Although the First Amendment outlines government's relationship to 
the press, it does not impose upon a private newspaper any obligation 
to the public.118 However, when the press is operating as an arm of the 
government, definition of the press's obligations to the public is avail-
able without legislation, for the press is then subject to the prohibitions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment under the "state action" doctrine. In 
Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool, eo the plaintiffs were members of the 
Texas Bar who were refused advertising space in the official state Bar 
journal. They sought to purchase the space to en,courage fellow members 
to the Bar to participate in their political meeting at the annual Bar 
convention. The District Court for the Western District of Texas held 
that since the defendant was the editor of the official publication of what 
118 Friedenberg v. Times Publishing Co., 170 La. !l, 127 So. 345 (19!10). 
118 See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 
114-15 (197!1). 
80 !124 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Tex. 1970). 
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it held to be a state agency, and since he had published political ads for 
other persons, his refusal was discriminatory state action. The court held 
this a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,61 which forbids state gov-
ernmental abridgment of the First Amendment freedom of speech.62 
The Pool holding delineated a right of access to an organ of the press, 
which together with its corresponding compulsion to publish, would aid 
members of the state Bar wishing to use the Bar journal to reach their 
colleagues. However, such a right would seem to be of little aid to citizens 
refused advertising space by privately owned and operated newspapers, 
since the First Amendment prohibits only censorship by federal or state 
governmental action, and not censorship on the part of private entities.es 
Yet the merchant or political activist, like the lawyers in Pool, desire 
their advertising to reach a large and geographically dispersed audience. 
That type of audience makes the more traditional methods of communi-
cation such as handbilling, leafletting, and streetcorner oratory ineffec-
tive, and requires the use of newspapers, which are more effective in 
reaching the audience but less accessible to the speaker. Furthermore, the 
contemporary speaker often depends on the one or two newspapers that 
service the relevant market region. Whether the refusal to print his ad-
vertisement is made by private or official governmental publications, it 
is clear that the suppression of free and full discussion antithetical to the 
First Amendment goals64 is the result. A remedy is available where the 
publisher can fairly be said to be the government, but is not currently 
available where the newspaper has a private monopoly over access to the 
market. Because the result is the same whether the censorship is private or 
governmental, there is the temptation to argue that the state can legislate 
to prevent private censorship. Thus, supporters of that position seek to 
have such private censorship defined as governmental censorship by ref-
erence to the state action doctrine in order to place the private newspaper 
in the same category as is the state journal in Pool, and thus impose the 
duty not to discriminate among advertisers.65 
In Resident Participation, Inc. v. Love,66 an association of Denver 
residents, protesting the construction of a plant in their neighborhood, 
brought an action to compel publication by two local newspapers of their 
paid editorial advertisement. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention 
that state governmental payments to the defendants for printing of legal 
notices, state jury exemption for certain newspaper employees, and state 
permission for operation of newspaper vending machines on public 
81 Id. at 270. 
82 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
68 412 U.S. at 114-15. 
64 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 (1945). 
ell See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1641, 1669 (1967). 
88 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971). 
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property all amounted to such a state subsidization of the newspapers, 
which held a monopoly in the community, as to infuse their refusal to 
publish with the character of official state action. Although the defen-
dants were shown to have received commercial benefit from these inter-
actions with the state, the court held that neither the editorial nor busi-
ness policies of the newspapers could be fairly said to be so interconnected 
with the state as to place them within the scope of the Pool rule.81 In 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,8s the Supreme Court of the 
United States enunciated a test to determine when conduct by private 
entities becomes so interconnected with the government as to warrant 
holding that conduct to the same standard of conduct imposed upon the 
state government by the Fourteenth Amendment. There, the state of 
Delaware had leased part of the publicly owned parking facility it oper-
ated to a privately owned restaurant, which refused to serve the plaintiff 
because of his race. The Supreme Court found that the fact that part of 
the restaurant's revenues were channelled directly to the state as part of 
its rental arrangement, the fact of state ownership of the property hous-
ing the restaurant, and the benefit of patronage received by the restau-
rant's proximity to the parking lot all operated to create such a degree of 
governmental involvement with the operation and with the success of 
defendant's private activity as to make its discriminatory action tan-
tamount to state action.89 Because the plaintiff residents' association in 
Resident Participation, Inc. v. Love could prove no similar- degree of 
state power behind the newspapers, the court was unable to find any 
Fourteenth Amendment duty of the defendant-newspapers to accept the 
plaintiff's editorial advertising.To However, the Burton application of the 
doctrine of state action is not the only one that has been pressed upon 
courts as relevant to the duty of newspapers. 
It has been suggested that the monopolistic position of many con-
temporary newspapers is sufficient to warrant the application of the state 
action doctrine to them, especially where that monopolistic position is 
permitted or even encouraged by the state or federal government. The 
source of the problem of the plaintiff in Love was the monopoly which 
the defendant-newspapers held and the consequent lack of alternative 
newspapers available to the plaintiff when refused advertising space by 
the defendants. The relevance of this lack of alternative newspapers to 
the application of the doctrine of state action was raised by the plaintiff 
in Chicago ]oint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago 
Tribune Co.n There, the plaintiff argued that the monopolistic status 
of the defendant-newspapers in a field of great public importance, with 
8T Id. at 110!1. 
88 !165 u.s. 715 (1961). 
89 Id. at 724. 
TO !122 F. Supp. at 110!1. 
n 4!15 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 97!1 (1971). 
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a consequent lack of alternative forums for communication with the 
public, required the newspapers to grant the paying advertiser a right 
of access to their advertising columns. In Chicago Tribune, a labor union 
sought space in each of the four newspapers in Chicago, all owned by 
the three defendants. The union sought to publicize its version of the 
facts of a labor dispute. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants, relying on 
the Burton definition of state action. The court implicitly rejected the 
plaintiff's alternative argument that the monopoly status of the defen-
dant-newspapers in an area of public concern was itself a fact sufficient 
to bring the papers within the state action doctrine. 
Apart from the question of appropriateness of the use of such a 
standard [a monopoly in an area of public concern as equivalent to 
state action] ... if the monopoly is not one conferred by the State 
or does not involve the exercise of a quasi-governmental function, a 
question we need not here decide, it has no application in the 
instant case. Neither [defendant] enjoys a monopoly in the relevant 
area •.. .'11 
Thus, the court in Chicago Tribune did leave the implication that, 
although a newspaper's simple possession of a monopoly is not sufficient 
to trigger the application of the state action doctrine, its rejection ~f 
advertising might be held to constitute state action and a violaion of the 
Fourteenth Amendment on either of two grounds: first, that the govern-
ment has conferred the monopoly on the newspaper; or second, that the 
newspaper can fairly be said to be exercising a quasi-governmental func-
tion. 
Although the court in Chicago Tribune indicated that governmental 
conferral of a monopoly upon a newspaper could bring the newspaper 
within the scope of the state action doctrine, it was not until 1970, 
when Congress enacted the Newspaper Preservation Act,78 that the argu-
ment was raised that federal or state government is involved with the 
conferral of a monopoly upon newspapers. Prior to that time, federal 
policy was opposed to the monopolization of the newspaper market.'14 
This policy was evidenced in successful antitrust prosecutions by the 
United States against both news gathering agencies,111 and newspapers.76 
72 455 F .2d at 477. 
78 15 U.S.C. 1 1801 et seq. (1970). The Act exempted certain newspapers from applica-
tion of the federal antitrust laws upon specified conditions. 
'14 See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, ll94 U.S. llll (1969); Associated 
Press v. United States, ll26 U.S. 1 (1945). 
'111 In Associated Press v. United States, ll26 U.S. 1 (1945), the Sherman Act romplaint 
alleged that defendant association of newspaper publishers had ronspired to restrict 
commerce in the distribution of news and to acquire a monopoly over that business and 
the business of publishing newspapers by enacting bylaws prohibiting the sale of news 
14
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The 1970 Newspaper Preservation Act, by allowing newspapers to com-
bine under certain circumstances, has substantially ended the federal 
policy of using antitrust prosecutions of newspapers to remove those 
restrictions on the free How of information that result from monopoliza-
tion in the newspaper publishing industry. 
The Newspaper Preservation Act legitimizes joint-operating agree-
ments among newspapers which result in the removal of commercial 
competition but the maintenance of editorial competition among the 
papers. While the immediate aim of the legislation was to insulate from 
antitrust prosecution the twenty-two joint-operating arrangements among 
forty-four metropolitan newspapers,17 it also expresses a congressional 
awareness that the character of the contemporary marketplace imposes 
an economic limit on the number of newspapers that can survive even 
where the capital to begin the enterprise is available.78 The policy of the 
Act is to preserve the independent editorial voices of existing newspa-
pers,79 rather than to allow destructive commercial competition to de-
crease further the number of newspapers in operation. The legislative 
history of the Act indicates that Congress decided that removal of com-
mercial competition may be necessary to assure the survival of many 
newspapers and enacted the legislation in order to overrule the most 
recent Supreme Court affi.rmance80 of an antitrust conviction of two 
newspapers which had combined to remove competition between them.81 
It has been proposed that the exemption from antitrust prosecution pro-
vided by the Act to newspapers which have ended commercial competi-
collected by it to any non-member newspaper and allowing any member newspaper to 
prevent the membership of a competitor. Although the Supreme Court held the convic-
tion of the defendant in the lower court not violative of First Amendment freedom of the 
press. because it was a regulation of business rather than editorial policy, the Court 
also noted that the First Amendment does not operate to limit the government's power 
over the press where exercised to limit private interruption or censorship of the free 
flow of information. The Supreme Court pointed out that the First Amendment con-
ferred no antitrust immunity, where the interruption is caused not by individual 
editorial policy but by conspiratorial business policy. 
78 See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, !194 U.S. 1!11 (1969); 
77 H.R. Rep. No. 91-119!1, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. !1-4 (1970). 
78 Id. 
79 Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., !144 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 
1972). 
80 Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, !194 U.S. 1!11 (1969). A profitable Tucson, 
Arizona daily had contracted in 1940 with its less successful competitor to combine all 
plant operations and to establish a joint company to formulate and execute the common 
business decisions to be made for the two newspapers. The contract empowered the 
joint company to set prices for copies and for advertising space, to pool and redistribute 
profits, and to prevent officers of either newspaper from organizing a competitor. Edi-
torial and reportorial staffs and decision making authority were retained by each pub-
lication. However, the Court rejected the defendant's claim of financial necessity on the 
particular facts of the case, and upheld the conviction in the lower court. 
81 H.R. Rep. No. 91-119!1, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. !1-4 (1970). 
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tion and formed a joint-operating business arrangement works such a 
governmental assistance of, and interaction with, private entities as to 
bring these private papers within the scope of the state action doctrine.82 
In America's Best Cinema Corp. v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc.,83 
the defendant joint-operating company controlling the business and 
advertising policies of the only two local dailies, and operating under 
the antitrust shield of the Newspaper Preservation Act, established an 
advertising policy that would operate to compel them to refuse the plain-
tiff's movie ads. The court there rejected without comment the plaintiff's 
contention that the federal antitrust exemption so colored defendant's 
refusal of the advertising with federal law as to constitute state action 
abridging its freedom of speech.84 However, it is clear that the antitrust 
exemption afforded the defendant newspapers did not sanction what a 
single newspaper acting alone was prohibited from doing. Thus, since 
the common law previously imposed no duty to publish advertising on 
a single newspaper, the defendant-newspapers joint decision to refuse 
the advertising was protected by the exemption. The federal law con-
ferred no greater rights on the newspapers acting jointly than those 
possessed individually.811 Perhaps that is why the question was not raised 
as to whether there was specific governmental involvement in the chal-
lenged newspaper policy so as to set into operation the doctrine of state 
action. Such an argument, if accepted, could lead to a holding that those 
newspapers operating in a joint-business combination under the antitrust 
exemption, though not an obvious arm of the state, as was the state bar 
journal in Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool,86 would acquire the Pool 
compulsion to publish under the state action doctrine. However, it is 
submitted that not only is the nexus between newspapers operating under 
the Newspaper Preservation Act and the government insufficient to bring 
the doctrine of state action into play, but also that the very nature of the 
First Amendment protection of the press precludes the application of the 
doctrine of state action in this area. 
The second arguable ground for finding state action in a newspaper's 
monopoly, thus triggering a constitutional duty not to discriminate 
among prospective advertisers, is the "public function" application of the 
state action doctrine. The public function doctrine requires that where 
property, though privately owned, has become so dedicated to a public 
82 See Columbia Broadcasting 8}'11 .• Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 144-
45 &: n.l5 (1973). 
88 M7 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ind. 1972). 
84 Id, at 885. 
811 Id. at 8!14. The Newspaper Preservation Act grants the newspapers participating in 
the joint operating arrangement an antitrust exemption for those acts performed in 
concert which would be legal if performed by a single newspaper. See H.R. Rep. No. 
91-1198, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970). 
86 824 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Tex. 1970). 
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use,87 open to unrestricted access to the public,88 or put to a use to which 
governmental or public property is normally put,89 the property owner 
acquires the governmental obligation not to abridge the public's First 
Amendment freedoms of -expression. 
Rather than performing a function for which the government has his-
torically been responsible, the press's role has always been viewed as the 
forum for communication of its observation and criticism of govern-
ment.90 The founding fathers' great fear of government control of the 
press arose from this view of the role of the press in a free society.n For 
that reason the Sedition Act of 1798,92 which made criticism of govern-
ment officials a criminal offense, was universally seen as violative of the 
First Amendment.9B While the press is given protection in order that it 
can act as an independent source of information and discussion, the 
press's unique public function in this respect is far different from those 
functions that are public because they are within the normal duties and 
functions of state or federal governments. Since the press does not carry 
on a public function in the sense that would make it an arm of the gov-
ernment, the First Amendment rights of newspapers cannot be subordi-
nated to the right of the public to access to the press. Newspapers have 
their own freedom of speech,H and any regulation by the state limiting 
their editorial discretion, even as to advertising policies, constitutes a 
87 See Evans v. Newton, !182 U.S. 296 (1966). An urban park originally operated in a 
non-discriminatory fashion by the city in its capacity as a testamentary trustee, reverted 
back to private trustees, who then refused to admit black people to the park. The Su-
preme Court held that the park had achieved such a public chara~:ter and function 
while under city control that a mere reversion to private title did not remove that 
character. Thus, the Court held, under the Fourteenth Amendment state action doc-
trine, that the trustees could not discriminate on the basis of race. 
88 See Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 891 U.S. 
808 (1968). But see Uoyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
89 See Marsh v. Alabama, 826 U.S. 501 (1946). The appellant was a member of the 
Jehovah's Witnesses and was convicted under an Alabama anti-trespassing statute for 
distributing literature on the shopping district corner of a wholly-owned company town. 
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that private ownership of property 
does not empower the owner to eliminate freedom of speech where the owner performs 
what is normally a state or municipal function. 
90 See New York Times v. United States, 408 U.S. 718, 717 (1971) (Black, J., con-
curring). See generally Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 18, 19 (1941). 
91 See Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 J. Elliot, Debates on the 
Federal Constitution 561-76 (2d ed. 1861). 
92 Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, §2, 1 Stat. 596. 
98 See Madison, supra note 91, at 561-76. Madison specifically wrote: 
Let it be recollected, lastly, that the right of electing members of the govern-
ment constitutes more particularly the essence of a free and responsible govern-
ment. The value and efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the com-
parative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust, and on the equal 
freedom, consequentl:y, of examining and discussing these merits and demerits of 
the candidates respectivel:y. [Emphasis added.] 
94 See Mills v. Alabama, !184 U.S. 214 (1966). 
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governmental limitation of that freedom.911 Though the publisher's free-
dom of the press has been held subject to some limited abridgment in 
the area of commercial advertising,96 the Supreme Court has emphasized 
that the publication of paid political advertising by newspapers should 
receive full immunity from governmental regulation.97 It is this very type 
of advertising that the Massachusetts Legislature would seek to regulate 
by House Doc. No. 3460. It would be a twisted application of the state 
action doctrine to hold that the press, which under the First Amendment 
is free from government interference, can be rendered subject to govern-
ment interference by a determination that it is so closely intertwined 
with the government as to effectively "become" the government.9S Thus, 
it is submitted that the state action doctrine is not applicable to create 
a power in the state to regulate a newspaper's editorial policy because 
that would operate to abridge the paper's First Amendment freedom of 
expression. Though the Supreme Court has not yet specifically addressed 
itself to the validity of the state action doctrine as a means of imposing 
a compulsion to publish political advertising upon newspapers, it will 
be submitted that its recent refusal to apply that doctrine to radio and 
television broadcasters99 further supports this conclusion. 
Even if the state action doctrine were held an applicable means of legis-
latively limiting the First Amendment freedom of the press, it is sub-
mitted that virtually no institutions of the printed press have a sufficient 
nexus with the government that is required under contemporary stan-
dards of state action. First, newspapers are not property which is dedi· 
cated to a public use so as to have a quasi-governmental character. 
Whereas the public function branch of the state action doctrine has been 
applied to place limits on property rights, if that branch of the doctrine 
911 See New York Times v. Sullivan, !176 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). 
96 See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 41!1 U.S. 
876, !184-85 (197!1); Valentine v. Chrestensen, !116 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
97 In the New York Times case, the Court refused to deny the newspaper's First 
Amendment rights merely because those rights had been exercised in a commercial 
setting: 
The second contention is that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech 
and of the press are inapplicable here, at least so far as the Times is concerned, 
because the allegedly libelous statements were published as part of a paid, 'com-
mercial' advertisement. • • • 
The publication here was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense in which 
the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed 
opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support 
on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the 
highest public interest and concern. • • • That the Times was paid for publishing 
the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers 
and books are sold. 
!176 U.S. at 265. 
98 See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 1!1!1 
(197!1) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
99 Id. at 120-21. 
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were applied to newspaper publishers by the judiciary, it would operate 
to limit First Amendment rights. Such an application of the doctrine by 
the courts would not only be a perverted use of the public function theory 
of state action, but in itself might be prohibited because it would con-
stitute action by government abridging the publishers' First Amendment 
. freedoms.1oo Indeed, the public function theory of state action has never 
been held applicable to a newspaper. 
A second reason why newspapers fail to fall within the scope of the 
state action doctrine is that the antitrust exemption afforded certain 
newspaper combinations does not involve the government in the editorial 
policies of the press. Rather than seeking to regulate the editorial poli-
cies of the press and thus align the government with the press, the 
Newspaper Preservation Act aims to preserve independent editorial poli-
cies.101 Further, the legislation creates no more state-conferred rights on 
the joint newspaper operation than were held by the individual papers 
without the intervention of legislation. Whereas the State of Delaware 
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority received payments in rent 
from the private entity and owned the property operated for a profit by 
the latter, neither the federal government nor any state government has 
an equivalent financial or property relationship with newspapers. For 
those private newspapers having monopoly status without the antitrust 
exemption afforded by the Newspaper Preservation Act, the courts have 
been unable to find any relationship with government sufficient to argu-
ably put them within the state action doctrine.102 
That the state action doctrine is presently unavailable as a source of 
constitutional power for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to compel 
press publication of paid political advertising is clear from a recent 
decision108 of the Supreme Court of the United States holding that doc-
trine unavailable to require acceptance of political advertising by the 
broadcasting press--radio and television. 
IV. BROADCASTERS AND PUBLISHERS 
Unlike newspaper publishers, radio and television broadcast licensees 
have been held constitutionally subject to governmental regulation of 
their editorial policies, notwithstanding the First Amendment guarantee 
of the freedom of the press.104 These regulations, which embody the fair-
100 Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, liM U.S. 1, 19 (1948). 
101 H.R. Rep. No. 91-119!1, 91st Cong., 2d Seas. (1970). 
102 See Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune, 
4ll5 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 97ll (1971). 
10s Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (197!1). 
104 Compare Mills v. Alabama, ll84 U.S. 214 (1966), with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v. FCC, ll95 U.S. ll67 (1969). 
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ness doctrine,1011 are enforced by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, which decides the merits of broadcasters•too license renewal applica-
tions partly by the results of investigation into the broadcasters' past 
compliance with the fairness doctrine. The nature of the federal regu-
lation of broadcasters' editorial policy is analogous to that of the com-
pulsion to publish regulation of newspaper editorial policy which is 
contained in House Doc. No. M60. Radio and television broadcast licen-
sees are compelled to broadcast the opinions of opponents of political 
candidates who had previously been granted time to appear over the 
station,107 and are also compelled to broadcast the replies of victims of 
character attacks made over the station.108 The fairness doctrine require-
ment that broadcasters present "discussion of conflicting views on issues 
of public importance"109 imposes day-to-day editorial obligations on 
broadcast licensees as part of the fulfillment of their statutory duty to 
operate in the public interest.uo 
The constitutional power of the federal government to require that 
broadcasters operate in the public interest and to implement that re-
quirement by regulating editorial policies of broadcasters was upheld in 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.111 There, the Supreme Court indi-
1011 See 47 U.S.C. §Sl5(a)(4) (1970), where Congress expressed statutory approval of 
the fairness doctrine. In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 595 U.S. 567 (1969), the 
Supreme Court of the United States desaibed the editorial policy regulations contained 
fn the fairness doctrine: 
There is a twofold duty laid down • • • • The broadcaster must give adequate 
coverage to public issues ••• and coverage must be fair in that it accurately reflects 
the opposing views. • • • This must be done at the broadcaster's own expense 
if sponsonhip is unavailable. • • • Moreover, the duty must be met by pro-
gramming obtained at the licensee's own initiative if available from no other 
source. 
Id. at 577-78. 
108 47 u.s.c. §309 (1970). 
107 47 U.S.C. §515(a). This "equal time" rule does not operate to a candidate's benefit 
where his opponent had merely appeared on news programming. Id. 
tos 595 U.S. at 378. 
100 47 U.S.C. §515(a)(4) (1970). 
110 See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 519 U.S. 190 (1945), where broad-
cast licensees challenged the authority of the FCC to issue regulations barring from 
license renewal a broadcaster who had agreed with a network not to broadcast programs 
aired by other networks. The Supreme Court held that the FCC's duty to prescribe 
conditions for license renewal which will advance the "public interest, convenience, and 
necessity" was not limited to engineering and technological conditions but extended 
also to conditions affecting content of programming. The Court reasoned that if the 
allowable conditions for license renewal were limited to those based on the engineering 
capabilities of the license applicant, there would be no standards which the FCC could 
utilize to decide among competitors for the same license with equal engineering capa-
bilities. The Court consequently held that FCC regulation of the programming of 
broadcast licensees was an essential means of executing its duty to protect the public 
interest. 
111 !195 u.s. 567 (1969). 
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cated that the benefits accruing to the public from the creation of "an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately pre-
vail"112 outweighs the private freedom of speech rights of the broad-
caster.113 The Court reasoned that since the right to broadcast derives 
from the public, who owned the airwaves, the federal government, as 
proxy for the public, is constitutionally free to condition that right to 
broadcast upon adherence to defined editorial standards.114 Using a 
balancing test of the public versus the private interests in the broadcast-
ing medium, the Court stated that "[i]t is the right of the viewers and 
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."1111 The 
Court in Red Lion justified the governmental intervention into the 
broadcasting media by citing the need to allocate the scarce number of 
frequencies of the public airwaves among the many wishing to use them 
for communication. Convinced that government licensing of those 
granted the privilege to broadcast was a reasonable consequence of the 
scarcity of frequencies, the Court was persuaded that since the licensing 
of the few bars the many from the use of the media, the government may 
constitutionally require the few to operate for the benefit of the many:116 
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broad-
cast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an un-
abridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the 
right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.11T 
The Red Lion Court also justified the constitutionality of govern-
mental regulation of the editorial policies of broadcasters on the rationale 
that the specific FCC regulations, promulgated to benefit the public, 
actually advanced the policies behind the First Amendment guarantees 
of a free press. The Court reasoned that the federal government, by re-
quiring presentation of discussion of public issues, presentation of com-
peting opinions on those issues, and provision of airtime for· reply by 
victims of character attacks made on the air, was advancing the reality 
of a true marketplace of ideas11s and thus furthering, rather than hin-
dering, the implementation of the ultimate goal of the First Amendment. 
Thus it can be contended that the United States Supreme Court, if 
presented with House Doc. No. 3460, might find some merit in the policy 
112 Id. at 590. 
111 ld. at ll87. 
114 Id. at 589-90. 
1111 Id. at 590. 
116 Id. at 589. The Court pointed out that rather than conferring a monopoly over 
a particular frequency upon a licensee and conditioning the existence of that monopoly 
status on adherence to certain editorial policies, the Government could have decided 
to ronfer no monopolies, but to allot an equal portion of broadcast time to each in-
dividual desiring to use it. Id. at 590-91. 
117 Id. at 588. 
us Id. at 592, 594. 
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behind the compulsion to publish on the ground that it too sought to 
increase the presentation of competing opinion on issues. For if House 
Doc. No. 3460 was redrafted to prevent the newspaper from escaping a 
statutory duty to print additional election advertising by not printing 
any at all, the Supreme Judicial Court's objection that the legislation 
would actually discourage publication of election advertising119 would 
be overcome. In that way the proposed legislation would increase the 
dissemination of political opinions and advance the reality of the mar-
ketplace of ideas. 
However, it is precisely because the compulsion to publish seems ap-
pealing from the policy viewpoint that the constitutional issue must not 
be forgotten. The Court in Red Lion emphasized that it was the peculiar 
characteristics of the broadcasting media that gave the federal govern-
ment the constitutional power to impose these policies upon broad-
casters. No matter how beneficial and harmless the policy to be imposed 
upon newspapers is in the judgment of legislators and courts, that fact 
does not remove the issue of whether government has the power to im-
pose the editorial policy on newspapers. The Supreme Court gave ex-
pression to this view in the case of Mills v. Alabama,120 involving a state 
statute which prohibited election day newspaper editorials in order to 
effectuate a policy of assuring a sober intellectual climate during election 
day. The Court held that the First Amendment precludes governmental 
dictation of editorial policy to those who would speak or publish, even 
where the government's interest in presiding over the elections is in-
volved. 
Although the legislative history of the Newspaper Preservation Act 
indicates a congressional awareness of an economic limit to the number 
of newspapers available in any given market,121 there has been no argu-
ment that the newspaper publishing business, like the broadcasting in-
dustry, is a scarce publicly owned resource for communication, having an 
inherent physical limit on the number of persons able to express them-
selves through it and thus subject to governmentally defined duties to 
operate in the public interest. Indeed, it has been suggested that tech-
nological innovations, such as cable television, may remove the inherent 
physical limitation to the number of television frequencies available for 
communication.122 Such a change in the need for allocation of the re-
source of the broadcasting frequencies could necessitate a review of the 
constitutional power of the government to allocate the frequencies by 
licensing and to condition the granting of the license to a broadcaster 
119 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1068, 298 N.E.2d at 833-34. 
120 384 u.s. 214 (1966). 
121 H.R. Rep. No. 91-1193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1970). 
122 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 157-58 
& n.8. (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
22
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/17
528 1978 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §14.1 
upon the adherence to certain editorial regulations,128 Thus, if the in-
herent physical limit to the number of broadcasting· frequencies were 
removed, the constitutional power of the federal government to allocate 
the frequencies and regulate the editorial policy of the broadcasters 
might also be removed. Since there has been no argwP.ent that there is 
any inherent physical limit to the number of newspapers such as would 
necessitate government licensing, the rationale for the constitutionality 
of legislative regulation of broadcaster editorial policy would seem in-
applicable to newspapers. 
Thus, it appears that not only does the regulation of newspaper edi-
torial policy through legislation have little constitutional support, but 
also that regulation implemented by an application of the doctrine of 
state action is not constitutionally justifiable. Recently, the Supreme 
Court rendered a decision dealing with broadcasters which casts great 
doubt upon the validity of the state action doctrine as authority for the 
sort of regulation of political advertising policies of newspapers which 
was embodied in House Doc. No. 8460. In Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,124 it was held that the relation-
ship between the federal government and broadcasting was not of such a 
nature as would justify a conclusion that broadcasters' refusal to sell 
airtime for political advertising was tantamount to g(>vernment censor-
ship violative of the First Amendment.1211 While this case did not specifi-
cally refer to the rights of newspapers, an application of its holding to 
newspapers substantially weakens the persuasiveness of the argument 
that newspapers holding a monopoly over the market, whether or not 
conferred by federal legislation, fall within the state action doctrine so 
as to require that newspapers refrain froln discriminating among prospec-
tive advertisers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although Columbia 
Broadcasting spoke of the doctrine of state action in terms of the federal 
government and the First Amendment, its reasoning also applies to the 
doctrine of state action as applied to the states and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.126 In support of the argument that the government-broad-
caster relationship brought the broadcasters within the state action doc-
trine, Justice Brennan, in his dissent, cited four facts.127 First, the public 
owns the property, that is, the airwaves, which the private licensee is 
utilizing for its business. Second, the broadcasters' pri-Jilege to broadcast 
is derived directly from the federal government. Thir<!l, the success of a 
broadcaster's business is to a large degree a result of a 'government grant 
121 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 895 U.S. 867, 896 (1969). 
124 412 u.s. 94, (1978). 
1211 Id. at 119. 
126 See Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, -*50 F.2d 642, 651 n.l5 
(D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. 
Demoaatic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1978). 
127 Id. at 178-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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of a monopoly over his assigned frequency, rather than as a result of the 
operation of the free market. Finally, there is implicit government sup-
port of broadcasters' advertising policy, because the federal government 
pervasively regulates other aspects of broadcaster editorial policy but 
specifically refuses to regulate political advertising policy. Although the 
majority in Columbia Broadcasting assumed the validity of the justifica-
tions in Red Lion12B for the constitutional power of the federal govern-
ment to limit the absolute freedom of speech of the broadcast licensees,129 
it refused to extend Red Lion to hold that broadcasters "are" the govern-
ment and thus are constitutionally required to refrain from discrimina-
tion against prospective political advertisers.1ao 
The reasoning of the majority opinion of Chief Justice Burger rested 
on the Court's rejection of the respondents' argument that the federal 
government was a partner in the effectuation of the broadcasters' dis-
criminatory political advertising policy.l31 The Court noted that mere 
governmental acquiescence in the challenged advertising policy does not 
make the federal government a partner of the broadcaster with respect 
to that policy.132 This would seem especially true where it is clear that 
the broadcaster is not performing a quasi-governmental public function, 
but is a private entity with its own First Amendment rights, which are 
abridgeable where necessary to serve the public interest.133 Because the 
broadcasters have their own First Amendment rights, the Chief Justice 
indicated that the state action argument is inapplicable to convert the 
action of private entities into that of the state or federal government: 
[I]t would be anomalous for us to hold, in the name of promoting 
the constitutional guarantees of free expression, that day-to-day 
editorial decisions of broadcast licensees are subject to the kind of 
restraints urged by respondents. To do so in the name of the First 
Amendment would be a contradiction. Journalistic discretion would 
in many ways be lost to the rigid limitations that the First Amend-
ment imposes on government.1S4 
Both Mr. Justice Stewart185 and Mr. Justice Douglas136 wrote opinions 
expressing the potential danger in adopting a constitutional doctrine 
which says the broadcasters "are" the government. Both saw that this 
application of the state action doctrine would completely strip the broad-
128 895 u.s. 867 (1969). 
129 412 U.S. at 101-02. 
130 Id. at 114-15, 117-21. 
181 Id. at 117-18. 
182 Id. 
188 895 U.S. at 887. 
184 412 U.S. at 120-21. 
185 Id. at 152-88. 
186 Id. at 150. 
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casters of their First Amendment freedoms, since if defined as government, 
they would no longer qualify for that protection from government intru-
sion which the First Amendment guarantees.137 Such an application of 
the state doctrine would subvert the intent behind the ;First Amendment 
of insuring a press free from governmental control. 
Whether or not state action is a persuasive argument for requiring 
broadcast licensees to accept paid political advertising, Columbia Broad-
casting substantially destroys the persuasiveness of the state action argu-
ment to support a requirement that newspaper publishers accept paid 
political advertising such as was contained in House Doc. No. 3460. 
There is a much lesser degree of interaction between newspaper publish-
ers and government than between broadcast licensees and government. 
Unlike the broadcasting market, the newspaper publishing market is not 
inherently limited by physical elements. Further, there is no pervasive 
state regulation of newspapers which would imply a state approval of a 
newspaper's policy of refusing any paid political advertising from its 
failure to regulate this area. While a particular newspaper's monopoly 
status may be supported by the federal Newspaper Preservation Act, its 
editorial policies with respect to political advertising can in no way be 
connected with the government. Most importantly, newspapers, unlike 
broadcast licensees, are not required to obtain a government license in 
order to publish. The First Amendment grants newspapers a right, not 
a license or privilege, to publish, and this right cannot be conditioned 
upon adherence to governmentally defined editorial standards. Therefore, 
even assuming that the state action argument is applicable in the area 
of the First Amendment, that argument is especially weak when applied 
to newspapers.138 
V. CoNCLUSION 
At common law, newspapers have been viewed as purely private entities 
and have thus not been subject to a duty to allocate their advertising 
space in a non-discriminatory fashion. Although the judicial refusal to 
alter the common law rule and impose that duty has been made without a 
reliance upon or a reference to the First Amendment right to freedom of 
the press, such a reference is required where it is the state legislature that 
is proposing to alter the common law rule. The legislative policy behind 
the compulsion to publish paid political advertising in House Doc. No. 
3460 is not obscure. It is to encourage fairer elections more accurately 
reflecting public sentiment. The legislative instrument of implementing 
this policy is to provide a purchased right to express political opinion in 
137 Id. at 189, 150. 
188 Even the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Columbia Broadcasting agreed 
that the state action argument was inapplicable to newspapers. Id. at 181 n.l2. 
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the newspaper and thus provide for a greater amount and diversity of 
opinion that may reach the electorate. However, a determination that the 
particular legislative policy is desirable does not foreclose the need for a 
decision upon whether it has the constitutional power to mandate the 
policy. The unique aspects of the broadcast media that create the consti-
tutional power in the federal government to impose editorial policy upon 
broadcast licensees has been shown not applicable to newspapers and 
other institutions of the press, which do not derive their ability to publish 
from a governmentally conferred license or privilege. 
The argument that a legislature may impose upon the press a duty to 
publish political advertising by virtue of the state action doctrine is a 
weak effort to justify House Doc. No. 3460 and the resulting restriction 
on the press's freedom of expression. Not only is the nexus between the 
government and newspapers insufficient for state action standards, but 
the application of such a doctrine to institutions of the press would unite 
the government and the press when the First Amendment requires the 
two to be separate. Upon analysis of the state action doctrine, it is clear 
that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts lacks the constitutional power 
to impose editorial duties upon the press. The First Amendment, which 
seeks to assure an independent press, forecloses the use of a doctrine 
which says that the press "is" the government. Hence, the First Amend-
ment forecloses dictation of editorial policy to the press. If the Massachu-
setts Legislature has the constitutional power to dictate to the press what 
it shall print because the Legislature feels it is dictating a desirable policy, 
then it would have the power to impose any governmentally-desired 
editorial policy upon the press. 
MICHAEL J. VARTAIN 
§14.2. Incarceration in the Charles Street Jail violates inmates' con-
stitutional rights: Inmates of Suffolk County ]ail v. Eisenstadt) Plain-
tiffs, named inmates of the Suffolk County Jail in Boston (commonly 
known as the Charles Street Jail), brought a civil rights action2 in 
federal district court on behalf of all inmates of the institution against 
state, county and city oflicials3 alleging that their conditions of confine-
ment violated rights guaranteed under the First, Sixth, Eighth and 
§14.2. 1 560 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 197!1). 
2 This action arose under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §198!1 
(1970), which provides: 
Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or 
usage, of any state or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for reddress. 
s The named defendants were the Sheriff of Suffolk County, the master of the jail, 
the Commissioner of Correction for the Commonwealth, and the Mayor and the nine 
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Fourteenth amendments.4 Most of the inmates in the plaintiff class were 
pretrial detainees, II men and women who had not been convicted of 
a crime but who were unable to post bail or were charged with a non-
bailable offense. The objectionable jail conditions included severe 
overcrowding; poor ventilation, heating and lighting; antiquated 
and deteriorated plumbing; roaches, mosquitoes and rats; inadequate 
safeguards against the likelihood of fire; lack of recreational facilities; 
and unsanitary eating and kitchen facilities. In addition to the funda-
mental structural inadequacies and unsanitary conditions of the jail, 
plaintiffs claimed that they suffered from a lack of clean clothing and of 
the necessary provisions for personal hygiene, an insufficient diet, inade-
quate medical and psychiatric care, and insufficient opportunities for 
exercise. The inmates also charged that the stringent limitations imposed 
upon visits by family, friends and attorneys, the censorship of mail, and 
prohibitions of reading materials were overly restrictive.e It was con-
tended that the cumulative effect of these squalid a,nd dehumanizing 
conditions on the physical and mental health of the inmates reached 
constitutional proportions requiring extensive equitable relief.' 
The court, on the basis of expert testimony, the submitted stipulation 
of facts, numerous affidavits of inmates, documentary evidence, and per-
sonal observation by the court during an overnight 'stay at the jail,s 
HELD: "the quality of incarceration at Charles Street is 'punishment' 
of such a nature and degree that it cannot be justified by the state's 
interest in holding defendants for trial; and therefore it violates the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.''9 In addition, the court 
found that . the conditions in the jail could be con$idered cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.10 
The court concluded, based upon its findings of fact11 and the com-
City Councillors of the City of Boston. 860 F. Supp. at 678. Under G.L. c. !14, §4, the 
Mayor and Councillors are county commissioners for Suffolk County and as such have 
both executive and legislative powers. Therefore, they share responsibility for pro-
viding a "suitable jail" under G.L c. !14, §!I. The Commission~r of Correction has 
general supervisory powers and duties over the jaU. G.L. c. 124, fl(a). 
4 !160 F. Supp. at 678. : 
II The court found that since Jan. 1, 1970, the average male population in the jaU 
had been !140-290 detainees awaiting trial and 50 prisoners sentehced for short terms. 
The average female population was found to be between 20 and 25. Id. at 681. It was 
approximated that 85% of the population at the jail were awaiting trial. Id. at 685. 
8 Id. at 678-79. I 
T Brief for Petitioner at 2!1, Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, !160 F. Supp. 
676 (D. Mass. 197!1). 
s 860 F. Supp. at 678. 
e Id. at 586. 
10 Id. at 588. 
11 Id. at 679-84. The findings were summarized as follows: 
[A]n inmate at Charles Street who merely stands accused spends from two to six 
months or longer awaiting trial. Each day he spends between 19 and 20 hours in 
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munity consensus as to the unsuitability of the jail,12 that for the de-
fendants to provide confinement consistent with constitutional princi-
ples, the century-old Charles Street Jail13 had to be replaced with a new 
facility.14 Pursuant to this conclusion, the court enjoined the use of the 
jail after June 30, 1976.111 In addition, the court fashioned an interim 
order16 to provide relief consistent with the physical limitations of the 
present facility. To alleviate overcrowding,17 the court prohibited double 
occupancy of cells by pretrial detainees as of November 30, 1973. A 
physical examination was required for all inmates remaining in the jail 
for over seven days1s and for all kitchen workers. Free institutional 
clothing and weekly laundry service were ordered. In addition, the court 
granted increased hours for attorney-client visits and one additional 
a cell with another, strange, and perhaps vicious man. When both inmates are in 
the cell, there is no room effectively to do anything else but sit or lie on one's cot. 
The presence of a cellmate eliminates any hope of privacy; an inmate may not 
use the toilet except in the presence of a stranger mere feet away. He passes his 
confined hours in a dank, decrepit room, often smelling of human excrement, 
usually in clothes which he cannot keep clean, and able to see nothing outside 
the cell except parts of the catwalk and outside wall. His mental stability may 
be affected. His food is often cold and dirty and must be eaten in a corridor that 
cannot be kept clean. In the three or four hours a day outside his cell, he has few 
opportunities for meaningful physical exercise, effectively none in the colder 
months. 
Id. at 687. See also note 61 infra. 
12 Id. at 681, 687, 689. The court cited seven governmental commission studies, all 
of which condemned the jail and most of which recommended that it be abandoned 
and a new facility be constructed. The governmental agencies sponsoring or conducting 
the studies were the City of Boston (1949), the Governor's Committee (1962), the 
Municipal Research Bureau (1962), the Finance Commission (1963), the Redevelopment 
Authority (1966), the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (1968) and a 
Special Legislative Study Commission (1970). Id. at 681. 
13 The jail has been in continuous use since its construction in 1848. Id. at 679. 
14 Id. at 686-87. 
111 Id. at 691. 
16 Id. Two stipulated partial judgments were entered previously by the court. These 
judgments are reported in 360 F. Supp. at 691, 692. The matters agreed to related to 
limitations on the use of solitary confinement, health and sanitary protections for 
those so confined, expanded opportunities for visitations, prohibitions on the censoring 
of outgoing mail, and the hiring of more Spanish-speaking personnel. 
17 The jail contains 180 cells for men and 48 for women and was originally designed 
for confinement of one prisoner per cell. In addition, over the years many cells have 
become unusable because of defective plumbing or locking mechanism8-()nly 142 cells 
for males were considered operable at the time of suit. Due to the expanding jail 
population (an average daily male population of 340 since Jan. I, 1970), double occu-
pancy in the 8' x 11' x 10' cells became a necessity. Id. at 679, 681. 
18 An estimated 60% of the inmate population were drug users prior to admission. 
At the time of trial, the medical staff at the jail consisted of two full-time nurses and 
a doctor who spent one-half to three hours a day, Monday through Friday, at the jail. 
Id. at 681. Considering the severe medical and psychiatric problems that are probably 
encountered, the court's order in this respect seems totally inadequate. 
28
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/17
534 1973 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §14.2 
hour away from the cells during daylight (four hours total, excluding 
meal times) and prohibited jail personnel from opening mail from 
attorneys except in the presence of the inmate. The above orders were 
to be implemented no later than 30 days from the date of the order. 
Lastly, upon the attainment of single occupancy, pretrial detainees were 
to have daily access to pay phones free from monitoring or wiretapping 
and the removal of age and family restrictions on visitors. The court 
ordered the defendants to file progress reports and retained jurisdiction 
to allow for continuing supervision of the implementation of its order.19 
This note will briefly discuss the history of "jail suits,"20 a relatively 
recent development in the law. The constitutional theories considered in 
Eisenstadt and other jail suits will then be examined in an attempt to 
evaluate their effectiveness as standards for assessing jail conditions of 
pretrial detainees. Lastly, possible guidelines for providing judicial relief 
and alternative legislative remedies will be considered. 
Changes in the law and in attitudes during the last decade have made 
possible the recent success of "jail suits"-challenges by pretrial de-
tainees to the totality of conditions and practices within jails. In the 
past, courts were reluctant to inject themselves into the internal ad-
ministration of jails and prisons because they felt that such matters were 
beyond their expertise and because they feared unde:tmining the dis-
ciplinary powers of prison officials. In addition to this "hands-off" 
policy, federal courts, in deference to the principles of federalism and 
separation of powers, refused to redress the grievances of inmates in state 
penal institutions.21 The Supreme Court, however, facilitated judicial 
intervention in prison and jail administration when it ruled in the 
early 1960's that the Eighth Amendment applied to states22 and that the 
doctrines of federal abstention23 and exhaustion of state remedies24 
were not barriers to suits by prisoners in state institutions.2G Finally, the 
19 Id. at 691. 
20 Jails are usually short-term holding facilities, under city or county control, 
designed to detain those who are awaiting trial and to house convicted misdemeanants--
convicts sentenced to less than one year. Prisons, maintained by a state or the federal 
government, are used for incarcerating felons-convicts sentenced to a year or more. 
Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual fol: Prisoners' Rights 
Litigation, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 473, 475 (1971). See also Note, 18 Wayne L. Rev. 1601, 1602-
03 (1972). 
21 See generally Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal 
to Review Complaints of Convicts, 72 Yale L.J. 506 (1963). 
22 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
23 Cooper v. Pate, 878 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam) (reversal of dismissal of prisoner's 
suit based on grounds, inter alia, of federal abstention doctrine). 
24 Monroe v. Pape, 865 U.S. 167 (1961) (exhaustion of state reme~ies is not a condi-
tion precedent to a federal court's accepting jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871). 
25 Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 
Va. L. Rev. 841, 842-48 (1971); Turner, supra note 20, at 507. 
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prisoner rebellions at Attica and Walpole and disorders at prisons and 
jails throughout the country in the early 1970's focused national concern 
on the conditions within prisons and jails. In response to these events, 
the "hands-off" attitude of the courts slowly yielded to a new approach 
which recognized the legitimacy of judicial intervention when conditions 
deteriorated to such an extent that they constituted a deprivation of 
constitutional rights.liG 
Although the first "jail suit" by pretrial detainees was brought in 
1968,21 the case that firmly laid the groundwork for broad challenges 
to conditions and practices within jails was Holt v. Sarver, in which the 
living conditions in the Arkansas penitentiary system were found to be 
so "shocking to the conscience" as to constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.28 Holt established 
the principle that the application of the Eighth Amendment was not 
limited to instances in which a particular prisoner is subjected to 
corporal punishment.29 The court in Holt recognized that the cumula-
tive effect of squalid and inhumane conditions in the prison inflicted 
cruel and unusual punishment upon the entire prisoner population.so 
Although Holt involved prisoners in the state penitentiary, its rele-
ll8 560 F. Supp. at 684. See also Comment, Incarcerating the Innocent: Pretrial De-
tention in our Nation's Jails, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 891, 907-12 (1972). Although the 
hands-<>ff doctrine no longer presents a serious obstacle to prisoner and jail suits, a 
modified version was followed in two recent cases, Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th 
Cir. 1971), and Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971). The court in Sostre 
stated: 
Even a lifetime of study in prison administration and several advanced degrees 
in the field would not qualify us as a federal court to command state officials to 
shun a policy that they have decided is suitable because to us the choice may 
seem unsound or persooolly repugnant. As judges we are obliged to school our-
selves in such objective sources as historical usage . . . before we may responsibly 
exercise the power of judicial review to declare a punishment unconstitutional ...• 
Id. at 191. 
2T Inmates of Cook County Jail v. Tierney, Civil No. 68 C 504 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 22. 
1968), in which Judge Julius Hoffman refused to dismiss a civil rights action by jail 
inmates, finding that if the allegations of jail conditions were proven, they would 
amount to cruel and unusual punishment. The case was settled on assurances by the 
defendant officials that they were effecting fundamental improvements. 
28 !09 F. Supp. 362, 372·73 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). Holt 
was initiated shortly after the Arkansas prison scandal broke in 1968. After several 
skeletons were found in a field at the Cummins Prison Farm, it was discovered that 
numerous murders had taken place on the farm over the past several decades. In 
addition, a state prison report previously suppressed by Governor Faubus was released. 
It told of the deplorable disciplinary measures used at Cummins and Tucker Prison 
Farms. Time, Feb. 9, 1968, at 74. 
29 309 F. Supp. at 372-73. Previously, in Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th 
Cir. 1968), then Circuit Judge Blackmun, writing for the court, enjoined the use of a 
strap as a disciplinary measure in the Arkansas prison system on the grounds that it 
violated the Eighth Amendment. 
so 309 F. Supp. at 380·81. 
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vance to pretrial detainees confined in city and county jails was obvious. 
Conditions in local jails are often as bad as, if not worse than, those in 
state prisons;st more importantly, inmates in jails are 1for the most part 
pretrial detainees, and therefore are presumed to be innocent of any 
crime under our system of justice. Even if deplorable conditions for 
convicted criminals can be justified as part of their punishment, such 
conditions are theoretically inappropriate for innocent persons who are 
confined to jail because they cannot afford bail. Whereas rehabilitation, 
punishment and deterrence are legitimate purposes for incarcerating 
persons convicted of a crime, 82 pretrial detainees are confined only be-
cause their presence at trial must be assured. Consequently, the standard 
of treatment for pretrial detainees should be higher than that for con-
victed prisoners.88 Following this reasoning, many courts have upheld 
the claim of pretrial detainees that the totality of conditions and prac-
tices within a jail deprive them of their constitutional ;rights.84 
Several different constitutional theories have been U$ed to uphold the 
claims of pretrial detainees, i.e., the due process and · equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause of the Eighth Amendment. As pointed ou~ by Judge Tuttle 
in Anderson v. Nossar, "There are many roads to Rome, and while one is 
clearly marked 'Eighth Amendment,' I agree that pa$sage can be had 
along that wide familiar boulevard known as 'Due Prodess.' "811 Although 
it is true that jail conditions are susceptible to attack on several 
grounds, it is submitted that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as used by the court in Eisenstadt,86 provides a more ap-
propriate approach for analyzing jail conditions than, does the Eighth 
81 For a description of typical jail oonditions see Note, Pre-Trial Detention in 
New York City Jails, 7 Colum. J.L. Be Soc. Prob. 850, 354-65 (1971); Note, Constitu-
tional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 Yale L.J. 941, 941-46 
(1970); N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1974 §6 (Magazine), at 14. 
82 See generally Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial 
Detention, 79 Yale L.J. 941, 956-57 (1970). 
88 Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
114 Rhem v. Maloolm, - F. Supp. - (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1974)' summarized in. 14 Crim~ L. Rep. 2345 (1974) (the Tombs); Collins v. Schoonfield, 844 f. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 
1972) (Baltimore City Jail); Brenneman v. Madigan, 348 F. Supp. ~28 (N.D. Cal. 1972) 
(the Greystone section of the Santa Rita Rehabilitation Center);, Hamilton v. Love, 
!128 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (Pulaski County Jail); Jones v~ Wittenberg, !123 F. 
Supp. 9!1 (N.D. Ohio 1971) Uones I]; Jones v. Wittenberg, 880 F. s¥PP· 707 (N.D. Ohio 
1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 19~2) Uones II] (Lucas 
County Jail); Commonwealth ex rei. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 P •• 8!1, 280 A.2d 110 
(1971) (Holmesburg Prison) (the only case to grant relief in a ha~ oorpus proceeding 
as opposed to a civil rights action). 
85 456 F.2d 8!15, 84!1 (5th Cir. 1972) (Tuttle, J., ooncurring in pa~t and dissenting in 
part). · · 
88 !160 F. Supp. at 686, 688. 
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Amendment or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
A majority of the decisions finding conditions within jails and prisons 
to be unconstitutional have relied upon the Eighth Amendment.37 
Nevertheless, courts have yet to develop a precise definition of the 
standard to be used in determining whether jail conditions constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment. Three basic formulations have been 
used.38 One approach for evaluating jail conditions in terms of the 
Eighth Amendment is to ask whether they "shock the conscience."39 
A second method is to examine the nature of the offense in relation to 
the severity of the punishment to determine if the punishment is dis-
proportionate.40 A third approach would find Eighth Amendment 
violations when conditions or practices extend beyond what is necessary 
to achieve a legitimate penal goal.41 All three of these tests have been 
applied with reference to community values, "the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."42 
It is submitted that these formulations do not provide a workable 
standard for courts to use in assessing the constitutionality of jail condi-
tions. A pretrial detainee should not have to suffer any punishment, 
regardless of whether or not it is shocking to the conscience.43 Moreover, 
any punishment beyond detainment of an innocent person is dispropor-
tionate to the nonexistent offense, and unnecessary to the achievement 
of any legitimate penal goal. Nevertheless, courts have relied upon the 
cruel and unusual punishment clause to assess the constitutionality of 
jail conditions, even though the above formulations do not provide clear 
37 See, e.g., Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 190-93 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd on re-
hearing on other grounds, 456 F.2d 835, 838 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane) (the court on 
rehearing concluded that the §1983 cause of action sounded more in the nature of 
deprivation of due process through infliction of summary punishment rather than 
the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 
1016, 1019 (E.D. La. 1970); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. at 99; Commonwealth ex 
rei. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. at 98, 280 A.2d at 117; Wayne County Jail Inmates 
v. Wayne County Board of Commissioners, Civil No. 173-217, (Cir. Ct., Wayne County 
Mich., May 18, 1971). See generally, Note, Recent Application of the Ban on Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments: Judicially Enforced Reform of Nonfedera1 Penal Institu-
tions, 23 Hastings L.J. 1111 (1972). 
38 See Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d at 191; Note, supra note 25, at 848-50; Note, 
supra note 37, at 1124-25. See also the principles enunciated by Justice Brennan in 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972). 
89 See, e.g., Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d at 191; Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. at 
1019; Commonwealth ex rei. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. at 97-98, 280 A.2d at 117. 
40 See, e.g., Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d at 193. 
41 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. at 1019. 
42 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). "The basic concept underlying the 
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man." Id. at 100. 
43 Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
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guidelines for distinguishing between simple punishment which is per-
mitted by the Eighth Amendment, and cruel and unusual punishment, 
which is forbidden. As a result, courts have tended in practice to in-
validate only those conditions which sink to the level of being inhuman, 
barbarous or tortuous-the truly shocking conditionsJI4 Moreover, the 
subjectivity of the shocking to the conscience standard has led to incon-
sistent results.411 In short, the cruel and unusual punishment clause ap-
pears to be helpful only in abating the most outrageous conditions 
since it imposes a standard no greater than minimal decency, and it is 
unpredictable because of its reliance on an individual judge's conception 
of justice. 
The court in Eisenstadt declined to rely on the Eighth Amendment 
and instead found that the jail conditions in Charles Street violated the 
rights of pretrial detainees under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.46 It is submitted that the due process clause provides 
a more appropriate analytic framework for judicial review, and con-
sequently provides a greater opportunity for effective relief. Under the 
AmeriCan system of justice, a person is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty, and under the due process clause, a person cannot be subjected to 
punishment without a judicial determination of guilt. Although the 
Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that detention or custody may 
be constitutionally permissible to ensure appearance for trial,47 any 
deprivation of liberty which is not necessary to this holding function 
will constitute punishment in violation of the due process clause.48 In 
addition to the need for a rational relationship between the state's 
purpose and the means used, courts have required that the governmental 
"purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental 
personal liberties when the end can · be more narrowly achieved. The 
breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less 
44 For examples of cases relating to prison conditions, see Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 
661, 665-66 (5th Cir. 1971); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 1971) (de-
claring the solitary confinement not "unendurable or subhuman or cruel and inhuman 
in a constitutional sense"); Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (E.D. La. 
1971) (since food was not contaminated on a regular basis, and as a general rule, food 
servers were not unclean, the claim did not reach the proportion: of a constitutional 
violation). For examples of cases relating to pretrial detainees, see Rogers v. Westbrook, 
362 F. Supp. 35!1 (E.D. Mo. 197!1); Woods v. Burton,- Wash. App. -, 503 P.2d 
1074 (1972). See also, Note, 4 Toledo L Rev. 262, 263 (197!1). 
45 Compare cases cited in note 44 supra with those cited in notes 29 and 34 supra 
and note 89 infra. 
46 360 F. Supp. at 688. 
47 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1954). 
48 360 F. Supp. at 686. See also Anderson v. Nosser, 4!18 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd 
on this ground on rehearing, 456 F.2d 8!15, 840 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane); Brenneman 
v. Madigan, 342 F. Supp. at 136-38; Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. at 1191-93; Jones v. 
Wittenberg, 32!1 F. Supp. at 99-100; Note, supra note 31, at 950-5!1. 
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drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."49 In short, all re-
strictions on pretrial detainees must be reasonably related to the state's 
interest in ensuring their presence at trial and the means used must be 
no more restrictive than is necessary to accomplish that limited pur-
pose.l'0 
Thus, under the "least restrictive means" test used in Eisenstadt, the 
state has the burden of justifying any restrictions upon detainees which · 
unnecessarily or unreasonably infringe upon their "basic liberties, among 
them the rights to reasonable freedom of motion, personal cleanliness, 
and personal privacy."Gl Although custody, which includes the need to 
preserve the security and orderly administration of the jail, legitimizes 
some restrictions, many conditions would be subject to attack, including 
regulations as to visitors, confinement in cramped quarters, restrictions 
on mail privileges and denial of recreation and exercise.G2 In addition 
under the "least restrictive means" approach, pretrial detainees need 
only show that conditions and practices are more restrictive or oppressive 
than is necessary to maintain custody. In other words, the detainees no 
longer have to prove "cruel and unusual," as required by the Eighth 
Amendment, but only "punishment."GS As a result, under a due process 
approach an isolated practice or condition could be subject to judicial 
review without the necessity of demonstrating that the totality of cir-
cumstances is so oppressive as to warrant judicial intervention; each 
restraint can be evaluated in terms of the state's purpose and the less 
drastic alternatives for accomplishing that purpose without having to 
amass sufficient indignities to satisfy the ambiguous threshold required 
by the cruel and unusual punishment clause. 
A second test for measuring due process claims was used by the court 
in Eisenstadt to buttress its conclusion under the "least restrictive means" 
approach. The court reasoned that since· conditions of confinement for 
sentenced inmates in state prisons were less oppressive than those in 
Charles Street,~>4 the pretrial detainee was being "punished" in violation 
49 360 F. Supp. at 686, citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (emphasis 
added). See also Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
50 Note, supra note 31, at 950. See also Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1191-9!1 
(E.D. Ark. 19~1). 
51 360 F. Supp. at 686. 
52 Note, supra note !II, at 950. 
53 See Jones v. Wittenberg, 32!1 F. Supp. at 100. 
G4 360 F. Supp. at 686-88. The court found that inmates in Massachusetts state 
prisons have more liberal visiting privileges-attorneys may visit on any day and at 
any reasonable hour without permisson and family, friends and children may visit 
for two to three hours, three times a week. In addition, state prisoners occupy single 
cells, are only required to be in their cells from 10:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M., and are 
permitted to have televisions and radios in their cells. Inmates in state institutions are 
also given clean clothes, free weekly laundry service and a complete physical examina-
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of the due process clause.llll Under this test, "conditions for pre-trial 
detention must not only be equal to, but superior to~ those permitted 
for prisoners serving sentences for the crimes they have committed .... "118 
This standard is also appropriate to an analysis under the equal pro-
tection clause,IIT which requires that those similarly classified must be 
similarly treated and that the classification system mu$t bear a rational 
relationship to a legitimate state purpose.IIB In terms' of treatment ac-
corded them, the state has placed pretrial detainees in a single class 
together with those persons sentenced to prison following conviction of a 
crime. But persons who are presumed innocent are being detained only 
to assure their presence at trial, whereas convicted persons can legiti-
mately be subjected to mandatory punitive, rehabilitative and deterrent 
measures. Thus, it is unreasonable to classify detainees with convicts for 
purposes of determining the conditions of detention.~~~ In short, under 
either a due process or an equal protection analysis, if conditions of 
confinement of pretrial detainees are inferior or equal to those of con-
victed prisoners, the detainees are subject to "punishment" without due 
process or are denied equal protection. 
It is submitted that this latter approach of comparing, jails with prisons 
may not be as useful as the "least restrictive means" test because such a 
comparison may not always provide a rigorous standar¢1 of review. Con-
sidering the prison conditions described in Holt,60 it would not be ad-
vantageous for detainees to argue that jail coqditions in Arkansas should 
merely be superior to those in Cummins State Farm. ln addition, since 
rehabilitation, deterrence and punishment are recogniZed goals of con-
finement for convicts, prisons necessarily have to be built to accommo-
date programs which will further these aims. However, it may be im-
proper for jail authorities to require detainees to participate in rehabili-
tation programs.81 Due to these differences in state pwtposes, prison life 
cannot readily be used as a standard for assessing jail conditions. In 
tion upon admission to the prison. Id. at 683-84. In rontrast, pretrial detainees at 
Charles Street are locked up in a cell with another inmate for 19 hours a day; receive 
no clothing, laundry service, or physical examinations; and ~ limited to three 
visits a week of one hour each from only adult members of th ir family and visits 
from lawyers, unless they receive permission, from 9:00 to 11:00 A. . and 12:00 to 4:00 
P.M., Monday through Saturday. Id. at 682-83. 
1111 Id. at 686-8S. 
116 Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 11S2, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
117 See Brenneman v. Madigan, !14!1 F. Supp. at IllS. 
liS Note, supra note lll, at 947. For an extensive discussion of ~e standards used to 
evaluate classifications for equal protection purposes, see Developtnents in the Law-
Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L Rev. 1067, 1076 et seq. (1969). See ~also Tussman &: ten 
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, !17 Calif. L. Rev. !141 a949). 
119 See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm,-F. Supp.-(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7; 1974), summarized 
in 14 Crim. L. Rep. 2!145 (1974); Brenneman v. Madigan, 34!1 F. Supp. at IllS; Hamilton 
v. Love, li2S F. Supp. at 1191; Jones v. Wittenberg, !12!1 F. Supp. :at 100. 
80 li09 F. Supp. at !17!1-Sl. 
81 Hamilton v. Love,li2S F. Supp. 11S2, 1192 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
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contrast, the "least restrictive means" test establishes a more uniform, 
stringent standard of review; it is only necessary to consider jail condi-
tions in terms of the state's sole purpose of assuring appearance of the 
detainee at trial, rather than comparing them to prison conditions, 
which inevitably vary from state to state. 
In addition to the Eighth Amendment and the two due process 
formulations used by the Eisenstadt court, additional arguments for 
challenging jail conditions can be_ advanced on the basis of the equal 
protection clause. According to this analysis, citizens detained pending 
trial are part of a class of arrested persons in whom the state's only in-
terest is to ensure their presence at trial. Within this class of arrested 
persons, a distinction is made between those who are detained, either 
because they cannot afford bail or because they are accused of a non-
bailable offense (usually a capital crime), and those who are released on 
bail. The only basis for the distinction between bailees and detainees is 
the state's determination that there is a need to maintain custody of the 
latter.62 Beyond this distinction, there is "no justification for any addi-
tional inequality of treatment beyond that which is inherent in the con-
finement itsel£."63 Under this test, as under the due process clause, con-
ditions of incarceration must be rationally related to the state's 
holding function and must "cumulatively, add up to the least restrictive 
means of achieving the purpose .... "84 
An alternative analysis under the equal protection clause could be 
based on the Griffin6ri.Douglas66 line of cases.67 The Court's holding in 
Griffin has been interpreted in at least one jail suit, Brenneman v. 
Madigan, as requiring a more stringent review ("strict scrutiny") than 
is regularly mandated under the equal protection clause because wealth 
classifications in the area of criminal prosecutions are considered to be 
"suspect."68 Following this reasoning, any restriction or deprivation im-
posed upon those in the class of accused defendants who are detained 
due to their inability to post bail must be strictly related to the state's 
purpose, and secondly, the classification must be based on a "compelling 
state interest."69 It is submitted that no "compelling state interest" could 
62 Note, supra note !11, at 947-48. 
68 Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1964). 
64 Hamilton v. Love, !128 F. Supp. 1182, 1192 (E.D. Ark.. 1971). See Note, supra note 
!11, at 949-50. 
66 Griffin v. Illinois, !151 U.S. 12 (1956) (a defendant cannot be denied access to an 
effective appeal due to his indigency). 
66 Douglas v. California, !172 U.S. !15!1 (196!1) a defendant has a right to oounsel for 
his first appeal regardless of wealth). 
67 See Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Sll Harv. L. Rev. 7, 25 n.55 (1969). 
68 !14!1 F. Supp. at US. 
69 Michelman, supra note 67, at 20 n.ll4; Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 
82 Harv. L Rev. 1065, 1101-04 (1969). 
36
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/17
542 1973 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS l,AW §14.2 
be established for the proposition that people with~ut the financial 
means to post bail present a greater risk of non-appearance than those 
who do have the means.1o Thus, assuming that Griffin does require a 
strict standard of review of wealth classifications in thel area of criminal 
prosecutions, n this standard could not be applied to indigent detainees 
without arriving at the logical conclusion that the whole principle of 
release on the basis of ability to pay would be subject to attack.12 Since 
it is unlikely that any court would arrive at this conclusion,13 the test has 
to be restated, as was done in Brenneman, to provide that "any restric-
tions and deprivations ... beyond those which inhere in the confinement 
itself, must be justified by a compelling necessity."14 In effect, under this 
strict equal protection standard, identical treatment for detainees and 
bailees would be required insofar as is possible given that a detainee's 
freedom to come and go as he pleases is limited. In ord¢r to achieve this 
standard, jails would have to become similar to hotels, with the only 
limitation being that the "clientele" could not leave. It 'is suggested that 
this would be an impractical standard for a court to apply. 
Moreover, it appears that an equal protection analysts comparing de-
tainees with bailees under either of the two-tiered tests-the strict 
scrutiny test suggested in Griffin or the rational relationship test-is less 
likely to succeed than a challenge based on the due process clause. There 
has been a noted reluctance on the part of courts to Jind a denial of 
equal protection based on an asserted common classifi¢ation of bailees 
and detainees. For example, the majority of courts have' denied relief to 
detainees who claimed that they were denied equal protection by being 
compelled to appear in lineups for crimes not included in ·their indict-
ments, even though those free on bail could not be forced to do so with-
-out first being arrested and charged with the specific crime for which the 
lineup was being conducted.'~'~~ In addition, the Supreme Court in 
McGinnis v. Royster16 upheld a New York law which' denied pretrial 
detainees good time credit for presentence incarceration! in county jails. 
The Court explicitly declined to apply the strict scrutiny test but instead 
relied upon the rational relationship test.n 
70 See study by the Vera Institute, The Manhattan Bail Projec~ at 7 (1970), cited 
in McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 281 n.4 (1973) (dissenting .pinion). 
11 This analysis of Griffin has been criticized by Michelman, supra note 67, at 24-llll. 
12 Note, supra note 31, at 947 n.52. 
78 As pointed out by the oourt in Hamilton, 328 F. Supp. at 1192, "[a] distinction 
L between bailees and detainees] is implicitly recognized in the Constitution when it 
provides that, 'excessive bail shall not be required ••• .' U.S. Cobst. Amend. Vlll." 
14 Brenneman v. Madigan, Mll F. Supp. at 138. 
711 See, e.g., United States y. Jones, 403 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1968); :Qigney v. Hendrick, 
355 F.2d 710 (lid Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966); United States v. 
Scarpellino, 296 F. Supp. 269 (D. Minn. 1969). Contra, Butler v. Crut!nlish, 229 F. Supp. 
565 (E.D. Pa. 1964). 
16 410 u.s. 263 (1973). 
11 Id. at 276-77. 
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In summary, the Eisenstadt court correctly chose the least restrictive 
means test over the Eighth Amendment as a tool for analyzing conditions 
of pretrial detention.78 The least restrictive means test provides the more 
exacting standard of review for assessing jail conditions because it 
analyzes them in terms of the state's sole purpose of assuring appearance 
at trial and thus avoids subjective judgments as to what is shocking to 
the conscience. It is also preferable to comparing jail conditions to those 
in prisons under either the due process clause or the equal protection 
clause since this latter formulation lacks uniformity due to the 
substantial differences among prisons. Lastly, the least restrictive means/ 
due process test is not only a more practical standard but is also more 
likely to be accepted than an equal protection claim that is based upon 
an asserted common classification of bailees and detainees. 
Once a court has found that the conditions in a jail violate the in-
mates' constitutional rights under any of the above tests, it still must 
grapple with the problem of providing affirmative relief. For the 
Eisenstadt court this was less of a problem since the necessity for a new 
jail relieved the court of having to develop extensive guidelines and 
timetables.79 The court, after enjoining the use of the Charles Street 
Jail as of June 30, 1976,8° ordered only minimal improvements in the 
existing facility. Despite the court's admission that, in principle, nearly all 
relief requested by the inmates should be granted,81 the pl:lysical limita-
tions of the jail restricted the extent to which the court could order 
compliance with the due process clause.82 In terms of reducing the over-
crowding, the court suggested that the number of usable cells could be 
increased thJ;:ough renovation and that consideration should be given to 
transferring the sentenced prisoners in Charles Street (mostly people 
convicted of public drunkenness) to other state institutions, the women 
inmates to M.C.I. Framingham, and the juveniles to the Division of 
Youth Services.ss 
Another method of relief, other than ordering a new jail, has been 
to base the remedy upon state or city housing and sanitation codes. This 
technique was used in Detroit where it was found that the state and city 
housing and building codes were applicable to jails.84 These regulations 
provide clear and concise requirements as to room size and density, 
quality of plumbing, and amount of ventilation and lighting .. As a result, 
the court has a practical tool for effectuating improvements in the jail. 
78 !160 F. Supp. at 688. 
79 See also Jones v. Wittenberg, !1!10 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
so !160 F. Supp. at 691. 
81 Id. at 689. 
82 Id. 
sa Id. at 690. 
84 Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Board of Commissioners, Civil 
No. 17!1-217 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., May 18, 1971). See Note, 18 Wayne L. 
Rev. 1601 (1972). 
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A similar result was reached in ]ones v. Wittenberg, where the court 
interpreted certain regulations of the Toledo District iBoard of Health 
as being applicable to the Lucas County Jail.811 This approach could be 
used in Massachusetts if a court were willing to interprt1t the state sanita-
tion c~de as being applicable by analogy, for unlike the Michigan laws 
which specifically apply to jails, Massachusetts has no such provision in 
its code.86 
A court could also formulate guidelines for relief by adopting the 
standards promulgated by either the American Correctional Associa-
tion87 or the Federal Bureau of Prisons.88 Reference to these sources 
was made in several suits challenging the use of solitary confinement 
in prisons.89 Lastly, it is suggested that state statutes providing for 
minimum standards for jails could be an appropriate grounds upon 
which to base relief.DO Unfortunately, the Massachusetts legislature has 
failed to provide any comprehensive standards goveFning conditions, 
maintenance, and administration of jails.91 
Although the judiciary has provided extensive relief in recent years 
for inmates in both prisons and jails, it is clear that "[c]ourts can per-
form only a small part of the role of overseeing the correctional 
system."92 Courts are limited to ordering injunctive or declaratory re-
lief affecting only one institution at a time; they cannot institute re-
habilitative programs, allocate the funds for new jails or additional 
personnel, or hire qualified staff.98 Thus, the solutions to the complex 
problems in our jails and prisons will ultimately rest with the legisla-
tures. 
811 3!10 F. Supp. 707, 715-16, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 
456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). 
86 Massachusetts Department of Public Health, State Sanitary Code, Art. II (1969), 
adopted pursuant to G.L. c. 111, §5. 
87 The American Correctional Association, Manual of Correctional Standards (!ld ed. 
1966). 
88 Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Justice, Manual of Policy Statements (Nov. 
28, 1966). 
89 See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, !187 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 
257 F. Supp. 674, 68!1 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See generally Hirschkop' &: Milleman, The 
Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 Va. L. Rev. 795, 820-21 (1969). For a criticism 
of this approach, see Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for 
Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 2!1 Stan. L. Rev. 473, 511 (1971). 
90 See, e.g., Holland v. Donelon, No. 71-1442 (E.D. La. June 6, 197!1), summarized 
in 2 Prison L. Rptr. !175 (197!1); Taylor v. Sterrett, !144 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972). 
91 See G.L. c. 127, §§1-151. Although this chapter covers prison and jail conditions 
and administration, few standards for detainees are provided, i.e., a physical examina-
tion is required in both prisons and jails for inmates who are committed for !10 days 
or more, id. at §16; inmates are not to occupy the same room unless the crowded state 
of the institution so requires, id. at §22; detainees are not to be confined with convicts, 
id.; and limitations are placed upon the use of isolated units, id. at' §§40-41. 
92 Goldfarb &: Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 175, 
!120 (1970). 
98 See Jones v. Wittenberg, !1!10 F. Supp. at 712-1!1. 
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Although a cogent argument can be made for the abolition of jails 
due to the social94 and economic911 costs to society, it is unlikely that this 
extreme step will be taken in the near future. Nevertheless, many 
realistic legislative reforms designed to relieve overcrowding and to 
limit the length of stay in jails have been suggested.98 The first and most 
obvious measure is to provide defendants with a "speedy trial" as re-
quired by the U.S. Constitution.97 The court in Eisenstadt found that 
the average time spent by detainees awaiting trial in Suffolk Superior 
Court is from five to six months, except that defendants charged with 
capital crimes customarily wait eight months to a year or longer.98 The 
court attributed this delay partially to 
a puzzling refusal by a majority of Massachusetts legislators to 
increase the size of the state trial court. . . . The total annual cost 
to the Commonwealth of the increases sought would be less than 
the cost of constructing a single mile of superhighway. Yet since 
1967 the legislators have turned a deaf ear.99 
Additional suggestions for limiting the length of detention include 
mandatory release after a determined period of dentention,100 and giving 
priority on court calendars to those in jail.101 Other corrective measures 
designed to alleviate overcrowding include transferring sentenced 
prisoners in detention facilities to state prisons and removing convicted 
alcoholics and drugs addicts to rehabilitation programs.1o2 
Lastly, it is submitted that the most effective remedial measure is 
legislation that establishes procedures designed to ensure the release of 
most accused persons. For instance, Massachusetts has recently enacted a 
Bail Reform Acttoa which provides that a defendant's ties to his com-
munity, rather than the seriousness of his charge and past convictions, 
are the most important determinants in any decision whether to detain 
94 See President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 825, 898 (1968). See also Rankin, Effect of Pretrial 
Detention, 89 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 641 (1964), which reported that detained persons are 
more likely to be sentenced to prison than bailed persons regardless of whether high or 
low bail amounts had been set. Id. at 641-48. 
911 In 1969, the Suffolk County jail cost the taxpayers a total of $1,060,657, or $8,586 
per capita. Center for Corrections and the Law, Metropolitan Boston Detention Study 
51-52 (1972). 
96 See generally Center for Correction and the Law, supra note 95, at 52-98 (1972); 
Note, Incarcerating the Innocent: Pretrial Detention in Our Nation's Jails, 21 Buffalo L. 
Rev. 891, 919-28 (1972). 
97 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
98 860 F. Supp. at 681. 
99 Id. at 685. 
100 Note, Pre-Trial Detention in New York City Jails, 7 Colum. J.L. &: Soc. Prob. 850, 
879 (1971). 
101 Note, supra note 96, at 928. 
102 Id. at 920. 
103 G.L c. 276, §58. 
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or release a person. The Act is applicable to all offenses not punishable 
by death and is based upon the fundamental premise that a person who 
is presumed innocent should be released on his own recognizance unless 
a judge believes that such a release will result in the risk of default. It 
has further been suggested that this expanded use of release-on-recog-
nizance should be coupled with additional legislative reforms, such as a 
program allowing provisional release to the custody of a third person or 
half-way house, a five percent deposit bail provision, and part-time 
release programs for persons who must be confined to jail but want to go 
to school or work.104 Pretrial release reforms are not only consistent with 
fundamental notions of human rights and freedoms, but they would also 
allow "circumvention of the tremendous social damage wrought by the 
moral contamination that occurs in ... jails."10I! 
ELLEN SEGAL FIUVELLE 
§14.3. The Massachusetts "Corrupt Practices Act": Corporate right 
to freedom of speech: First National Bank v. Att01"1'U!)) General.1 In the 
1972 general elections a proposed constitutional amendment empowering 
the General Court to impose a graduated income tax on both corpora-
tions and individuals was submitted to the voters.2 A Massachusetts 
statute that had been in effect for many years, G.L. c. 55, §7, specifically 
prohibited corporate expenditures to influence or affect the vote on 
referendum questions except those "materially affecting any of the 
property, business or assets of the corporations."3 In 1962 the 
Supreme Judicial Court, in construing the statute, held that a proposal 
to allow the imposition of graduated taxes on personal and corporate 
income would materially affect corporations within ' the meaning of 
section 7.4 On June 7, 1972, -before the campaign on the proposed con-
stitutional amendment began, the General Court amended section 7 to 
provide that "[n]o question submitted to the voters concerning the taxa-
tion of the income, property or transactions of individuals shall be 
deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of the cor-
poration.''li In a separate action, the General Court a~tached an emer-
gency preamble to the amendment to section 7.6 This required that the 
104 Center for Correction and the Law, supra note 95, at 56-74 (1972). 
1015 McGee, The Administration of Justice: The Correctional Process, 5 N.P.P.A. J. 
225, 228 (1959). 
§14.!1. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1711, 290 N.E.2d 526. 
2 The proposed constitutional amendment is quoted in full in 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 1712 n.2, 290 N.E.2d at 528 n.2. 
a G.L. c. 55, §7, quoted at length in the text at note 15 infra. 
4 Lustwerk v. Lytron, Inc., 344 Mass. 647, 651-53, 183 N.E.2d 871, 873-75 (1962). 
li Acts of 1972, c. 458. 
6 Id. 
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amendment become effective upon signature by the Governor, rather 
than after the usual ninety-day waiting period. Shortly thereafter, several 
large corporations instituted a declaratory judgment action challenging 
the constitutionality of the statutory amendment.T They alleged that they 
intended to expend funds to oppose the proposed graduated income 
tax.8 The Attorney General of the Commonwealth stated that if they 
did, he would prosecute them for violating section 7, as amended.D In 
First National Bank v. Attorney General,t0 the Supreme Judicial Court 
declared that G.L. c. 55, §7 was ineffective to prohibit the expenditure 
of corporate funds to oppose the graduated income tax referendum. 
Justice Quirico, in an opinion in which two other justices concurred, 
read the amendment to section 7 as prohibiting corporate expenditures 
only as to those referenda which solely concerned the taxation of the 
income of individuals. Since the question on the 1972 ballot concerned 
the taxation of corporations as well as individuals, he reasoned that 
corporate expenditures to influence the vote on the measure were not 
prohibited by the statutory amendment. Justice Quirico justified this 
interpretation by referring to the maxim of statutory construction which 
requires that, when faced with a choice between two possible interpreta-
tions of a statute, one of which raises serious constitutional questions as 
to the validity of the statute, a court will choose the interpretation which 
will not place the validity of the statute in question.11 In a separate 
opinion, Chief Justice Tauro, with one justice concurring, found clear 
indications of a legislative intent to prohibit corporate expenditures to 
oppose the proposed graduated income tax amendment, but refused to 
enforce the statute because he found that it abridged the freedom of 
speech guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article Sixteen of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.12 In the election campaign that followed, corpora-
7 The plaintiffs were the First National Bank of Boston, the New England Merchants 
National Bank of Boston, the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company and the 
Wyman-Gordon Company. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1712 n.l., 290 N.E.2d at 528 n.1. 
8 Id. at 1712,290 N.E.2d at 528. 
9 Id. at 1712-1!1, 290 N.E.2d at 529. 
10 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1711,290 N.E.2d 526. 
11 Id. at 17!15, 290 N.E.2d at 542. 
12 The status of the two opinions in this case is the subject of some confusion. It is 
the practice of the Supreme Judicial Court to sit with only five of seven justices present. 
Presumably there are procedures whereby the other two justices can be called in to 
decide cases where there is a three to two disagreement. In any case, it seems that the 
circumstance of two factions reaching the same result for opposed reasons is not suffi-
cient to warrant calling upon the other members. Since only three of the seven justices 
subscribed to Justice Quirico's opinion, it would seem that his opinion does not have 
the precedential value of a majority decision, despite representing a majority of the 
panel which heard the case. Chief Justice Tauro's opinion, subscribed to by only two 
justices, would seem to have even less precedential value, despite the fact that it is 
placed first in: order and is referred to as the opinion of the court. 
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tions contributed large amounts of money in an effQrt to defeat the 
graduated income tax amendment. As a result of these contributions, 
opponents of the measure enjoyed a significant financial advantage over 
those favoring its adoption.1a The proposed amendment was over-
whelmingly defeated.14 
This note will examine the disagreement between the justices about 
the meaning of the amendment to G.L. c. 55, §7 and then, assuming that 
the statutory amendment did prohibit expenditures to oppose the pro-
posed constitutional amendment, will discuss the iss-qes raised by the 
Chief Justice relative to the rights afforded to corporaUons by the con-
stitutional guarantees of freedom of speech. 
I. THE MEANING OF THE STATUTORY AMENDMENT 
The relevant language of G.L. c. 55 §7,- as amended in 1972, provides: 
No ... business corporation ... shall ... give, ~ay, expend or 
contribute . . . any money for the purpose of . • . influencing or 
affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other 
than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets 
of the corporation. No question submitted to the voters concerning 
the taxation of the income, property or transactions of individuals 
shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets 
of the corporation.1fl 
The administrative procedures of the court might explain why an opinion concurred 
in by only two justices is placed before an opinion concurred in by three. Before a case 
is decided, one justice is appointed to write the opinion of the court. His assignment 
is withdrawn only if he dissents from the result, but not if he concurs for reasons other 
than those relied on by the remainder of the court. Thus, even if his opinion is dia-
metrically opposed to that of the other justices, and even though the adherents to 
another thesis outnumber the adherents to his, his opinion will be the opinion of the 
court. 
18 According to the files of the Division of Public Records qf the Office of the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, the Coalition for Tax Reform, the committee which 
organized proponents of the measure, collected $6,464. The Comioittee for Jobs and 
Government Economy, which opposed the graduated tax, collect~ $119,291. Of this 
amount, corporations gave approximately $92,000. The current iJlcome tax is a flat 
rate tax, according to which everyone, regardless of the amount io! his income, pays 
the same percentage to the state. The opponents of the gradua~ income tax used 
their campaign funds to convince the voters that replacement ~f the flat rate tax 
with a graduated tax would actually increase the amount of tax m~t people would have 
to pay. See Boston Evening Globe, Nov. 1, 1972 at 1, and Nov. ~. 1972 at 1 and 24. 
See also Herald Traveler Be Boston Record American, Nov. ll, 1972 at ll. 1~ The vote was 712,0!10 for the proposed constitutional amen~ent and 1,455,6!19 
ag;unst. J. F. X. Davoren, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Election, Statistics, Common-
wealth of Massachusetts-1972, Publication No. 4m-4-7li-0749llll. 
111 G.L c. 55, §7, as amended by Acts of 1972, c. 458. 
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The Court split on the question of whether the language of the statute 
prohibited corporate expenditures to oppose a question concerning 
graduated taxes on corporate as well as individual income. 
Chief Justice Tauro, with Justice Reardon concurring, found that the 
statute did prohibit corporations from making expenditures to oppose 
such referendum questions. He read section 7 to say that, regardless of 
whether a referendum question contained provisions which might ma-
terially affect a corporation, if it dealt at all with the taxation of in-
dividuals it was not to be deemed to materially affect the corporation 
for the purposes of the statute. The Chief Justice also noted that if the 
General Court had intended that referendum questions which concern 
only the taxation of individuals were not to be deemed to materially 
affect the corporation, it could easily have made its intent clear by plac-
. ing the word "solely" before the word "concerning." He also pointed 
to the emergency preamble. No other question concerning the taxation 
of individuals was scheduled to be on the November ballot. An emer-
gency preamble must be approved by each house of the Legislature on 
votes which are separate from the votes on the actual measure. The 
Chief Justice therefore found that the only logical explanation for this 
separate action was that the General Court desired to regulate the 
imminent campaign on this particular referendum question.16 
Despite these arguments, Justice Quirico, joined by Justices Braucher 
and Kaplan, found that section 7, as amended, did not prohibit corpora-
tions from making expenditures to oppose adoption of a referendum 
question concerning graduated taxes on the income of individuals 
where the question also dealt with graduated taxes on the income of 
corporations. They read the statutory amendment as removing from the 
general prohibition only those questions which solely concern the taxa-
tion of the income of individuals. They were unwilling to believe that 
the General Court intended to suspend the "materially affecting" test 
whenever any part of a question submitted to the voters dealt with the 
taxation of the income of individuals. 
Justice Quirico's interpretation was also based on the maxim of statu-
tory construction that "[w]hen the validity of [a legislative enactment] is 
drawn into question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is 
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court ... will first ascertain 
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible, by which the 
question may be avoided."17 If the statutory amendment were inter-
preted to prohibit expenditures on all referendum proposals concerning 
16 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1716·21, 290 N.E.2d at 531·84. 
17 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1735, 290 N.E.2d at 542, quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 
u.s. 22,62 (1952). 
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the taxation of individuals, regardless of the fact that other provisions of 
the proposal materially affected a corporation, then cqrporate expendi-
tures to oppose the 1972 graduated income tax proposal would be illegal 
and the plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of the statutory 
amendment would have to be faced. Justice Quirido expressed the 
suspicion that the decision on the constitutional issue would invalidate 
the statute. If, on the other hand, the statutory amend!ment were inter-
preted to prohibit corporate expenditures on those re~erenda questions 
which solely concern the taxation of individuals, the expenditures which 
the plaintiff corporations desired to make to oppose the 1972 graduated 
income tax proposal would not be illegal, and the constitutional issues 
would not be raised.1s 
Justice Quirico alluded to the emergency preamble only in passing.19 
It is significant that he did not attempt to refute the C~ief Justice's con-
clusion that the only explanation for enacting it w'th the statutory· 
amendment was to regulate the upcoming referenda campaign on the 
proposed constitutional amendment. 
It is a general principle that when statutory language is ambiguous, 
courts attempting to construe it ought to make use of everything which 
may be of assistance in determining the proper application of the statu-
tory language to the circumstances giving rise to the dispute.2Q The 
emergency preamble seems to be a clear indication of 1egislative intent. 
Chief Justice Tauro's argument that the 1972 graduated income tax 
proposal was the only referendum question to which the emergency 
preamble, and therefore the statutory amendment, could have referred is 
convincing, and stands uncontradicted by Justice Quirico. 
If Justice Quirico's interpretation is to prevail, it must do so on the 
strength of his maxim's preference for interpretatioris which do not 
question the constitutionality of a statute. While he do~s not discuss the 
emergency preamble or what it implies about legislative intent, Justice 
Quirico finds that this maxim of statutory construction controls the 
interpretation of the statutory amendment. Whatever he sees as the 
18 A strong argument could be made that even a referendum 
1
question solely con-
cerning the taxation of the income of individuals materially afftcts the interests of 
the corporation. See Lustwerk v. Lytron, Inc., !44 Mass. 647, 651t5!, 18! N.E.2d 871, 
873·75 (1962) and text at notes 89-91 infra. It could be argued tl!tat Justice Quirico's 
interpretation does not preserve the constitutionality of the statute but only prevents 
the court from reaching the question of constitutionality in the case presently before 
it. This same charge has been leveled against opinions of the UDrited States Supreme 
Court which have applied variants of the maxim. See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 
106, 129-132 (1948) (concurring opinion). 
19 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1732·33, 290 N.E.2d at 541. 
20 See Frankfurter, Some Reftections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 
527, 542 (1947), in which John Marshall is quoted. "Where the. mind labors to discover 
the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived • • • ." 
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805). 
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implications of the emergency preamble, he considers them to be out-
weighed by the strength of the maxim.21 
The maxim derives from the doctrine of the separation of powers and 
the limitations inherent in the judicial process.22 A just respect for the 
role and prerogatives of the legislative branch has made courts reluctant 
to hold any act of a legislature unconstitutional. If there are two possible 
interpretations of a statute, one of which raises serious constitutional 
questions while the other does not, it is felt to be an infringement on the 
legislature's proper role to assume that it intended to pass an act of 
doubtful constitutionality when another "fairly possible" interpretation 
would unquestionably be valid.2a 
The beneficial effects of this doctrine may be seen in situations where 
the constitution allows the legislative branch only a portion of the 
powers sought to be exercised through a statute and where the boun-
daries of the constitutionally permissible exercise of power can be clearly 
delineated. If a court employs th~ maxim to limit legislative intent to 
what is constitutionally permissible, the legislature will not be com-
pletely frustrated in its attempt to deal with the situation.2' Quirico's 
interpretation could be seen as limiting the meaning of the statutory 
amendment to avoid raising constitutional questions. But to interpret 
the statutory amendment to G.L. c. 55, §7 so that it does not even refer 
to the graduated income tax referendum is to conclude that the General 
21 In the legislative session following the decision in First National Bank, the 
General Court amended G.L. c. 55, 17 by inserting the word "solely." The statute then 
read: "No question submitted to the voters solely ooncerning the taxation of the in· 
rome, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the 
property, business or assets of the oorporation." Acts of 1973, c. 348 {emphasis added). 
This oonformed the statute to Justice Quirioo's interpretation but did not necessarily 
imply that his interpretation of the legislative intent in passing the 1972 statutory 
amendment was oorrect. In view of the opinions in First National Bank, the General 
Court oould reasonably have assumed that a statute would be declared unoonstitutional in 
which oorporate expenditures were prohibited on referendum questions oonceming 
the taxation of individuals regardless of whatever else the same referendum question 
might ooncern. 
22 The policy's ultimate foundations .•. lie in all that goes to make up the unique 
place and character, in our scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for 
oonstitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that function, particularly 
in view of possible consequences for others stemming also from oonstitutional 
roots; the oomparative finality of those oonsequences; the consideration due to 
the judgment of other repositories of oonstitutional power ooncerning the srope 
of their authority; the necessity, if government is to function oonstitutionally, 
for each to keep within its power, including the oourts; the inherent limitations 
of the judicial process, arising especially from its largely negative character and 
limited resources of enforcement; withal in the paramount importance of consti-
tutional adjudication in our system. 
Rescue Aimy v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947). 
28 United States v. Delaware &: Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407..08 (1909). 
24 See, e.g., Demetropolos v. Commonwealth, 342 Mass. 658, 660, 175 N.E.2d 259, 261 
(1961). See text at nQte 33 infra. 
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Court had no logical reason to affix the emergency preamble to the 
statutory amendment and renders that action superfluo111s. 
The proper use of the maxim has been the subject of controversy 
among judges and commentators,211 Most of the disa~eement has cen-
tered around the issue of the proper weight to be affdrded the maxim 
when it conflicts with other evidence of legislative intent.28 While there 
is some room for dispute, employing the maxim to render meaningless a 
separate and distinct action of the legislature seems to be a misuse of it. 
An obvious corollary to the principle of the separation of powers and 
the respect for enactments of the legislative branch of g<>vernment is that 
the judiciary can invalidate an act of the legislature only if it finds that 
the act violates the constitution. The maxim is applied prior to 
reaching any decision on the issue of constitutionality, but only upon the 
court's doubt that the outcome of that inquiry would favor the validity 
of the statute.2 7 It would seem that the General Court! having gone to 
the trouble of passing a separate resolution making the ~tatutory amend-
ment effective for the election of 1972, would have preftrred a full hear-
ing on the constitutionality of that attempt before it was completely 
frustrated. 
Justice Quirico cited numerous precedents for his inter-pretation and 
asserted that they required the result he reached. Actually, all but one of 
the precedents cited stand for variants of the general proposition that 
courts should be reluctant to declare statutes unconstit,tional. They do 
not speak to the crucial issue of whether signs of legislative intent which 
clearly indicate a desire on the part of the legislature to pass a statute 
of doubtful constitutionality can be outweighed by the maxim. For 
example, Perkins v. W estwood28 and the cases cited therein29 are used 
as authority for the proposition that a statute "will not be declared void 
unless it is impossible by any reasonable construction to interpret its 
provisions in harmony with the Constitution."so This language is derived 
from a different maxim of statutory construction which provides that: 
where a statute has been passed which from its nature is necessarily 
to be referred to the exercise of powers granted by a particular 
211 See Bernard, Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in the United States Supreme 
Court: Liberties of the First Amendment, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 261 (1951); Note, 55 
Colum. L. Rev. 655 (1955); Note, 22 Md. L Rev. !J48 (1962). 
28 Some oommentators have found that the maxim establishes ll presumption that 
in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary the legislatur~ did not intend to 
exceed its oonstitutional powers. See, e.g., Bernard, note 25 liupra. Others have 
hypothesized that the weight of the maxim varies with the strength of the oontroversy 
around the oonstitutional issues in question. Note, 55 Colum. L. ~ev. 655 (1955). 
27 United States v. Delaware Be Hudson Co., 215 U.S. 566, 407-08 (1909). 
28 226 Mass. 268, 115 N.E. 411 (1917). 
29 Id. at 271, 115 N.E. at 412. 
ao 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1755, 290 N.E.2d at 542, quoting Perkins v. Westwood, 226 
Mass. 268, 271, 115 N.E. 411, 411·12 (emphasis added). The quoted language is dicta. 
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clause in the constitution, under one branch of which it would be 
clearly invalid, but under another it might be sustained as being 
within the limits of constitutional authority, it is the duty of this 
court to presume that the legislature intended to act under that 
portion [of the constitution] which will support the statute and 
give it validity, unless [the statute's] language is so clear and explicit 
as to render it impossible by any reasonable construction so to in-
terpret it.81 
This second maxim is based on the same general judicial reluctance to 
invalidate acts of the legislature as the maxim sought to be applied by 
Justice Quirico. However, Justice Quirico's maxim seeks to determine 
legislative intent, while the other refers to the question of which grant of 
legislative power will be used to measure the validity of a statute whose 
meaning is clear or whose meaning has already been determined. In the 
effort to determine whether unambiguous legislative intent is constitu-
tional, respect for a co-equal branch of government requires that the 
court give the legislature a fully considered decision on the constitu-
tional question before refusing to enforce its intent. If any provision of 
the constitution would sustain the power of the legislature to enact the 
statute, it must be upheld. The only exception is where it is impossible 
by any reasonable construction to interpret the statute with reference 
to that constitutional provision which would have to sustain it. On the 
other hand, if the court fails to construe a statute in a way clearly favored 
by indicia of legislative intent, it will have frustrated that intent without 
affording the legislature a full decision on the constitutional issue. This 
result is contrary to the respect owed to the legislative branch by the 
judiciary. Thus, it seems that the maxim should be limited to those cases 
in which legislative intent will be saved or in which there are two 
fairly possible interpretations. 
Only one case cited by Justice Quirico, Demetropolos v. Common-
wealth,82 supports the use of the maxim to outweigh the usual signs of 
legislative intent.83 The defendant in Demetropolos was prosecuted for 
81 Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Savings Bank, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 428, 
431-32 (1862). While it is not immediately clear from Perkins that the quoted language 
derives from the second maxim, each of the cases cited in Perkins as authority for the 
language quoted by Justice Quirico employ the second maxim without exception. 
Those cases are alluded to by Justice Quirico as authority for the quoted language. 
Only one of those cases mentions the maxim sought to be applied by Justice Quirico. 
In that case it plays only a minor role and is overshadowed by the second maxim. 
82 342 Mass. 658, 660, 175 N.E.2d 259,261 (1961). 
88 Except for Demetropolos, Justice Quirico's Massachusetts citations either deal 
with other maxims derived from the courts' reluctance to declare legislative enactments 
unconstitutional or with the maxim sought to be applied by him, but in circumstances 
where extrinsic signs of legislative intent are absent or point to the same interpretation 
favored by the maxim. The circumstances of First National Bank include clear in-
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selling pornographic magazines. The statute under whith he was charged 
did not expressly require a finding that the seller was aware that the 
magazines were pornographic. Another statute prohibited the sale of 
pornographic books and was identical to the statut¢ prohibiting the 
sale of pornographic magazines except that it did e~pressly require a 
finding of intent to sell pornography. The legislature is presumed to 
know its own , enactments. The usual inference drawn from statutes 
which are identical except for a provision included in one but not in-
the other is that the difference was intentional. The ~mitted provision 
will not be read in by implication. This rule would otdinarily have led 
the court in Demetropolos to find that the statute pr~hibiting the sale 
of pornographic magazines did not include intent as an essential element 
of the crime. The United States Supreme Court, how¢ver, had recently 
ruled that a statute criminalizing the sale of pornographic materials 
must require a finding of intent in order to pass constitutional muster.•• 
The Supreme Judicial Court viewed the statutory lapguage as having 
two possible interpretations. One, following the usual' rule of statutory 
construction, would not imply the requirement of a ~nding of intent. 
The other would require such a finding for convicti~n. The Supreme 
Judicial Court then applied the maxim and, despite ~e implications of 
the usual rule of construction, found an implied req .. rement of intent 
to sell pornography.aG The situation in Demetropolos ;is distinguishable 
from that of First National Bank because the fore¢ of a separately 
enacted emergency preamble would seem to be greater • than the implica-
tions of the differences between similarly worded statutes. More im-
portantly, the Court in Demetropolos was apparentiy trying to save 
what it could of the statute. While Justice Quirico can be said to have 
I 
saved some of the statutory amendment, he makes no ~ffort to show that 
he saved any of the emergency preamble. 
Justice Quirico also cites United States v. UAW," a United States 
Supreme Court case dealing with the prohibition of union "expendi-
tures" in federal elections.87 UAW does not apply the maxim, and in 
dicia of legislative intent pointing to an interpretation of the l!tatute which would 
raise constitutional issues. They are, therefore, different in im~rtant respects from 
the circumstances of the cases cited. Justice Quirico described thc!Se cases as justifying 
the application of the maxim in the circumstances of First Natiorlal Banlc but he gave 
no reasoning to justify the extension of their holding to cover !the changed circum-
stances. 
84 Smith v. California, !161 U.S. 147 (1959). 
811 !142 Mass. at 661; 175 N.E.2d at 262. 
86 !152 u.s. 567 (1957). 
87 The relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. §610, prior to ita amendthent by the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971, provided: • 
It is unlawful . • • for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to 
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any • election at which 
Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in • • • 
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fact refuses to apply it in the presence of clear indications of legislative 
intent. A union was prosecuted for sponsoring a television program in 
which a candidate for Congress was endorsed. The lower court attempted 
to avoid constitutional issues and applied the maxim to carve out an 
exception to the total prohibition.3B It interpreted the term "expendi-
ture" so as not to include funds spent to purchase television time and 
dismissed the indictment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded 
for trial and determination of the statute's constitutionality.39 In review-
ing the history of congressional attempts to purify elections, the Court 
found, in the committee reports on the bill that became the statute and 
in the remarks of the sponsor of the bill, an intent to include the pur-
chase of television time for a candidate within the meaning of the term 
"expenditure." The maxim was held not to apply.4o 
The voice of a majority of the legislature voting in favor of an 
emergency , preamble is, if anything, an even stronger indication of 
legislative intent than the history of the statute, the committee reports 
and the remarks of the sponsor. If these considerations are strong enough 
to prevent the maxim from applying, an emergency preamble should also 
be strong enough to prevent its application.41 
When beneficially used, the maxim preserves legislative intent. But its 
use always involves a tension between the desire to avoid constitutional 
issues and the courts' responsibility to come to a full decision on the 
constitutional issue actually raised before it refuses to enforce legisla-
tive intent. Use of the maxim to render meaningless the separate action 
of the legislature in passing the emergency preamble does not serve 
legislative intent but rather sacrifices it without a decision on the con-
stitutional issue. Based on legislative intent, the more reasonable inter-
pretation of the statute see~s to be that of Chief Justice Tauro. 
Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or 
political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing 
offices •••• 
38 United States v. UAW, 138 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Mich. 1956). In this case, the strength 
of the maxim was enhanced in the light of Congress' express desire not to pass an 
unconstitutional statute. 
89 UAW is an excellent example of how the use of the maxim differs from the use 
of other principles designed to avoid the decision of constitutional issues. While 
finding that the expression of legislative intent was so strong that the constitutional 
issue was not to be avoided by strained interpretation, the Court declined to decide 
the important constitutional issue presented by the case until it had the benefit of the 
lower courts' consideration of it. 
40 352 U.S. at 589. 
41 UAW is one of three United States Supreme Court cases which construed the 
former version of 18 U.S.C. §610, note 37 supra, cited by Justice Quirico and in which 
statutory construction is discussed. The other two cases are United States v. CIO, 335 
U.S. 106, 120-21 (1948), and Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 
401 n.12 (1972). 
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II. FllEEooM OF SPEECH AND CoRPORATE EXPRESSION 
Chief Justice Tauro, joined by Justice Reardon, felt that he could not 
ignore the emergency preamble. He interpreted the 'statutory amend-
ment to mean that no referendum question which cohcerned the taxa-
tion of the income of individuals could be considered to "materially 
affect" the interests of the corporation within the meaqing of G.L. c. 55, 
§7,42 regardless of other parts of that referendum that might in fact 
materially affect corporations.4a He therefore found ~rporate expendi-
tures to influence the vote on the 1972 graduated inoome tax proposal 
prohibited by G.L. c. 55, §7. 
The Chief Justice divided his analysis into two part$. First, he found 
that corporations are afforded at least some First Amendment rights by 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to 
referenda which materially affect them. The legal theory from which he 
derived these rights is not clearly spelled out in the opinion. Freedom 
of speech has been held to be one of the fundamental personal rights and 
liberties protected by the due process clause.44 Chief Justice Tauro's 
opinion indicates that he based the existence of a corpQrate. right of free 
speech upon the premise that corporations are "persons" within the 
meaning of the due process clause, and therefore qual1fy for its protec-
tion. However, the only reason expressly given to justify the result of his 
holding relates to the right of the voters to be inform~d on referendum 
issues. This implies a rationale for the decision which· extends constitu-
tional protection to corporate speech, not to prot¢ct the right of 
corporate "persons" to speak, but to protect the right of the "persons" 
who make up the general public to hear what the corporations have to 
say. . 
Once he determined that corporate speech is constitutionally protected, 
the Chief Justice turned to the question of whether the prohibition en-
forced by the statute was a permissible regulation of ~orporate speech. 
The state may not regulate constitutionally protected speech unless 
certain stringent criteria are met. The interest of the . state must 
be a compelling one and the means employed to further that interest 
must be the least restrictive which would be effective td attain the state's 
goal.411 The Chief Justice concluded that 
42 The relevant portions of G.L. c. 55, §7 appear in the text at 
1
note 15 supra. 
43 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1716-21, 290 N.E.2d at 5!11-M. For a mqre general discussion 
of this problem, see Garrett, Corporate Contributions for Politicjll Purposes, 14 Bus. 
Law. !165, ll68 n.7 (1959). 
44 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Near v. Minnesota, 28!1 
U.S. 697, 707 (19!11). The Chief Justice also mentioned the coverage of corporations 
as persons under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Al:nendment. It would 
seem that the meaning of the word person as used in both these clauses of the 
Amendment would be the same. In any case, his analysis of the cdnstitutional implica-
tions of the statute refers only to due process standards. i 
411 See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, ll2ll U.S. 516, 5!10 (1945); Sherbert v. Verner, 574 U.S. 
598, 406-09 (196!1); Bridges v. California, 514 U.S. 252, 26!1 (1941). · 
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[a ]!though a corporation's expression on political issues is subject 
to some restraint, we hold that in the absence of a compelling State 
interest showing that any amount of corporate expression, however 
small, on election questions results in undue influence over the 
electoral process, corporations may not be totally prohibited from 
expressing their views on issues that materially affect them. The 
voters have a right to be informed on referenda issues. The statu-
tory amendment does not meet the requirements of a narrowly 
drawn law, circumscribing only the evil to be curtailed.46 
The final portion of this comment will first describe the limits of the 
holding of the Chief Justice's opinion. It will then examine the basis on 
which the Chief Justice extends constitutional protection to corporate 
speech. Finally, it will discuss the Chief Justice's conclusion that a com-
plete prohibition of corporate speech is not the least restrictive means of 
satisfying the state's compelling interests in limiting corporate speech. 
The holding of the Chief Justice's opinion can be stated very nar-
rowly. It deals with restrictions on corporate expenditures to influence 
the vote on substantive proposals submitted to the people for their 
approval or rejection. It refrains, at least ostensibly, from dealing with 
campaigns for elective office. In the case of a referendum question, the 
state's primary interest is in preventing one side from being so well 
financed that the debate over the proposal is not a clear exposition of 
the issues. In elections at which public officials are to be chosen the 
state has the additional interest of preventing corruption. The opinion 
does not address the question of whether the added weight of the state's 
interest in preventing corruption would justify a complete prohibition 
of corporate speech in elections at which public officials are to be chosen. 
Were the question of a corporation's right to contribute funds in aid of 
a candidate for public office ever presented, its resolution would not then 
be conclusively governed by considerations dealt with by Chief Justice 
Tauro in First National Bank. 
Another situation outside the ambit of the holding is the matter of the 
corporate right to speak on questions submitted to the voters which. do 
not materially affect the interests of the corporation.47 The Chief Justice 
46 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1729-30, 290 N.E.2d at 539. The Chief Justice also found 
corporate speech to be protected by Article Sixteen of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights. Article Sixteen protects the "liberty of the press" and right of "free speech." 
Chief Justice Tauro saw "no reason why such freedoms should not also be afforded to 
the corporations in the instant case .•. ," Id. at 1726, 290 N.E.2d at 537. The Chief 
Justice gave no separate analysis of whether the statutory amendment exceeded the 
General Court's power to regulate speech protected by Article Sixteen. Evidently he 
was persuaded that, at least as applied to the circumstances of First National Bank, 
Article Sixteen echoed the guarantees of the federal constitution. A similar approach 
was taken in Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E.2d 115 
(1946), in which the Supreme Judicial Court decided an Article Sixteen question on 
the basis of First Amendment precedents. 
47 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1724,290 N.E.2d at 536. 
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specifically excluded corporate speech on such referenda from the scope 
of his holdingfs In so doing, he seems to be leaving open the possibility 
that corporations might be found to have no right to speak on questions 
submitted to the voters which do not materially affect corporate interests. 
Further, the opinion does not attempt to delineate the particular aspects 
of the proposed graduated income tax amendment whfch do materially 
affect the interests of the plaintiff corporations. TM 1972 graduated 
income tax proposal would have allowed the General Court to impose 
graduated taxes on both corporate and personal income. It is obvious 
that such a proposal materially affects the interests of corporations. It 
is also obvious that a proposal to impose a tax on corporate income alone 
would materially affect the interests of corporations. The questions of 
whether a referendum which solely concerned the taxation of the income 
of individuals would also be found to materially affect a corporation and 
whether a prohibition on corporate expenditures to influence the vote 
on such a referendum question would therefore be un~onstitutional are 
not determined4D Finally, the opinion does not purport to set limits 
upon the power of the General Court to regulate corpoirate expenditures 
to influence the vote on questions submitted to the people, except to 
disallow a complete prohibition of corporate speech regarding questions 
that materially affect the interests of the corporation.110 Here the Chief 
Justice seems to have suggested that the imposition of l¢Ss restrictive, but 
still severe, limits on corporate political expenditures might be upheld.lll 
Narrowly stated, Chief Justice Tauro's opinion only 'finds unconstitu-
tional complete prohibitions on corporate expenditures to influence the 
vote on referendum questions which "materially affect" the interests of a 
corporation. 52 
III. THE BASIS OF TilE CoRPORATE RIGHT TO SPEAK 
The First Amendment prohibits the federal government from abridg-
ing the freedom of speech.113 Its restrictions have beep applied to the 
states by the Fourteenth Amendment.114 The traditiona~ means of invok-
48 Id. 
49 Referenda solely referring to the taxation of individuals might very well be held 
to materially affect corporations. See text at notes 91-92 infra. 
110 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 17!10, 290 N.E.2d at 5!19. 
Ill Id. 
62 Id. 
113 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law .•• abridging 
the freedom of spc:ech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of their grievances." U.S. 
Const. amend. I. 
64 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that: "No state 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property withou~ due process of law 
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ing the protection of these provisions is for the aggrieved party to 
assert that his rights under the Constitution have been violated by the 
state. Under the traditional analysis, a party would argue that he was a 
"person" who was being deprived of his "liberty" to speak.~>5 
An alternate way to justify the extension of freedom of speech to a 
party is to find that the protection of the rights of someone else depends 
on giving rights to the claimant.56 The heart of such an approach are 
the premises that the people are the ultimate sovereign; that public dis-
cussion is the only way the people can decide a public issue; and that 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee them the public dis-
cussion that they need for the proper exercise of their sovereign power.57 
If a given type of speech will help the people to decide the issues before 
them, their right to hear that speech gives the speaker the right to say it, 
even though he may have no independent right to speak on his own. 
Under this analysis, the "persons" who are being protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment are the members of the general public. The 
"liberty" being protected is their right to hear. 
The Chief Justice addresses the threshold question of whether corpora-
tions can lay any claim at all to constitutional protection, with the 
justification for that protection to be found in the nature and status of 
corporations themselves. He explicitly found that corporations are "per-
sons" within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and that their right to speak is a "liberty" protected by that 
Amendment.~>s In two of the cases which the Chief Justice cited as pre-
.••. "U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Through this language the First Amendment has been 
applied to the states. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
Cili See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., !193 U.S. 50!1 (1969). 
116 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, !176 U.S. 254 (1964). 
117 Id. at 267-8!1. In New York Times the police commissioner of a southern town 
obtained a libel verdict in state court against the Times for printing an advertisement 
purchased by civil rights activists which contained some inaccuracies marginally re-
lating to the commissioner. A verdict of $500,000 was awarded to the plaintiff. The 
Times asserted that the state libel laws were unconstitutional abridgements of freedom 
of speech and of the press. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that inaccurate state-
ments about public officials were inevitable in the "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" 
public debate envisioned by the First Amendment. Id. at 270. The Court reasoned that 
subjecting the people and the press to the danger of large libel judgments where 
statements about public officials were merely inaccurate, would cause them to withhold 
comments unless they were sure that their allegations were true. The Court was of the 
opinion that such "self-censorship" would prevent full discussion and disclosure of 
the conduct of public officials. The Court regarded such discussion as protected by the 
First Amendment and essential to a democratic society. In order to protect the right 
of the people to hear the facts essential to the intelligent exercise of their franchise, 
the right of others to engage in debate about public officials without this restraint 
must be guaranteed. 
Ci8 The Chief Justice quoted Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 2!13, 244 
(19!16) in noting that " 'a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the equal 
protection and due process clauses ..•• "' 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1722-23, 290 N.E.2d 
at 5!15. 
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cedents for his decision, Covington · i:t Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co. v. 
Sanfordli9 and Smyth v. Ames#eo the Supreme Court fom!ld that states had 
taken corporate property without due process of law irl violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Covington and Smyth provide no reasoning to 
support their assertion that corporations are "persons" Within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment.61 The first case cited by both of them 
is Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R.62 The portion of that case 
in which corporations were held to be protected by. the due process 
clause was affirmed by the Supreme Court without comlment. The lower 
court had reasoned that since the value of the shares of corporate stock 
held by individuals is dependent on the value of the ptoperty owned by 
the corporation, any seizure of corporate property by the government 
would necessarily reduce the value of each share owned by an individual. 
Such a red"~Jction in the value of stock takes the individual shareholder's 
property. Therefore, the conditions under which the !government may 
take corporate property must be the same as the conditions under which 
it may take an individual's property, i.e.# only with du~ process of law.63 
All of the other authorities on which Covington and Smyth rely for their 
fiat statements that corporations are "persons" within the meaning of the 
due process clause depend on the rationale of the loweri court opinion in 
Santa Clara." Despite the fact that for decades the Supreme Court has 
The Attorney General attacked the proposition that corporations were "persons" 
whose "liberty" was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. iHe cited a number 
of cases which bad specifically rejected that proposition, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Life 
Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 205 U.S. 24!1, 255 (1906). 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. atl1722, 290 N.E.2d at 
5!15. He attempted to distinguish prior cases which bad held corporations to be pro-
tected by First Amendment liberties applied to the states by th~ due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment by showing that all of those corporations bad been 
in the business of communications and were classifiable as "pres$." The plaintills in 
First NationtJl Bank were engaged in general business pursuitJ and the Attorney 
General argued that the "liberties" of such corporations had never been fOund to be 
protected, and in fact, bad been found to be unprotected. 
The Chief Justice went to great lengths to refute the importance of the press/non-
press distinction. He noted cases where corporations involved in the production of 
motion pictures, books and magazines sold for a profit bad been found to be protected· 
from state abridgement of their activities. However, he could find ~ convincing reason 
to deny the distinction's validity and was forced to make the l~e conclusion that 
"we believe it is a distinction that does not defeat the Plaintiffs' ~ght to First Amend-
ment protection ••• ," 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1724, 290 N.E~ a~ 5!16. 
G9 164 U.S. 578 (1896). 
80 169 u.s. 466 (1898). 
81 164 U.S. at 592; 169 U.S. at 522. 
82 118 U.S. !194, 396 (1886), atf'g County of Santa Clara v. Soutllem Pacific R.R., 18 
Fed. !185 (C.C.D. Cal. 188!1). I . 
63 County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific R.R., 18 Fed. !185 (C.C.D. Cal. 188!1). 
M See Pembina Consol. Silver Mining &: Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 
189 (1888); Minneapolis &: St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889); Charlotte, 
C. &: A. R.R. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 586, !191 (1892); Gulf, Coloradd &: Santa F6 Ry. v. 
Ellis, 165 u.s. 150, 154 (1897). 
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relied on flat assertions that corporations are "persons" protected by the 
due process clause, it appears that corporate property is protected by the 
due process clause only because the protection of corporate property is 
essential to the protection of the personal property of the owners of the 
corporate stock. The "persons" being protected are the individuals who 
own stock.85 The "property" being protected is the value of that stock. 
Strictly applied, the Santa Clara approach is not authority for a 
corporate right to speak as a means of protecting the right to speak of 
the owners of the corporation. By prohibiting corporations from speak-
ing, the government does not deprive the natural persons who own the 
corporation of their own right to speak. Thus, although the value of 
each individual stockholder's property is necessarily reduced when 
corporate property is reduced, the individual stockholder's right to speak 
and expend funds for political purposes remains unaffected when the 
corporation's ability to expend funds on political issues is restricted." 
However, there is a right of natural persons which might not be pro-
tected unless corporate speech is protected, i.e., the right of the general 
public to be informed on referendum issues. Granting constitutional pro-
tection to corporations when such protection is necessary to secure the 
rights of the owners of the corporation is one step removed from grant-
ing constitutional protection to corporations when such protection is 
necessary to secure the rights of natural persons other than the owners. 
That step seems to have been taken in Grosjean v. American Press 
Co.e7 and its progeny,68 which were also cited by the Chief Justice in his 
attempt to demonstrate that corporation themselves are "persons" within 
the meaning of the due process clause. Grosjean involved a challenge, 
by corporations which owned and operated newspapers, to a statute 
a The situations in which corporations have been held to be "persons" within the 
meaning of the due process clause all appear to be circumstances in which corporate 
property was held to be protected or where corporations in the business of communica-
tions successfully maintained that their freedom of the press was being violated. 
66 It could be argued that the owner's right to associate for political purposes was 
being abridged by the prohibition on corporate political expenditures. The United 
States Supreme Court has disposed of similar contentions in its interpretation of the 
former version of 18 U.S.C. §610. That statute contained a flat prohibition on union 
activity in federal elections. In Pipefitter's Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. ll85 (1972), 
the Court interpreted the prohibition so as not to forbid voluntary associations which 
paralleled the structure of the union and whose funds were solicited by the same union 
representatives who collected dues. By analogy, the Court arguably would allow some 
corporate support for efforts of controlling shareholders or officers to solicit funds 
from shareholders and employees. The assodational rights of shareholders would thus 
be preserved. However, the requirement that the funds of the voluntary association be 
kept separate from accumulated corporate funds would protect the public's interest 
in limiting corporate political expenditures. 
87 297 u.s. 235, 244 (1956). 
88 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 545 U.S. 495 (1952); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 576 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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which imposed an advertising tax on all newspapers with a circulation 
over a certain number. The Supreme Court found such taxes to be 
among the restraints on the press which were often imposed under 
English law of the colonial period and which the Firs~ Amendment had 
been specifically intended to deny to the new goveijnment,69 and ex-
plicitly stated that corporations are "persons" protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,70 citing Covington and 
Smyth.n However, the root justification for the result reached by the 
Court is the function of a free press in providh1g the information neces-
sary to enable the people to make informed decisions Qn public issues.72 
In Grosjean it seems clear that the Court based its decision on the latter 
consideration. Covington73 and Smyth,T• the cases cited to support the 
Court's statements that corporations are protected by the due process 
clause, involved challenges to state action depriving corporations of 
property. Grosjean involved a tax which, if unconstitJ.Itionally applied, 
would result in the deprivation of corporate property, but the Court 
dismissed the importance of these considerations. 
The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the 
pockets of [the corporations]. If that were all, a wholly different 
question would be presented. It is bad because, in the light of its 
history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and 
calculated device in the guise of a. tax to limit the circulation of in-
formation to which the public is entitled in virtue of the con-
stitutional guarantees. A free press stands as one of the great 
interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it 
to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.711 
For Grosjean to require the result which Chief Justice Tauro reaches 
in First National Bank, the freedom of expression of general business 
69 297 U.S. at 245-49. 
70 Id. at 244. 
71 Id. 
72 The Court in Grosjean quoted 2 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 886 (8th ed.): 
The Evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any 
action of the government by means of which it might prevent $Uch free and gen-
eral discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essenti~l to prepare the 
people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens. 
297 U.S. at 249-50. 
73 164 u.s. 578 (1896). 
74 169 u.s. 466 (1898). 
711 297 U.S. at 250. Minority opinions in two United States Supreme Court cases also 
support the proposition that corporations have a right to speak ~hich is derived from 
the people's right to hear, as opposed to any inherent right in corporations. See United 
States v. CIO, !1!15 U.S. 106, 144, 154-55 (1948), and UJlited States v~ UAW, !152 U.S. 567, 
59!1, 597 (1957). See also King, Corporate Political Spending and the First Amendment, 
2!1 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 847 (1962). 
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corporations must be required for the proper functioning of democracy.'' 
The Chief Justice assumes that a prohibition on corporate speech will 
completely silence the corporate point of view.n If this is true, in view of 
the important role of corporations in American life, the people would 
not be provided with sufficient information to make intelligent decisions 
at the polls. · 
In this way the Chief Justice's assertion that the people have a right 
to be informed comes together with the holdings of the cases he uses as 
authority to support his conclusion. However, the Chief Justice never 
distinguished between a corporate right to speak derived from rights 
inherent in corporations as "persons" and a corporate right to speak 
derived from the people's right to be informed. This confusion allowed 
him to make assumptions which, when viewed in the framework of the 
people's right to hear, do not seem as self-evident as they do when viewed 
in the framework of an inherent corporate right to speak. 
Specifically, if corporations were found to have an inherent right to 
speak, it is obvious that a complete prohibition on corporate speech 
would violate their First and Fourteenth amendment rights. But when 
the complete prohibition is viewed from the standpoint of the people's 
right to hear, it is not self-evident that a complete prohibition on 
corporate political speech would deprive the people of exposure to the 
corporate point of view. Many corporations will have spokesmen in 
those citizens whose financial interests in the corporation are sufficient to 
motivate them to protect its interests. This could include directors and 
employees as well as stockholders. Thus, a statute prohibiting the use of 
corporate funds in political campaigns would, for many corporations, 
merely throw the burden of paying for political expression on the real 
parties in interest, i.e., the citizens with a stake in the corporation. The 
Chief Justice, viewing the prohibition from the point of view of a right 
to speak inherent in corporations, did not discuss this question. From 
the standpoint of the right of the hearer, the question is a close one and 
needs to be discusse~.7s It is submitted that if the full Court ever con-
'18 Ckosjean has been referred to as a precursor of the line of cases granting First 
Amendment rights on the basis of the people's right to hear. Comment, Freedom to 
Hear: A Political Justification of the First Amendment, 46 Wash. L llev. 511, .555 
(1971). The Grosjean Court's citations of Smyth and Cuuington and its reliance on Bat 
statements that corporations are protected by the due process clause might possibly be 
traced to its uncertainty about the right of the hearer rationale. Since the decision in 
Gf'osjean, however, the right of the hearer has become an established feature of First 
Amendment analysis. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 576 U.S. 254 (1964). 
77 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1721, 1724, 1729, 290 N.E.2d at 554, 556, 559. The Chid 
Justice does not provide any reasoning or factual material to support his assumption. 
78. It is conceivable that there may be some corporations whose stock is 10 widely 
dispersed and whose oOicers serve at such low rates of compensation that no individual 
will have the incentive to protect his interests by giving voice to its views. It may be 
important to the public that the views of such corporations be aired, and to enfcm:e 
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siders the constitutionality of legislative prohibitions on ~rporate speech, 
the justices should consider it in the framework of the :people's right to 
hear. If they do, the first question to be answered is whether a complete 
prohibition on corporate speech would effectively silence the corporate 
point of view as to any issue. If it is found that a prqhibition on cor-
porate speech will effectively style some corporate points of view, the 
constitutionality of the statute will turn on whether th~ public's interest 
in hearing the corporate speech is outweighed by the $tate's interest in 
limiting it.'1'8 . 
In First National Bank two justices found a prohibition on corporate 
speech to be unconstitutional and three justices had serious doubts about 
its constitutionality. Regardless of the theory on whiq,. these decisions 
were based, prohibitions on corporate speech do not se~ to be favored 
by the Supreme Judicial Court. Whatever the outco~e of any future 
dispute over the constitutionality of a complete prohibition on corporate 
political speech, it is hoped that a decision will be based exclusively on 
the people's right to hear and not be confused with thei consideration of 
any inherent right of corporate "persons" to speak.80 
IV. THE LIMITATION OF mE HoLDING ro THosE :REFERENDA 
QuESTioNs WHICH MATERIALLY AFFEar mE CoRPORATION 
The Chief Justice found that corporations are protefted by constitu-
tional guarantees of freedom of speech "at least in circumstances where 
they seek to express their views to the public on refet!enda issues that 
materially affect them.."81 This phrase was appended to. his finding that 
a prohibition on corporate speech that would muzzle such views would be counter to 
the public interest. 
'1'8 One interest which the state has in limiting or prohibitinErporate speech has 
not been mentioned in the literature and should be noted; i.e., tha of refraining from 
fostering inequalities in the ability of citizens to express th .lves. Cf. Columbia 
Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat1 Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 121 (1978). Corporate 
speech is controlled by those who control . the corporation, although they may not 
necessarily own all or even a majority of the stock. Furthermore~ if the stockholder 
or director had to pay for political advertisements out of his ownj stock dividends or 
salary, he would have to pay graduated inmme taxes on such Ids. On the other 
hand, employees, conservationists and consumers have no access corporate speech 
and must pay personal inmme taxes on any funds used for po "tical contributions 
above certain small exemptions. : 
80 The state's next move may be to put severe limits on cor.forate speech. The 
Chief Justice left the door open for this type of regulation. 1972: Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1780, 290 N.E.2d at 589. The fact that many corporations have llllo4holders, employees 
or directors who will express their· point of view lessens any int~t in allowing cor-
porate speech, and the state's interests in preventing corruption and undue influence 
and in limiting the advantages in expressing political views that lthe tax llDd incor-
poration laws give to those in control of mrporations would seem: to justify a 1e9e1e 
restriction on corporate speech. · 
81 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1724, 290 N.E.2d at 586. 
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corporate speech is protected, and is not discussed further. It may merely 
represent an attempt to limit the scope of the opinion to the circum-
stances of First National Bank. Nevertheless, as it is used, the limitation 
of constitutional protection of corporate speech to referendum issues 
which materially affect the interests of the corporation may also be in-
terpreted to mean that corporate speech needs some special qualification 
to claim constitutional protection. As such, it may be viewed as a new 
test for determining the constitutional protection afforded to corporate 
speech. 
Except to say that the people have a right to be informed on referen-
dum issues, the Chief Justice said nothing about how a constitutional 
"materially affecting" test would segregate expression that the First 
Amendment was intended to protect from expression which is not suf-
ficiently related to First Amendment goals to merit its protection. One 
possible dividing line suggests itself. Corporations play such an impor-
tant role in the modern economy that the people should know how they 
will be affected by proposed changes in the law. Their need to hear 
what the corporation has to say is most acute when corporate speech 
deals with those issues which materially affect the corporation. On the 
other hand, a state may have an interest in restricting a corporation 
from speaking on issues that don't materially affect it, interests in 
addition to preventing undue influence.82 One such interest could be 
that of preventing those who control a corporation and determine what it 
shall say from appropriating for their own political purposes funds 
which would otherwise be paid out as dividends to all the stockholders. 
Where a referendum question affects a corporation, it may be assumed 
that those who control the corporation, management or a controlling 
group of stockholders, can be relied upon to represent the interests of 
the corporation. But corporate speech on a referendum proposal that 
does not materially affect the corporation could be an abuse of corporate 
funds by those in control of the corporation for the purpose of further-
ing their own political views. The state could have a strong interest in 
preventing such expenditures to protect minority stockholders. This 
interest, together with the interest in preventing undue influence, might 
even justify a complete prohibition of corporate speech. 
The Chief Justice gave us little guidance in determining whether 
such a material effect exists as to a referendum question other than a tax 
on the incomes of corporations and individuals. Used as a constitutional 
test, the "materially affecting" standard is not the same concept of 
"materially affecting" that remains embodied in G.L. c. 55, §7. The test 
by which referendum questions are determined to materially affect a 
corporation under the statute depends upon a fair construction of the 
statutory language and the legislative intent. That intent was interpreted 
82 Cf. United States v. CIO, !1!15 U.S. 106, 1!14 (1948). 
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to include issues of graduated income taxes in Lustwerk, v. Lytron Inc.,83 
but that interpretation was supplanted by the General Court when it 
adopted the statutory amendment.84 The materially ~ffecting standard 
used by the Chief Justice in First National Bank includes issues of 
graduated income taxes on both corporations and individuals. It is a 
judicially promulgated standard and does not depend upon legislative 
intent. 
If it is a new constitutional standard, the Chief Justice was casual 
about its promulgation. Except for a reference to Lustwerk,85 we are not 
afforded the means to determine whether a referendum question can be 
fairly said to materially affect the corporation. The C4ief Justice spoke 
only of issues "materially affecting the plaintiffs' business,"86 or more 
simply, of issues that "materially affect [corporations]."87 The language 
of the statute speaks of issues "materially affecting any of the property, 
business or assets of the corporation."88 The Chief Justice did not state 
whether he is using a shorthand term equivalent to t]le longer phrase 
used in the statute or whether the difference in language· means that the 
standard for determining that which materially affects the interests of a 
corporation in constitutional terms is different than the standard for 
determining that which materially affects the interests of a corporation 
in terms of the statute. 
The practical problems in applying the materially !lffecting test are 
immense. The debate as to the materiality of the effect on corporations 
of a referendum question solely concerning the graduated income tax of 
individuals provides a good example of this.89 In both First National 
Bank and Lustwerk, corporations argued that a tax on personal income 
materially affected their property, business and asset$. Their reasons 
ranged from the effect that such a tax would have on the general business 
climate ofthe Commonwealth to the effect it would have on the willing-
ness of highly paid executives to come to Massachusetts to work for the 
corporation and the salaries that the corporations would have to pay all 
their personnel.90 Both Lustwerk and First National Bank also involved 
83 844 Mass. 647, 183 N.E.2d 871 (1962). 
84 G.L c. 55, §7, as amended by Acts of 1972, c. 458. 
85 The reference is general in that the Court notes that LustuJ,erk held graduated 
income taxes to materially affect corporations and assumes throughout the opinion 
that the 1972 graduated income tax proposal would materially affect corporations. See, 
e.g., 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1718, 290 N.E.2d at 532. 
86 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1724, 290 N.E.2d at 536. 
87 Id. 
88 G.L. c. 55, §7 (1972). See text at note 15 supra. · 
89 Such an example is particularly relevant because Justice Quirico interpreted G.L. 
c. 55, §7, as amended, to bar corporate expenditures on referend"m questions which 
solely concerned personal income taxes, and because in 1973, after the decision in 
First National Bank, the General Court amended the statute again and conformed it 
to Justice Quirico's interpretation. See note 21 supra. 
90 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1734, 290 N.E.2d at 541; !144 Mass. at 650, 183 N.E.2d at 
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taxes on corporate income, thereby justifying a finding of a material 
effect without an exploration of the effects on corporations of a tax solely 
on personal income. Yet neither case rejected the corporations' assertion 
that a tax solely on personal income would materially affect them. Chief 
Justice Tauro in a footnote indicated that the mere indirectness of the 
effect that a measure, such as one proposing a tax solely on individual 
income, might have on a corporation would not necessarily disqualify it 
from being material, and therefore protected, under his opinion. 91 
Nevertheless it seems that some questions that would impinge to some 
degree on the corporation would have so immaterial an effect as not to be 
within the class of issues on which it is helpful for the people to hear 
the corporate point of view. For example a corporation could argue 
that a referendum question on school busing would affect its ability to 
recruit employees from out of state. Conceivably, any question submitted 
to the voters might be cast in a light emphasizing as material an effect 
upon the corporation which in reality is quite ephemeral. Officers or 
controlling stockholders might be tempted to devise ingenious charac-
terizations in order to harness corporate funds to voice their own in-
dividual viewpoints. Indeed, the energetic corporate opposition to the 
1972 proposal for a graduated income tax is not free from criticism that 
it was primarily impelled by corporate officers and controlling stock-
holders fearful of high-bracket status under the individual income tax 
provisions of the proposal. 
Similar problems arise in determining the degree of effect which is 
"material." It could be argued that anything that takes any money from 
the corporation is material to its interests. Perhaps the answer is a com-
mon sense test based on the circumstances of each particular case. How-
ever such a test would be exceedingly difficult to apply since each set of 
circumstances is different, and would lead to litigation as to the legality 
of prohibitions on corporate expenditures on each individual referen-
dum issue as applied to each general type of corporation. Each decision 
would depend upon a myriad of factors, and general rules would be 
difficult to develop. In addition, these factors change over time; decision 
in any one case would not necessarily be dispositive of the relationship 
between the general type of corporation and the general type of referen-
dum question since the state or corporation could later argue that the 
circumstances of the prior case had been altered by intervening develop-
ments.92 
87!J. It should be noted that these discussions related to the statutory "materially af-
fecting" test. 
91 Id. at 1719 n.12, 290 N.E.2d at 5!J!J n.12. 
92 These considerations raise doubts as to the constitutionality of the "materially 
affecting" test, which is still embodied in G.L c. 55, §7. Statutes limiting First Amend-
ment rights must be clearly drawn to prevent allowed speech from being chilled by 
the apprehension of prosecution. United States v. CIO, !J!J5 U.S. 106, 141-42 (1948) (con~ 
curring opinion). 
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The problems in applying a "materially affecting" test are formidable. 
The Supreme Judicial Court would be well advised not to adopt it if 
there is any viable alternative. Rather, the court should view the use of 
the test in the Chief Justice's opinion as merely a convenient means of 
limiting the holding in First National Bank. 
CoNcLUSION 
Justice Quirico, in applying the maxim that statutes are to be inter-
preted in such a manner that they will not be unconstjtutional, crossed 
over the line between saving a statute and frustrating legislative intent 
because of mere suspicions of a statute's constitutionality. In so doing he 
invalidated an act of the legislature without a full decision on its con-
stitutionality. 
Chief Justice Tauro found that the "liberty" of corporate "persons" 
was protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and that therefore corporate speech was protected from abridgement by 
the Commonwealth. He justified his opinion by referri~g to the right of 
the people to be informed on referendum issues. Despite the Chief 
Justice's reliance on a right of corporations themselves to speak, the 
exact holdings of the precedents which he cites and his own justification 
for his decision indicate that corporate speech is protected to ensure the 
people's right to be informed rather than any inherent right of corpora-
tions to speak. 
Because the Chief Justice conceptualized the issue in terms of an in-
herent right of corporate "persons" to speak rather than. the right of the 
people to be informed, he assumed that a complete prohibition on 
corporate speech would impose impermissible restrictions on the dis-
semination of the corporate point of view. In doing so he failed to discuss 
adequately the question of whether corporations themselves need to 
speak in order that the people be informed of their views on referendum 
issues which affect them. 
JAMES ANTHONY FRIEDEN 
§ 14.4. Obscenity revisited: Recent Supreme Court decisions. Ever 
since the first recorded obscenity decision in America came down in 
1821,1 the standards promulgated by the courts to de~ermine what is 
obscene have changed considerably with the times. The United States 
Supreme Court's 1973 obscenity decisions2 are the products of a long and 
§14.4. 1 This first decision was a Massachusetts case brought against the book later 
to be known as "Fanny Hill." D. Gillmor Be J. Barron, Mass Communication Law 315 
(1969). 
2 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (197!1): Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 41!1 U.S. 
49 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 1!19 (197!1); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 
41!1 U.S.l2!1 (1973). 
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tortured evolution. In order fully to understand and appreciate the 
nature of the changes in the law of obscenity wrought by these decisions, 
it will be helpful first to examine briefly the more modern line of cases 
in this area beginning with the 1957 landmark decision of Roth v. 
United States.8 
In Roth the Supreme Court held that obscenity is not protected by the 
First Amendment because it does not contain ideas of social importance." 
The Court held that all ideas having even slight social importance have 
the full protection of the First Amendment unless they encroach upon 
the limited areas of more important interests.5 The Roth Court also 
stated that "[s]ex and obscenity are not synonymous"6 and that "(o]b-
scene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to 
prurient interest."7 The test of obscenity, sa:id the Court, was "whether 
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the 
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient 
interest."& It is important to note, however, that the Court in Roth 
never defined the term "prurient interest." Later, in 1964, the Court in 
]acobellis v. Ohio,9 after reiterating its belie£ that obscenity is not en-
titled to First Amendment protection because it is " 'utterly' without 
social importance,"10 held that the contemporary community standards 
of the Roth test were those of the "national community."l1 In so holding, 
the Court reasoned that although communities vary in many respects 
other than their tolerance of alleged obscenity, such variances have 
never been considered to require or justify a varying standard for ap-
plication of the Federal Constitution.12 It is natural, said the Court, to 
use national contemporary community standards to determine what is 
obscene, for "[i]t is, after all, a national Constitution we are expound-
ing."18 
In 1966 the Supreme Court, due to confusion in the state and lower 
federal courts over the proper interpretation of the Roth test, again had 
occasion to clarify its definition of obscenity. In Memoirs v. Massachu-
setts,H the Court overturned a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court which had held that a book need not be "unqualifiedly 
worthless" before it can be deemed obscene and that a work may be 
8 354 u.s. 476 (1957). 
4 Id. at 484. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 487. 
7 Id. 
s Id. at 489. 
9 378 u.s. 184 (1964). 
10 Id. at 191. 
11 Id. at 195. 
12 Id. at 194. 
18 Id. at 195. 
14 383 u.s. 413 (1966). 
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considered obscene if it lacks "social importanoe."i11 The Supreme 
Court held this to be error and stated that "[a] boo~ cannot be pro-
scribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeemi~g social value."18 
The Court incorporated this standard into a new thre~ point test under 
which a work could be classified as obscene: ' · 
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to 
a prurient interest in sex; 1 
(b) the material is patently offensive because it alironts contem-
porary community standards relating to the descri.,tion or repre-
sentation . of sexual matters; and ' 
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social' value,17 
In Ginzburg v. United States,18 also decided in 1966, the Supreme 
Court held that the manner in which a purveyor of a ~ook or magazine 
displays his work is also an element to be considered in ascertaining 
whether that work is obscene. "Where the. purveyor's sqle emphasis is on 
the sexually provocative aspects of his publications," 1 said the Court, 
''that fact may be decisive in the determination of ob~cenity.''19 Under 
this view, where it is otherwise debatable whether a ~articular work is 
obscene, the fact of "pandering" in the merchandising 1 or dissemination 
of the work will tip the scales in favor of a finding of 1obscenity.2o 
In the interval between the Roth and Ginzburg ca~es, the Supreme 
Court failed to affirm a single obscenity conviction. It ~s for this reason 
that many saw Ginzburg as a frantic effort to re-balapce the scales in 
favor of the censors after a decade of tipping them in' favor of free ex-
pression.21 The Ginzburg decision introduced consiqerable confusion 
in the obscenity area, as did the other 1966 Supreme1 Court obscenity 
decisions, which produced fourteen separate opinions and numerous 
tests of obscenity.22 In fact, in none of these decisions, nor in any other 
111 Id. at 419. 
18 Id. (emphasis added). 
lT Id. at 418. -
18 58!1 u.s. 46!1 (1966). 
19 Id. at 470. 
20 "Pandering" was defined by the Ginzburg Court as "the business of purveying 
textual or graphic matter openly advertized to appeal to the ~tic interest of • • • 
customers." Id. at 467, citing Roth v. United States, !154 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957) (Warren, 
C.J ., concurring). 
21 D. Gillmor Be J. Barron, Mass Communication Law !127 (1969). 
22 Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas consistently maint;!.ined that govern-
ment is wholly powerless to regulate any sexually oriented mat~er on the ground 
of its obscenity •••• Mr. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, 1believed that the 
Federal Government in the exercise of its enumerated powers l:ould control the 
distribution of "hard core" pornography, while the States welre afforded more 
latitude to "[ban) any material which, taken as a whole, has been reasonably 
found in state judicial proceedings to treat sex in a fundal)lentally offensive 
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Supreme Court decision handed down after the Roth case, decided in 
1957, and up until Miller v. California/la decided in 1973, did any one 
test of obscenity receive the approval of a majority of the Court. As of 
1967 there was so much confusion and disagreement among the members 
of the Court that it adopted, in Redrup v. New York,2' the policy of 
issuing per curiam opinions in obscenity cases. 
In 1968, the Court in Ginzberg v. New York211 was called upon to de-
termine whether a state could proscribe the distribution to minors of 
materials that were admittedly suitable for adults.28 The Court answered 
this question in the affirmative, suggesting that different treatment for 
adults and minors was justified on the grounds that a legislature could 
rationally find certain material to be harmful to minors but not harmful 
to adults.2T Subsequent to such a finding, said the Court, the legislature 
could bar distribution of the material to minors as an aid to parents, 
who have the primary responsibility for their children's well-being.2B 
The power to do this, the Court stated, was derived from the state's 
manner, under rationally established criteria for judging such material." 
Mr. Justice Stewart regarded "hard rore" pornography as the limit of both 
federal and state power. 
Mr. Justice Clark believed that "social importance" rould only "be considered 
together with evidence that the material in question appeals to prurient interest 
and il patently offensive." ••• Similarly, Mr. Justice White regarded "a publication 
to be obscene if its predominant theme appeals to the prurient interest in a 
manner exceeding customary limits of candor •••• " 
Paril Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 41!1 U.S. 49, 80-82 (197!1) (Brennan, J., dilsenting). 
In addition to the above views, Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Fortas 
believed the government rould regulate obscenity by use of the Memoirs test if the 
standards used in the determination of obscenity were local rommunity standards. 
Mr. Justice Brennan agreed with the above view, except that he believed that national 
oommunity standards should be used in the determination of obscenity. 41!1 U.S. at 81. 
28 41!1 u.s. 15 (197!1). 
M !186 U.S. 767 (1967). 
211 !190 u.s. 629 (1968). 
28 Appellant Ginzberg was convicted under a New York statute, Law of March 12, 
1909, ch. 88, §484-h, [1909] N.Y. Penal Law !19 (repealed in 1967), which made it an 
offense to knowingly sell to a minor under 17: (a) any picture which depicts nudity, 
sexual ronduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors and (b) any 
magazine which contains such pictures and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to 
minors. The statute also stated that "harmful to minors" meant: 
that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, 
sexual oonduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it: (i) pre-
dominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and 
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult oommunity as a 
whole with respect to what is suitable for minors, and (iii) is utterly without 
redeeming social importance for minors. 
!190 U.S. at 645-46. 
27 Id. at 658. 
28 Id. at 6!19. 
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power to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of the com-
munity.t9 
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncements in the obscenity 
area are contained in an assemblage of cases decided on June 21, 1973,80 
and have been designed by the Court as a comprehensive alteration and 
restatement of the law of obscenity. One of the Court's obvious purposes 
in rendering these decisions was to eliminate the confusion in this area 
and to create a standard which a majority of the Court could approve 
and adopt. While the Court succeeded in formulating such a standard, 
it is questionable whether in redefining the law the Court has removed 
the confusion. This article will attempt to explain the latest Supreme 
Court decisions and will seek to analyze them to determine how they 
have changed the law, whether they have clarified the law, and whether 
they introduce new uncertainties. 
I. HoLDINGs oF MILLER v. CALIFORNIA AND CoMPANION CASES 
A. Miller v. California 
In Miller v. California,81 the defendant, who had mailed sexually 
explicit material to adults who had not solicited it, wa$ tried in a state 
court for violation of a statute which made it a Inisdemeanor to know-
ingly distribute obscene matter. The test utilized by the trial court to 
determine whether the material in question was obscene was virtually 
identical to the Memoirs test of obscenity. The judge instructed the jury, 
however, that when applying this test it should use ~e contemporary 
community standards of the state of California and not those of the 
nation. The defendant's conviction was affirmed on appeal. On appeal 
to the United States Supreme Court, the Court reaffi.$ed its position 
that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment and 
stated: 
[T]he States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemina-
tion or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemina-
tion carries with it a significant danger of offending tlb.e sensibilities 
of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.82 · 
The Court also recognized, however, the inherent consti~utional dangers 
involved in an attempt to regulate any form of expresSion. It declared 
that obscenity statutes must be carefully limited, and it confined the 
29 Id. at 6!!6, citing Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y. 2d 71, 75, 218 N.E.2d 668, 
671, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947 952 (1966). 
80 See note 2 supra. 
81 41!! u.s. 15 (197!!). 
82 Id. at 18-19. 
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permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe 
sexual conduct.8B Moreover, "[t]hat conduct must be specifically defined 
by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed."34 
The new test of obscenity adopted by a majority of the Court is: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary oom-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest . . . 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive 
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.s11 
In creating this new standard, the Court in Miller altered the 
Memoirs test in three important respects. First,· the Court held that the 
"contemporary community standards" to be applied were not those of 
the nation but those of the "community"-a term which it never defined. 
Secondly, the new test also renders the "utterly without redeeming social 
33 Id. at 24. Prior to Miller, the permissible scope of proscription extended to the 
description or representation of sexual matters. The term "sexual matters" includes in 
its definition pictures and descriptions of naked bodies in which no conduct is 
depicted or described. This type of activity, a major source of pornographic effort 
in the past, is now viewed by the Court as protected by the First Amendment, and 
thereby free from state regulation. 
84 Id. The dissenters in Paris believe that this requirement invalidates the obscenity 
statutes of every state except Oregon, which revised its statute to prohibit only the 
distribution of obscene materials to juveniles and unconsenting adults. 413 U.S. 49, 95 
n.l3 (Brennan, J. dissenting). The majority in Miller, however, does not require that 
the statute on its face specifically define proscribed conduct, but permits a statute 
which simply prohibits "that which is obscene" to be construed by a court as limiting 
the permissible scope of proscription to the description of specified types of sexual 
conduct. In this way state courts can prevent such statutes from being declared 
unconstitutional. In fact, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts purported to do just 
this in Commonwealth v. Chafiin, 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 475, 298 N.E.2d 888, 
a case decided subsequent to Miller. The court upheld a conviction for violating G.L. 
c. 272, §28A, which prohibits the sale of anything "which is obscene." While the 
statute on its face is not sufficiently definite to pass constitutional muster, the court 
noted that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has traditionally construed this 
statute in the light of the definitions of obscenity employed in Roth and subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions, and upheld the statute on that ground. The Court did not, 
however, specifically state that it would henceforth read into the Massachusetts 
obscenity statute the examples given in Miller of conduct which a state could consti-
tutionally proscribe. See note 102 infra. The court apparently did not feel it necessary 
to do so since the case before it invalidated a conviction rendered prior to the Miller 
decision and was therefore governed by the standards laid down in Roth and Memoirs. 
It would seem, however, that for future convictions to be upheld, the Massachusetts 
courts will have to incorporate into the obscenity statute the examples set forth in 
the examples in Miller. See Literature v. Quinn, 482 F.2d 372 (1st Cir. 1973). 
86 413 U.S. at 24. 
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value" test of Memoirs obsolete since it only requires the state to prove 
that the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value.86 The reason for this change, said tihe Court, is that 
when the prosecution is forced to prove that work i$ utterly without 
redeeming social value it must prove a negative, and that this is a 
burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards 
of proo£.87 It should be noted, however, that the Miller "serious value" 
test also requires the prosecution to prove a negative--namely, that the 
work is without serious value. It may therefore be qu~stioned whether 
the new test substantially lightens the prosecution's burden of proof. 
Thirdly, the Court held that only those who sell or expose obscene ma-
terials depicting "hard-core" sexual conduct specifically defined by state 
statute as written or authoritatively construed can be constitutionally 
subjected to criminal prosecution.88 This prerequisite is necessary, the 
Court found, to provide one who deals in such materials with fair 
notice that his activities may result in prosecution.89 As an aid to the 
states, the Court listed the following as examples of what a state statute 
_could define for regulation: 
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate 
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. 
(b) Patently offensive representations or description$ of masturba-
tion, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.4o 
B. Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton 
In Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton,41 the State of Georgia had filed civil 
complaints in state court to enjoin a theater owner from exhibiting to 
the public films that were allegedly obscene and in violation of a Georgia 
criminal statute.42 The theaters in which the films were exhibited did not 
86 Id. The "serious value" test, by definition, assumes that works which contain 
some value can nevertheless be termed obscene and therefore be proscribed. The 
view that this impinges upon the protection given to free speech by the First Amend-
ment was summarized by Justice Brennan in his Paris dissent: 
That result is not merely inoonsistent with our holding in Roth;: it is nothing less 
than a rejection of the fundamental First Amendment premi$es and rationale 
of the Roth opinion and an invitation to widespread supprelssion of sexually 
oriented speech. Before today, the protections of the First Amen~ent have never 
been thought limited to expressions of serious literary or political value. 
4U U.S. at 97. 
87 Id. at 22. 
88 Id. at Z'/. 
89 Id. 
40 ld; at 25. 
41 4U U.S. 49 (1978). 
42 Id. at 51. The statute, Geo. Code Ann. §26-2101 (1972), defines obscenity as 
follows: 
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display pictures at their entrance, but had signs which advertised that 
they exhibited "Atlanta's Finest Mature Feature Films." On the door 
of the theaters involved was a sign stating: "Adult Theatre-You must 
be 21 and able to prove it. If viewing the nude body offends you, Please 
Do Not Enter." 
The trial judge, after viewing the films and assuming that obscenity 
was established, dismissed the complaint, stating: 
It appears to the Court that the display of these films in a com-
mercial theatre, when surrounded by requisite notice to the public 
of their nature and by reasonable protection against the exposure 
of these films to minors, is constitutionally permissible. 48 
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed on the ground that "the sale and 
delivery of obscene material to willing adults is not protected under the 
first amendment."44 
The United States Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, affirmed 
the state supreme court's decision with this language: 
[T]here are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide 
of commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible to enforce 
effective safeguards against exposure to juveniles and to passersby . 
. . . These include the interest of the public in the quality of life and 
the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the 
great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itsel£.45 
The Court also stated that there is an arguable correlation between 
obscene material ~nd crime, that the state of Georgia may assume that 
such a correlation exists, and that it may consequently prohibit such 
material to protect "the social interest in order and morality."46 It 
pointed out that judges and legislators have always acted upon un-
(b) Material is obscene if considered as a whole, applying community standards, 
its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid in-
terest in nudity, sex or excretion, and utterly without redeeming social value 
and if, in addition, it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in 
describing or representing such matters .•.. 
4S 413 U.S. at 53. 
44 Id. 
411 Id. at 57-58. 
46 Id. at 61. This statement appears to be inconsistent with what the Court said 
in Stanley v. Georgia, !194 U.S. 557 (1969), in which it stated: 
Georgia asserts that exposure to obscene materials . may lead to deviant sexual 
behavior or crimes of sexual violence. There appears to be little empirical basis 
for that assertion .••• Given the present state of knowledge, the State may no 
more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead 
to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the 
ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits. 
ld. at 566-67. 
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provable assumptions and that "[s]uch assumptions un<J4rlie much lawful 
state regulation of commercial and business affairs."4T . 
In addressing itself to the right of privacy argumen~ propounded by 
the petitioner, the Court declared that "[n]othing .. 
1
• in this Court's 
decisions intimates that there is any 'fundamental' privaty right 'implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty' to watch obscene mqvies in places of 
public accommodation."4B In so holding, the Court dePined to extend 
the rule previously enunciated in Stanley v. Georgia49 that a person may, 
within the privacy of his home, lawfully possess obs~ne materials.C10 
The Court in Paris went on to add that it was not et!ror for the trial 
court to fail to require expert affirmative evidence thlat the materials 
were obscene when the materials themselves were actually placed in 
evidence. Obviously, said the. Court, the films "are the . best evidence of 
what they represent."lil 
C. United States v. Orito 
In United States v. Orito,u the defendant was prosecuted in federal 
district court for violating a federal statute prohibiting the transporta-
tion of lewd, lascivious and filthy materials in inters-ate commerce.lis 
Defendant contended that since Stanley v. Georgia estall>lished the right 
to possess obscene material in the privacy of the home, i it followed that 
a person may transport such material in the privacy of. his automobile. 
The defendant argued that the statute was unconstituti~nally overbroad 
since it prohibited the transportation of obscene mateqal by private as 
well as by public carrier. The court rejected this argumept and held that 
the zone of privacy protected under Stanley does not extend beyond the 
home, nor does it imply any correlative right to transport obscene ma-
terial to the home in interstate commerce.114 
In addition to rejecting the defendant's right to pr~vacy argument, 
the Court stressed 
4T 413 U.S. at 61. 
411 Id. at 66. 
49 894 u.s. 557 (1969). 
110 Id. at 564. 
Ill 418 U.S. at 56. 
112 418 u.s. 139 (1978). 
118 The statute, IS U.S.C. §1462 (1970), provides: , 
Whoever brings into the United States, or any place subject tq the jurisdiction 
thereof, or knowingly uses any express company or other comPI.on carrier, for 
carriage fn interstate or foreign commerce- , 
(a) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, [picture, motion-
picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indec~t character ••• 
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both •••• 
114 413 U.S. at 141-42. 
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the well-settled principle that Congress may impose relevant con-
ditions and requirements on those who use the channels of interstate 
commerce in order that those channels will not become the means 
of promoting or spreading evil, whether of a physical, moral or 
economic nature.llll 
D. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels 
In United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels,11o a forfeiture action was brought 
by the United States in federal district court under a federal statute 
which prohibited the importation of obscene material and which pro-
vided that such material was subject to seizure and forfeiture.57 On 
direct appeal from the district court's finding that the statute was overly 
broad and an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, the Supreme Court 
held that the government could constitutionally prohibit the importation 
of obscene material even though it is intended for purely private use.11s 
It further added that the right to possess obscene material in the privacy 
of one's home does not afford a similar right to acquire, sell or import 
such material.59 In reversing the district court, the Court also recognized 
"the plenary power of Congress to regulate imports"60 and "the com-
plete power of Congress over foreign commerce."61 
III. THE UsE oF CoMMUNITY STANDARDS 
A. What is the "Community'"! 
In Miller the Court declared that in judging whether or not certain 
material is obscene, local "community" standards would henceforth be 
used rather than the "national" standard previously required. However, 
the Court never specifically defined the meaning of "community." While 
the Court did allow California to define community as the entire state, 
it did not say that this was the only permissible definition. It can be 
argued that under Miller the states are free to define community as the 
entire state, a county of the state, a city within the state, or even a 
neighborhood within a city. Until the Supreme Court expressly declares 
1111 Id. at 144. 
56 413 u.s. 12!1 (197!1). 
117 Id. at 124. The statute, 19 U.S.C. §1305 (1970), provides that: "[a]ll persons are 
prohibited from importing into the United States from any foreign country ••• any 
obscene book, pamphlet, paper, writing . • • or other article which is obscene or 
immoral •••. " 
118 Id. at 128. 
119 Id. 
oo Id. at 126. 
61 Id. 
72
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/17
578 ·1973 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §14.4 
that the community may be a geographical area smaller than the state, 
this question will remain in doubt. Even assuming that an area smaller 
than the state can be considered a community, the question remains as to 
who has the power to define the community in each state: the legislature, 
the highest court of the state, or both? 
B. Effect upon Interstate Commerce 
Individual Supreme Court justices have in the past m~de the argument 
that interstate commerce in books, movies, magazines and other materials 
would be inhibited by the use of community rather than national 
standards. In ]acobellis v. Ohio,62 Justices Brennan and Goldberg ex-
pressed their belief that application of community standards would run 
the risk of preventing dissemination of materials in son:te places because 
sellers would be unwilling to risk criminal prosecution !by testing varia-
tions from place to place.63 The Miller Court discounted this argument 
with the assertion that: 
The use of "national" standards, however, necessariliY implies that 
materials found tolerable in some places, but not 4nder the "na--
tional" criteria, will nevertheless be unavailable where they are 
acceptable. Thus, in terms of danger to free expression, the potential 
for suppression seems at least as great in the application of a single 
nationwide standard as in allowing distribution in accordance with 
local tastes. 64 
This argument is based on the premise that under a n:ational standard 
materials found tolerable in some places will not be available there. In all 
likelihood, however, if books, movies, and magazines are acceptable in 
a community, sellers and distributors of these materials will not be 
prosecuted. If this is the case, these materials will gen~lly be available 
where acceptable even though they are not acceptable under national 
criteria. 
If "community" is defined as the entire state, it is quite possible that 
interstate commerce in books, movies, magazines and similar material 
will be substantially and adversely affected by the Co~rt's holding in 
Orito that the federal government has the power to pitohibit interstate 
commerce in obscenity. In this regard, the following possibilities may be 
considered: first, the transportation of materials from a state in which 
they have been declared not to be obscene to a state in which they have 
be~n found obscene or in which no judicial determination has yet been 
made as to their obscenity, and second, the transporta~ion of materials 
62 !178 u.s. 184 (1964). 
63 Id. at 194. 
64 413 U.S. at S2 n.l!J. 
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from a state that has declared them to be obscene to a state that has 
found them to be acceptable or which has not yet determined whether 
they are acceptable or not. Does either act constitute the transportation 
of obscene material in interstate commerce? The threshold question 
which must first be answered is whether the material must be judicially 
declared obscene in both the sending and the receiving states before the 
transporter can be convicted of knowingly transporting obscene material 
in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1462.811 No precedent 
provides an answer to thfs question. · 
If the Court upholds a conviction upon a finding that the material is 
obscene in only the sending state, this may greatly inhibit interstate 
commerce in the following manner: if a nationwide publisher or dis-
tributor of books, movies or magazines were located in Massachusetts, he 
would be precluded from distributing to the other forty-nine states any 
work held to be obscene by the Massachusetts courts, even if the material 
was constitutionally protected in every other state. Conversely, if the 
Court upholds convictions under the statute when the transported ma-
terial has been declared obscene in only the receiving state, interstate 
commerce in these materials will be greatly burdened when a publisher 
or distributer wishes to transport material between two states where it 
is acceptable and all or most of the states between them have declared 
the material to be obscene. The only possible way for the publisher to 
avoid prosecution in such a case would be for him to transport the 
materials by air, a requirement that would certainly burden interstate 
commerce in these materials, if not eliminate it entirely. 
After a consideradon of the above examples, a sound argument can be 
made that if the cOmmunity standards of a given state through which 
materials pass are particularly stringent as compared to those of other 
states where the materials either originate or are destined, application of 
that state's obscenity statutes will substantially and unreasonably affect 
interstate commerce in books, films and other related material and there-
fore must be considered unconstitutional." It is doubtful, however, that 
the Supreme Court would be amenable to such an argument and more 
probable that it would consider the state statute merely an indirect in-
trusion into the area of interstate commerce and a valid exercise of the 
state's police power. An insight into the Court's thinking on this issue 
may be gleaned from its statement in Miller that: 
811 See note 52 supra. 
88 U inte111tate oommerce is substantially and unreasonably affected in any of the 
above situations, the state statutes involved must be considered unoonstitutional. See, 
e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., !J97. U.S. l!J7 (1970); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 
!J25 U.S. 761 (1945). If such state regulation were found merely to have an indirect or 
incidental effect upon intelltate oommerce, however, the states could oontinue to 
regulate it. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Board, !J74 U.S. 424 (196!J); Huron Portland 
Cement Co. v. Detroit, !162 U.S. 440 (1960); Breard v. Alexandria, Ml U.S. 622 (1951). 
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Obscene material may be validly regulated by a Statel in the exercise 
of its traditional local power to protect the gener~ welfare of its 
population despite some possible incidental effect on ~e flow of such 
materials across state lines.e7 ' 
Perhaps the Court in making this statement simply neg1ected to consider 
the possibility that the effect on interstate commerce of~ state's obscenity 
statutes might prove to be substantial and adverse rather than merely 
incidental. What is more likely, however, is that the Court did consider 
the question and that its statement must be viewed as ~n indication that 
it will not be disposed in the future to see the effect a$ substantial. 
C. The Need for Expert Witnesses ~ 
I 
The Court's holding in Paris Adult Theatre that th~' e is no constitu-
tional requirement for expert testimony in obscenity aseses has raised 
questions concerning the application of the communi y standards test. 
If community standards are considered to be those of! the entire state, 
Massachusetts for instance, how is a jury comprised enti~ely of Bostonians 
to know whether the material in question appeals to 1 the prurient in-
terest, is patently offensive and lacks serious value a(s judged by the 
standards of people from Springfield, Pittsfield or Wqrcester? In what 
way other than expert testimony will the Boston jtni be informed of 
statewide standards? If the Boston jury is.not so info?Died how can it be 
said that a statewide standard is being applied? Whi~:Jn argument can 
be made that in some states the standard would noti vary from com-
munity to community, this would not necessarily be ~in many of the 
states, especially those having both rural and urban areas. And even 
urban (or rural) areas may differ within a state. It ca ot be said, for 
instance, that a Los Angeles jury and a San Diego ~· could always 
agree that a particular book or movie is obscene. Fail to offer expert 
testimony on statewide community standards permits juror to apply 
only the standard of the area in which he resides, or , rse yet, his own 
personal standard, i.e .• whether he as an individuallik~s or dislikes the 
particular book, movie or magazine. 
D. Are Community Standards to Be- Applied to A~l Three Parts 
of the Miller Test1 
Although the Court substituted community standards for national 
standards in the test it formulated in Miller. it ~s arguable that 
67 41!1 U.S. at lJ2·85 n.llJ. 
68 Id.at56. 
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community standards are to be applied only to part (a)69 of that test 
since it is only in that part that they are mentioned, and the questions 
raised in parts (b)70 and (c)71 can be answered without reference to 
community standards. A counterargument would be that since the na-
tional standards utilized by the Court in Roth and Memoirs were held 
to apply to all three parts of their tests of obscenity even though they 
were not mentioned in each part, the community standards of Miller 
would likewise apply to all three parts of that test. This counterargu-
ment is further supported by the Court's statement in Miller that "we 
... hold that obscenity is to be determined by applying 'contemporary 
community standards' .... "72 Since the term "obscenity" refers to the 
result reached after an application of all three parts of the Miller test, a 
logical conclusion would be that "community standards" apply to all 
three parts. 
Irrespective of the persuasiveness of the above arguments, it is ques-
tionable whether local community standards should be used in determin-
ing whether material has "serious ... value" under the part (c) test. The 
Court appeared to recognize this when it stated: "The First Amendment 
protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value, regardless of whether the government or a 
majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent."73 
The italicized language seems to imply that a work cannot be found to 
lack serious value through the application of local community standards, 
and that, therefore, national standards must be utilized. An argument in 
support of this view would develop as follows: Although certain material 
may be considered obscene in Massachusetts because it appeals to the 
prurient interest of Massachusetts citizens and is patently offensive to 
them, the same work might not affect the citizens of Virginia in the 
same way and would therefore not be obscene in Virginia. However, it 
would be illogical to assert that the same work can have serious value in 
one state and lack such value in another state. Serious value is a term of 
art which should not vary from state to state; it is for this reason that the 
Court declared that once serious value is shown to exist, the First 
Amendment protects a work from proscription regardless of whether or 
not the government or a majority of the people (the "community/') 
approve of the ideas it expresses. 
69 Part (a) of the Miller test is "whether 'the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest • • • ." Id. at 24. 
70 Part (b) of the Miller test is "whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law 
.... " Id. at 24. 
71 Part (c) of the Miller test is "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24. 
72 Id. at 86-!17. 
73 Id. at !14 (emphasis added). 
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A contrary argument can be formulated in the follo~ng manner: if a 
given work appeals to the prurient interest of and is patently offensive 
to Massachusetts citizens, then, at least as to them, it can be said to laclt 
serious value. If the same work, however, does not appe~· 1 to the prurient 
interest of citizens of Virginia and is not patently offens veto them, then 
at least for them, there is nothing to prevent it fro having serious 
value. The fallacy in this argument, however, is that it ~ould render the 
serious value test unnecessary because it would permit! a finding of ob-
scenity solely upon a determination of whether or not tfle particular ma-
terial appeals to prurient interest and is patently oalensive. It would 
render the requirement, separately stated in Miller, that the material be 
found to be without serious value, redundant and supbiluous. To pre-
vent such a result-a result which the Court could notlhave intended-
a national standard should be used in applying the seqous value test. 
E. Effect upon Federal Statutes 
If, as the Court states in Miller, the use of national i standards is "an 
exercise in futility"" and "unrealistic,"TII and if the sta~dards themselves 
are "hypothetical and unascertainable,"TI will the C~urt nevertheless 
mandate that national standards still be utilized in fe<leral cases? If so, 
and if a federal jury composed exclusively of Bostoni~ns will continue 
to use them, why is it that the same jury cannot use th~ very standards 
in state court proceedings? It appears that the Court! has a choice to 
make: either national standards are acceptable in all qbscenity cases in 
both state and federal courts, or they are acceptable in! none and there-
fore should be replaced by local community standards. 1 
If federal juries are henceforth to utilize the standar~s of the state in 
which the federal district court sits, the problem descJibed above will 
not occur. However,.another problem may arise. If ea~ federal jury, for 
instance, uses the community standards of the state in which it sits to 
determine whether.or not the federal statute which proijibits the mailing 
of obscene materialTT has been violated, the statute wi~l not be applied 
uniformly since fifty or more separate standards will ~ utilized. Under 
such a system, if a person mailed identical material iq both Massachu-
setts and Connecticut, he might be convicted of mailing~obscene material 
in one of these stat(:S and acquitted in the other. If the efendant haa in 
fact mailed the material, the difference in result would attributable to 
the application of two different standards to determ ne whether the 
material was obscene. It is inconceivable that Congress · tended, or even 
T-i ld. at liO. 
Til ld. 
T8 ld. at !11. 
TT 18 U.S.C. §1461 (1970). 
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contemplated, that the place of mailing would determine whether the 
statute was violated. 
These and other considerations prompted the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit, in United States v. One Reel of Film'l8 
and United States v. Palladino,79 to mandate that in First Circuit pro-
secutions under the federal statute prohibiting the mailing of obscene 
materials,8° national rather than community standards would be ap-
plied.81 The court felt free to do so because it noted that while the 
Supreme Court in Miller "made it clear that the elements of obscenity 
which it spelled out for states also applied to federal statutes ..• [it] 
stopped short of applying to federal statutes its holding as to community 
standards in evaluating those elements.''82 In addition to noting that the 
use of national standards would avoid "serious constitutional probleins 
of due process and equal protection,"83 the court also stated that the 
use of local coJ.DIIlunity standards 
would open the possibility of senders of identical materials from 
the same state to be found guilty or not, depending on the course 
of transit or state of delivery of their materials. The vice of selective 
prosecution would also be present, as well as the anomalous situa-
tion of having prosecution under a natioJ!al law depend upon the 
laws of the least permissive states. None of these eventualities 
would promote the uniform application normally attributed to_ 
federallegislation.84 
The court went on to say that even though the concept of national 
standards is elusive and will be marred by serious dispute, "the effort to 
identify a national standard of tolerance would seem to differ only in 
degree from the effort, upheld in Miller, to identify a state-wide standard 
in such a large, populous, and variegated state as California.''85 
F. Effect upon Appellate Review 
The Court in Miller said that under its new test of obscenity it is still 
possible for appellate courts to conduct an independent review of con-
'18 481 F.2d 206, 208 (1st Cir. 1975). 
'19 United States v. Palladino, Civil No. 72-1005 (1st Cir., filed Jan. 7, 1974). The 
original case was United States v. Palladino, 475 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1975), and was 
reheard in light of Miller, Paris, Orito, and Reels 
80 18 u.s.c. §1461 (1970). 
81 United States v. Palladino, Civil No. 72-1005 at 6. 
82 Id. at 5. 
83 Id. at 6-7. 
84 Id. at 7. 
811 Id. at 8. 
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stitutional claims when necessary.so To accomplish this when community 
standards are used, state and federal courts must be able to determine 
what a state's community standards are before they' can conduct an 
independent review to determine whether or not they have been properly 
applied. Federal appellate courts might have to ascertMn the standards 
of the several states within their jurisdictions, and the Supreme Court 
might have to familiarize itself with the different standards of all fifty 
states. This number will be greatly increased if the "community" in 
some or all of the states is held to consist of numerous geographical areas 
within a given state. The difficult question that must be answered is 
whether these courts will be able to conduct an independent review of a 
community standard that may not be enunciated in the trial record. 
Since expert testimony on what the community standard actually is in 
each state is no longer required in obscenity cases, it is d~fficult to see how 
an appellate court can independently review an obscenity case to de-
termine whether that standard was properly applied without having 
the standard before it. 
III. PROBLEMS OF VAGUENESS 
A. Use of the terms "Prurient Interest" and "Patently Offensive" 
to define "Obscenity" 
In Miller the Court listed what it termed "a few plain examples" of 
the conduct state statutes could proscribe. They were: "(a) Patently 
offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate selual acts, normal 
or perverted, actual or simulated," and "(b) Patently offbsive representa-
tions or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd 
exhibition of the genitals.''87 The question raised herein is whether 
these examples are any more definite and certain than the requirements 
for obscenity mandated by the Memoirs test. Are these examples of con-
duct specifically defined? What constitutes an "ultimate sexual act," and 
when does an exhibition of the genitals become lewd?88 Is "patently of-
fensive" a specific term? Does it convey the same meaning to most 
people? . 
Terms such as "patently offensive" and "prurient in~erest" are vague, 
ambiguous terms that are utilized because neither court$ nor legislatures 
have been able to define precisely the term obscenity. the fact that the 
Supreme Court resorted to the use of such terms indicates that they can-
not define what has been deemed "indefinable" by one member of the 
88 41!1 u.s. at 25. 
87 Id. 
ss For a discussion of this problem, see Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 49, 
99 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Court.89 These terms clearly do not -distinguish between protected and 
unprotected speech in any comprehensible manner. The Paris dissenters 
agreed with Chief Justice Warren's statement in United States v. Har-
riss90 that "[t]he constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated 
by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence 
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.''91 
They also noted a previous statement by the Court that 
stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied 
to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man 
may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dis-
semination of ideas may be the loser.92 
It may be questioned whether the Court's holdings in Miller, Paris, 
Orito and 12 200-Ft. Reels violate these principles. 
It appears that the five justices who joined in the majority opinions in 
these cases believe that the terms "patently offensive" and "prurient in-
terest" do define what is obscene with sufficient precision and provide 
adequate notice of what conduct is forbidden, since in United States v. 
12 200-Ft. Reels they reviewed a federal statute which prohibited the 
importation of articles which were "obscene" or "immoral"98 and held: 
If and when such a "serious doubt" is raised as to the vagueness of 
the words "obscene," "lewd," "lascivious," "filthy," "indecent," or 
"immoral" as used to describe regulated material in 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1805 (a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1462 ... we are prepared to construe such 
terms as limiting regulated material to patently offensive representa-
tions or descriptions of that specific "hardcore" sexual conduct given 
as examples in Miller v. California .•.. 94 
In so stating, the Court in effect has made the terms "obscene," "lewd," 
"lascivious," "filthy," "indecent," and "immoral" synonymous with 
89 Jacobellis v. Ohio, !178 U.S. 184:, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
90 M7 U.S. 612 (1954). 
91 Id. at 617. 
92 Smith v. California, !161 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). The dissenters' agreement with this 
statement appears to be inconsistent with their intimation that it may be permissible 
for the state to protect children and unconsenting adults by prohibiting the sale or 
exposure of obscene material to them. They justify this difference in treatment with 
the rationale that the state interest in protecting children and unconsenting adults 
stands on a different footing from the state interest presented when only consenting 
adults are involved. 41!1 U.S. 49, 106 (Brennan, J., dissenting). If, as they have said, 
"the concept of 'obscenity' cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to 
provide fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually oriented materials 
••• ," id. at 10!1, then how can a state statute which purports to do just that be 
deemed constitutional if addressed only to minors and unconsenting adults, but 
unconstitutional if applied to persons in general? 
98 19 u.s.c. §1!105 (1970). 
94 41!1 U.S. at 1!10 n.7. 
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"patently offensive." Can it be said that by defining the term "obscene" 
as "patently offensive" the Court has transformed a vague, ambiguous 
term into a meaningful definition of proscribed conduct which gives the 
average citizen adequate notice of what conduct is forbidden by an ob-
scenity statute? The majority apparently believed so since it said in 
Miller: 
Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to 
prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless 
these materials depict or describe patently offensive "hard core" 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as 
written or construed. We are satisfied that these specific prerequi-
sites will provide fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his 
public and commercial activities may bring prosecution.• 
B. The Use of Community Standards 
One of the reasons advanced by the Miller Court in support of its 
substitution of community standards for national standards was that 
"[t]he adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual ultimate factfinders 
in criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted triers of fact to draw 
on the standards of their community, guided always by limiting instruc-
tions on the law."96 However, when the Court allows jurors to determine 
whether the average person applying contemporary community stan-
dards would find that a work appeals to the prurient interest or is pa-
tently offensive, it is not limiting jurors to instructions on the law, but 
rather is inviting them to classify as obscene any work that they believe 
is in "bad taste" or is "dirty," or any work that they simply do not like. 
It does so by the use of vague, indefinite, subjective standards which do 
not have to be enunciated by the prosecution at trial, thereby making 
it impossible for an appellate court to determine whether they were 
properly applied. A juror instructed that he is to determine whether the 
average person applying contemporary community standards would 
find that certain material appeals to the prurient interest or is patently 
offensive, but given no expert testimony as to what the contemporary 
oommunity standards are at that time, will tend to think that he is an 
average person, that he knows what the community standards are, and 
that all he need do is determine whether or not the work appears to be 
obscene to him. To allow a juror to draw upon the standards of the 
community to determine whether crimes such as armed robbery, kid-
napping or rape were committed--crimes whose elements are relatively 
clear, and comprehensible to the average juror-is vastly different from 
911 Id. at 27. 
96 Id. at SO. 
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permitting that same juror to determine whether a work appeals to the 
prurient interest and is patently offensive. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit appears to be 
in accord with this view, for when it first heard United States v. Palla-
dino,91 it held that expert testimony was required in federal obscenity 
cases because 
Without some guidance from experts or otherwise, we find ourselves 
unable to apply the Roth standard with anything more definite or 
objective than our own personal standards of prudence and decency, 
standards which should not and cannot serve as a basis for either 
denying or granting first amendment protection to this or any other 
literature.9s 
The court was of the opinion that fundamental fairness, and therefore 
due process, required the assistance of expert witnesses and stated that 
if it were mistaken in this conclusion, it would reach the same result 
through the use of its supervisory powers because it believed that jurors 
are just as much in need of such assistance in wrestling with obscenity 
tests as they are in evaluating a defense based on insanity or other mental 
or emotional illness. 99 . 
Another reason advanced by t;Jte' Supreme Court in Miller for the 
substitution of community standaros for national standards is that 
"[w]hen triers of fact are asked to decide whether 'the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards' would consider certain 
materials 'prurient', it would be unrealistic to require that the answer be 
based on some abstract formulation."100 The question here is whether 
the formulation of "national" standards is any more abstract than that of 
"community" standards. In each instance the juror is required to base his 
findings on what an "average person" believes and not on his own per-
sonal opinions. It does not, it is submitted, matter a great deal whether 
that average person is taken from the nation as a whole or from 
the state in which the juror resides.1o1 
IV. PRoPOSED SoLUTIONS TO nm VAGUENESS PRoBLEM 
A. Introduction 
There are two aspects to the vagueness problem: first, an individual 
will often be uncertain as to whether or not certain contemplated action 
97 475 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 197!1). 
98 Id. at 74, citing United States v. Groner, 475 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir. 1972). 
99 475 F.2d at 7!1. 
100 41!1 U.S. at !10. 
101 Accord, United States v. One Reel of Film, 481 F.2d 206, 208 n.2 (1st Cir. 197!1); 
United States v. Palladino, Civil No. 72·1005 at 8 (1st Cir., Jan. 7, 1974). 
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will violate the applicable state obscenity statute, and second, assuming 
he knows that his acitons will violate the statute, he may not know 
whether or not the statute is constitutional. The second problem will to 
a large extent ultimately be resolved in the following manner: new state 
obscenity statutes patterned after the examples given by the Court in 
Miller102 may be presumed to be constitutional. This is necessarily so 
since the Court expressly stated that these examples would pass constitu-
tional muster.108 Existing state statutes which have not yet been changed, 
but which are construed by state courts as limiting state regulation to 
works which contain types of conduct given as examples in Miller, must 
be considered constitutional for the same. reason. The constitutionality 
of newly enacted legislation which is not precisely patterned after the 
examples in Miller will depend on how specifically the conduct it pro-
hibits is defined, and will remain in doubt until the Supreme Court 
decides the question. 
The first question-whether or not certain contemplated action 
violates the applicable state statute-is more difficult to resolve. Vague-
ness will not be cured by a statute specifically defining prohibited con-
duct, since the specific conduct cannot constitutionally be prohibited 
unless it is "patently offensive," and such determinations will frequently 
be the subject of considerable doubt. This section will briefly discuss and 
analyze a few proposed solutions to this particular aspect of the vague-
ness problem. 
B. Administrative Censorship 
To implement administrative censorship, a state would have to 
authorize the creation of a censorship agency. This procedure would 
also necessitate the passage of a state obscenity statute similar to the one 
given as an example in Miller.104 The state could then enact a statute 
providing criminal penalties for the display, sale, and transportation of 
certain materials before the censor had declared them not to be obscene, 
and a further law prohibiting the prosecution of an individual for 
violation of the obscenity statute prior to a finding by the agency that the 
material is obscene. However, if such statutes are enacted, the state is 
required by Freedman v. Maryland106 to place upon the censor the burden 
of proving that the material is unprotected expression, and to provide 
102 The examples given by the Court are: 
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal 
or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations or desaip-
tions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals. 
4l!J U.S. at 25. 
108 418 U.S. at 25. 
104 See note 102 supra. 
106 !180 u.s. 51 (1965). 
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for prompt judioial review of the censor's dedsions.tos Since this 
procedure would constitute prior restraint and would considerably en-
danger free expression, Freedman requires the censor to decide whether 
or not the material is obscene within a brief period that must be specified 
in the statute.107 The Court in Freedman held that without these safe-
guards a distributor or exhibitor may find it burdensome to seek review 
of the censor's determination and may instead elect to distribute or 
exhibit his materials elsewhere, thus depriving the locality of the 
materials.1os 
Under administrative censorship as described above, an exhibitor or 
purveyor of certain material would receive fair notice that his con-
templated conduct in exhibiting, selling or transporting that material is 
prohibited by the state criminal obscenity statute. However, while this 
system, as well as those that will be discussed in subsequent sections,109 
will not deprive an exhibitor or seller of liberty wtihout due process of 
law, an argument can be formulated that it will deprive certain in-
dividuals of property without due process of law. For instance, if it is 
granted that obscenity statutes cannot provide publishers or writers 
with sufficient notice that their contemplated conduct is prohibited 
before they begin to either publish or write a particular work, these in-
dividuals might invest substantial sums of money and a substantial 
amount of time in the creation of works only to be informed in subse-
quent administrative proceedings that their work violates the state ob-
scenity statute and cannot be exhibited, sold or transported. Arguably, 
such a system results in a denial of property-albeit not also a denial of 
liberty-without due process of law. From the publisher's viewpoint, a 
partial solution might be to send a draft of the particular work to the 
censor for a determination as to whether or not it is obscene before 
numerous copies are printed up for sale. While this practice would solve 
one aspect of the problem, it would not solve the problem of the poten-
tial loss by the publisher of an advance payment made by him to the 
writer for the exclusive rights to publish the work. Nor is there a 
readily apparent solution for the plight of the writer whose labor has 
already been invested in the work. 
The Court in Miller, however, has made it clear that it will not con-
sider this type of due process argument if the states pattern their ob-
scenity statutes after the examples given by the Court. Nevertheless, it 
does seem likely that whatever state obscenity statutes are enacted, or 
however existing statutes are construed by the courts, the writing or 
106 Id. at 58-59. 
101 Id. at 59. 
108 Id. 
1011 Subsequent sections discuss the feasibility of declaratory judgment actions, suits 
for injunction, public nuisance actions and in rem proceedings against the offending 
materiaL 
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publication of a novel or the production of a movie will necessarily be 
attended by some risk and uncertainty. The value of an administrative 
censorship program such as that outlined above is that it will limit this 
risk and uncertainty to the financial area and will prevent a situation 
from arising whereby an individual could face a jail sentence for con· 
duct which he could not know to be criminal at the time he acted. This 
would be a considerable improvement over the system as it presently 
operates in most states. 
C. Declaratory Judgment Action 
Another method of solving the vagueness problem would be the 
enactment of state statutes authorizing declaratory judgment actions to 
determine whether or not certain material is obscene.11o Such a statute 
could contain a provision that an individual bringing such an action 
could not be prosecuted under the state's criminal obscenity statutes 
until a final judgment was rendered, and then only if the material were 
found to be obscene and the individual persisted in selling, transporting 
or exhibiting it. The state could also be given the right to bring a de-
claratory judgment action, and the statute might provide ·that no 
criminal charges could be brought against a defendant until after he has 
dealt in materials previously declared to be obscene in either a declara-
tory judgment action or in some other non-criminal proceeding de-
signed to determine whether the materials are of a prohibited na~ure. 
It should be noted, however, that such a system would not eliminate all 
risks and uncertainties in the writing, publication or production of 
novels, movies and other related material. 
D. Suit for Injunction 
A similar solution would be for the state to enact a statute requiring 
state officials to sue for a civil injunction before prosecuting publishers, 
sellers or exhibitors under criminal statutes for dealing in allegedly ob-
scene material. The statute could provide that no one shall be prosecuted 
under the state's criminal obscenity statutes unless he deals in materials 
which have already been declared obscene in a civil injunction suit. The 
statute should further provide that an injunction prohibiting the sale 
110 The Supreme Court in Paris recognized that this type of proceeding is an 
excellent way to provide an individual with advance notice that the material in which 
he proposes to deal is prohibited by law. In discussing the Georgia practice of 
permitting state officials to bring civil suits to enjoin the exhibition of allegedly 
obscene material, the Court said: "This procedure would have even more merit if 
the exhibitor or purveyor could also test the issue of obscenity in a similar civil action, 
prior to any exposure to criminal penalty." 4lll U.S. at 55 n.4. 
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or exhibition of allegedly obscene material shall not be issued until after 
the material has been found obscene in an adversary proceeding in which 
the material has been viewed by a court. The statute could provide, how-
ever, for the ex parte issuance of a temporary injunction restraining the 
respondents from destroying the material or removing it from the court's 
jurisdi~tion. 
The civil injunction proceeding is a common practice in some states. 
In fact, it was the type of proceeding which was employed by the Georgia 
authorities in Paris and which the Supreme Court in that case described 
as a "procedure (which] provides an exhibitor or purveyor of materials 
the best possible notice, prior to any criminal indictments, as to whether 
the materials are unprotected by the First Amendment and subject to 
state regulation."111 It should be pointed out, however, that in Paris the 
Georgia authoritieS were permitted to bring a civil suit for injunction, 
but were not required to do so, prior to commencing criminal proceed-
ings. A preferable procedure from the standpoint of notice and fairness 
would be to require the bringing of such a suit or the commencement of 
some other civil proceeding-such as the declaratory judgment action 
mentioned above-prior to the initiation of any criminal action. 
E. Public Nuisance Action 
A solution similar to both the declaratory judgment action and the 
suit for injunction is the public nuisance action. A state could enact a 
statute which specifically provides that the sale or exhibition of obscene 
materials constitutes a nuisance, defines obscenity in the same terms 
used in the state criminal obscenity statute, and authorizes private in-
dividuals as well as the Attorney General to bring suits in equity to ob-
tain injunctions. The theory behind such an injunctive proceeding, of 
course, would be that an individual, by showing an obscene movie or by 
selling obscene books and magazines, is creating a nuisance which is 
injurious to the welfare and morals of the public. 
One virtue of a statute authorizing private individuals to bring public 
nuisance actions is that if a court determines that the sale or exhibition 
of the materials is a nuisance it can issue an injunction instead of a 
prison sentence. If the injunction is issued, the seller, publisher, distribu-
tor or exhibitor will be provided with excellent notice that his con-
templated conduct might violate the state criminal obscenity statute. 
Another advantage is that it permitS the man who believes he is harmed 
by obscenity to become a "private attorney general." The benefit to the 
state, in addition to providing its citizens with an opportunity to in-
fluence or even change their environment, is that the private citizen or 
citizen group will bear the expense of the suit. 
111 Id. at 55. 
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However, if the court finds that the materials are not obscene and 
therefore not a nuisance, the state could still bring criminal charges 
against the individual since such a prior adjudication would not be 
considered res judicata in a criminal proceeding.1111 The major defect in 
a nuisance action is that fair notice would not be provided to defendants 
that their contemplated conduct is prohibited. 
F. Massachusetts Procedure 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts already has the statutory 
authority to implement procedures similar to those mentioned above, at 
least in regard to the sale of books.11a The statute authorizes the At-
torney General, or any district attorney within his district, to bring an 
information or petition in equity in superior court directed against the 
book by name.114 H a justice of the superior court upon summary exam-
ination of the book finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that 
the book is obscene, indecent or impure, he may issue an order of notice, 
returnable in thirty days, addressed to all persons interested in the pub-
lication, sale, loan or distribution of the book, affording them the op-
portunity to show cause why the book should not be judicially declared 
obscene, indecent or impure.1111 Any person interested in the publication, 
sale, loan or distribution of the book may appear and file an answer and 
may claim a right to trial by jury on the issue of whether the book is 
obscene, indecent or impure.116 H this is done, the case is given a speedy 
hearing, but a "default and order" is first entered against those persons 
who did not appear and file an answer.m 
It should be noted that while the statute does not provide for a civil 
injunction nor afford persons interested in the sale of the book a 
chance to bring a similar action, it does provide to persons interested in 
the book fair notice that their contemplated conduct is forbidden by the 
112 The party claiming res judicata by reason of a prior adjudication must establish 
that the prior action was "(1) between the same parties; (2) concerned the same 
subject matter; and (ll) was decided adversely to the party seeking to Htigate the 
subject matter again." Fabrizio v. U.S. Suzuki Motor C'4rp., 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 15!11, 
289 N.E.2d 897,898. 
113 G.L. c. 272, §128C-F. It is unfortunate that this statute was last used over 
eight years ago against the book Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure. Telephone interview 
with Dennis M. Sullivan, Assistant Attorney General, in Boston, Oct. 2!1, 197!1. 
114 G.L c. 272 §28C. Although the statute is Hmited to proceedings against boob, 
there is no apparent reason for doing so, and the Legislature perhaps should expand 
it to include films, magazines and other Hke materials. 
1111 G.L c. 272, §28C. 
118 G.L c. 272, §28D. 
11'1 G.L c. 272, §28F. 
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state's obscenity statute. Like the civil injunction suit brought by the 
state authorities in Paris, this Massachusetts in rem procedure is author-
ized but not required. A preferable alternative would be to require the 
bringing of such an action, or a similar civil proceeding. prior to the 
commencement of criminal proceedings. 
RoNALD E. LAsKY 
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